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Abstract 
 In 1849, Kierkegaard praised Hamann’s dedication to written and spoken 
language as derived from the Divine Logos.  This thesis examines Hamann and 
Kierkegaard in order to understand both thinkers’ impact upon verbal and written 
communication.  Hamann’s dedication to the idea of communication as given graciously 
and solely by God is apparent in his authorship.  Kierkegaard’s model of indirect 
communication is ultimately one of Christian existence.  Given the fact that Kierkegaard 
owed much to Hamann and was perhaps even led back to faith in God through his 
exhaustive reading of the German linguist, this thesis examines the possibility of a 
Hamannian impact upon Kierkegaard’s conception of communication.  The research 
question throughout this thesis is: What is Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard’s 
theory of indirect communication? 
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Chapter One: Introduction and Presentation of the Problem 
Throughout his authorship, the Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard 
(1813-1855) developed a method of indirect communication which became an essential aspect of 
his thought.  Indirect communication in Kierkegaard’s thought is recognizable by the use of 
pseudonyms, the employment of concepts such as irony and humor, and ultimately deals 
specifically with Christian existence.  It is well known that a great deal of Kierkegaard’s thought 
concerning indirect communication derives from his admiration of Socrates.  However, one 
influence on Kierkegaard’s thought has traditionally been less acknowledged: that of Johann 
Georg Hamann (1730-1788).  This researcher asserts that Kierkegaard was extremely influenced 
by the thought of Hamann, and that this influence reaches into the area of indirect 
communication.  The research question surrounding this thesis is: What is Hamann’s influence 
on Kierkegaard’s theory of communication?   
Through the voice of the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard  once 
wrote of Hamann: “With all his life and soul, to the last drop of blood, he is concentrated in a 
single word, the passionate protest of a highly gifted genius against a system of existence” 
(Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 224).  What Kierkegaard means is that 
Hamann, above all else, is concerned with the Logos, the Creator (German 49), the divine Word. 
In addition, Kierkegaard also recognizes just how starkly Hamann’s views contrast those of the 
Enlightenment and the systematic philosophies of his Rationalist contemporaries.  There is a 
sense in which the above quotation could be applied to Kierkegaard’s life and authorship as well, 
in all its enigmatic passion and charisma.  For throughout the entirety of his writings, 
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Kierkegaard is not only concerned with the problem of how the single individual may become a 
true Christian through faith, but also with how the individual stands in relation to the inscrutable, 
divine God and the Word Incarnate.    
This researcher’s main objective is to investigate Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s 
theory of indirect communication.  In his article “Hamann and Kierkegaard,” Ronald Gregor 
Smith writes that between Kierkegaard and Hamann there “was an extraordinary connection” 
(Smith, “Hamann and Kierkegaard” 52).  Although it has been said that only Socrates impressed 
Kierkegaard unqualifiedly as a thinker (Thulstrup, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel 345), it has 
also been noted Hamann may have been the only author who profoundly influenced 
Kierkegaard’s thought (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.1
Throughout this project, this researcher will show how Kierkegaard’s model of indirect 
communication relates to his authorship, to the concept of religious communication, and finally 
to Christian existence.  Kierkegaard began dealing with the concept of communication early in 
his career; in fact, the subject arises over and over throughout his entire authorship.  (For the 
purposes of this study, the researcher has chosen four major works which deal heavily with 
Kierkegaard’s concept of indirect communication: Philosophical Fragments, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The Point of View on My Work as an 
 164).  However, some scholars have chosen 
not to recognize this connection, while others believe that Kierkegaard’s interest in Hamann was 
merely a passing phase. Therefore, this researcher examines the thought of both Hamann and 
Kierkegaard in order to explore the evidence behind these claims.  While many scholars agree 
that Hamann provided inspiration for Kierkegaard’s thought, debate nevertheless remains over to 
what extent the former affected the latter.  Therefore, the research question surrounding this 
thesis: What is Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication?  
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Author, as well as numerous entries in Kierkegaard’s journals.) As early as 1847 he had mapped 
out a model of communication in his journals which is significant to his published writings.  He 
writes, “When I think of communicating, I think of four parts 1) the object, 2) the communicator, 
3) the receiver, 4) the communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 1
Now, Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication, according to Kierkegaard scholar 
Walter Lowrie, has to do with his notion of inwardness, subjectivity, and existence (Lowrie 630).  
 306).  Here he 
deals with what would eventually become a basic model for communication studies.  Yet 
Kierkegaard has not been thoroughly examined by communication scholars.  While Kierkegaard 
has traditionally not been understood from the standpoint of the communication discipline, this 
researcher believes such an understanding is indeed necessary.  Perhaps many communication 
scholars simply have not researched Kierkegaard enough to realize his importance to 
communication, or have simply chosen to not accept his theory as valid for the discipline.  
Whatever the reason, Kierkegaard lacks any effectual presence in the field of communication 
(Herrmann 71), and his expansive model of indirect communication continues to remain obscure 
to the field.  However, “While at present Kierkegaard does not attract the attention of 
communication scholars either with reference to the purpose of his writing or his views on 
Christian existence, his contributions to an understanding of communication are undoubtedly 
relevant to…communication theory” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 128).  Perhaps 
there will always be a need for research relating to Kierkegaard, no matter how extensive the 
research may be in the field in the future, for “it follows that another 150 years from now, the 
need for fortified, accelerated, and expanded Kierkegaard research may be monstrous” (Lønning 
178).  Therefore, it is imperative to show how Kierkegaard’s understanding of communication 
relates to the realm of Christian communication and Christian existence.   
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The model can be broken down into two relational aspects, both of which it is imperative here to 
at least introduce.  First, the concept of indirect communication relates to Kierkegaard’s 
authorship itself.  In The Point of View on My Work as an Author (1848), Kierkegaard stresses 
the central theme of his writings: to show what it means to become a Christian.  He writes: 
The contents of this little book affirm, then, what I truly am as an author, that I am a 
religious author, that the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the 
problem ‘of becoming a Christian,’ with a direct or indirect polemic against the 
monstrous illusion we call Christendom, or against the illusion that in such a land as ours 
all are Christians of a sort (Kierkegaard, The Point of View
Kierkegaard saw that Christendom in his own day had become mere objective adherence, that is, 
it was regarded as simply a regurgitation of facts with no substance or personal examination 
behind them.  What was needed instead was faith.   
 6).  
Indirect communication is readily observable in the authorship by Kierkegaard’s more 
than occasional use of pseudonyms.  By the aid of pseudonymity, he developed an “aesthetic 
disguise” (14) through which he presented esthetic, ethical, and Christian categories.  This often 
confusing aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought has led critics such as Louis Mackay to say that “there 
can be no such ‘point of view’ for Kierkegaard’s writing, only points of view” (Evans, 
Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments 4).  However, this 
charge is refuted by the fact that Kierkegaard makes a clear distinction from his own viewpoint 
and those presented by the medium of indirect communication (via the pseudonyms) in an 
appended section to Concluding Unscientific Postscript (hereafter CUP) entitled “A First and 
Last Declaration.” In formally acknowledging himself as the author of all the pseudonymous 
literature (a fact already known throughout Denmark), Kierkegaard also states his purpose in 
using pseudonyms.  “My pseudonymity or polynymity has not had a casual ground in my 
person…but it has an essential ground in the character of the production…” (Kierkegaard, 
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Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Certainly a key inspiration for Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms is found in the Socratic 
method of indirectness.  From Socrates he learned the “maieutic method (the method of 
midwifery) to bring to birth thoughts which the learner already obscurely possessed” (Lowrie 
630).  According to C. Stephen Evans, “Socrates practiced indirect communication through his 
use of the ‘maieutic method,’ rather like the method of a midwife who does not give birth herself 
but assists another to do so” (
 551).  He continues, saying, “What is written therefore is in 
fact mine, but only in so far as I put into the mouth of the poetically actual individuality whom I 
produced, his life-view expressed in audible lines” (551).  Kierkegaard is referring in the latter 
statement to the pseudonymous author Johannes Climacus, but we can safely assume that he also 
is referring to his other pseudonyms as well.  He takes responsibility for the content, but makes 
his aim clear, mainly, that the pseudonyms often present “life-views” consistent with those in 
which many men and women exist.  The pseudonyms, functioning as indirect communication, 
are actually leading towards what it means to become a Christian, i.e. they both present esthetic 
and ethical snapshots to show how Christianity stands in marked contrast to the categories in 
which people typically find themselves living.  Hamann wrote exclusively under pseudonyms as 
well, and his pseudonymous activity always serves a purpose, albeit a somewhat different 
purpose than found in Kierkegaard’s writings.   
Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 10).  To Kierkegaard, the 
maieutic method necessarily involves the category of reflection in order to be successful.  In his 
communication model Kierkegaard says, “When in reflection upon the communication the 
receiver is reflected upon, then we have ethical communication.  The maieutic.  The 
communicator disappears, as it were, makes himself serve only to help the other to become” 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 307).  This Kierkegaard labels “the communication of 
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capability” (307).  One must notice how in the maieutic method the communication is reflected 
upon as well as the receiver.  The communicator himself “disappears” so that the communication 
can be reflected upon more clearly.  In Kierkegaard’s use of the maieutic method in his unsigned 
works, “the author is absent from his work, so that the reader may be free to determine the 
meaning of the work” (Shakespeare 170).  Kierkegaard’s style of standing at a distance from the 
pseudonyms, as we will uncover later in detail, means that Kierkegaard, as the object of 
communication, disappears.  The reader is then left as the receiver to be faced with truth and 
make an ethical choice of whether or not to accept it.   
The second function of indirect communication examined herein deals not only with the 
receiver’s relation to God, but God’s relation to the individual through divine revelation.  To 
Kierkegaard, God reveals himself to mankind indirectly through the person of Christ.  It was not 
directly recognizable that Christ was God; rather it is to be believed.  Christ, as we shall 
examine, is Himself the essence of indirect communication.  The condescension, the way He 
lived His life and His speech to mankind all constitute indirectness.   
But where does Hamann fit into all this?  Again we return to our research question:  What 
is Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication?  In order to begin 
to answer this question, this researcher will set the foundation in the beginning of chapter four of 
this thesis by examining the thought of Hamann as it relates to his own times.  Only then will one 
be able to understand the ideas he was combating and also the reason his writings were so 
intriguing to Kierkegaard.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
There are five main areas through which this researcher reviews the literature examined 
for this project: research concerning Kierkegaard, research relating to Hamann, research 
concerning indirect communication, research relating to Kierkegaard and Hamann, and lastly, 
research concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard in the area of indirect communication.   
Research Concerning Kierkegaard 
 Based on the literature reviewed for this project, it appears that research about 
Kierkegaard in the English language has increased so significantly in recent years that to 
describe even half of it at length would prove to be a seemingly endless process.  Instead, this 
researcher seeks to incorporate into this chapter a review of some of the major secondary sources 
used in this thesis which are related to Kierkegaard.  Since J. Heywood Thomas pointed out that 
much of the literature surrounding Kierkegaard in the English language tends to be “of 
introductory nature” (Philosophy of Religion in Kierkegaard’s Writings
Walter Lowrie (1938), David Swenson (1941) and Hermann Diem (1966) all offer what 
are arguably still the most definitive introductions to the thought of Kierkegaard available today.  
, i), Kierkegaard research 
has expanded greatly and is now in abundance.   However, this does not mean that there exists no 
room for new research.  Given the fact that Kierkegaard’s own body of literature is vast and 
often taken out of context, it appears that there will always be a need, as Per Lønning suggests, 
for new research in the field of Kierkegaard studies (178).   
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Joakim Garff (2005) offers the most complete biography of Kierkegaard, and placed along side 
each other, all of these act as excellent introductions to Kierkegaard’s life and thought.   
 Throughout this thesis, the works of C. Stephen Evans are relied upon heavily, especially 
Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript (1999) and Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (2006).  
In the former, Evans investigates the works behind the Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous author 
Johannes Climacus, while in the latter he presents major Kierkegaardian themes within the 
proper scope of Christianity.    
 Niels Thulstrup’s book Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel (1980) displayed the 
predominant view among scholars as to Kierkegaard’s understanding of and opposition to the 
German philosopher.  Recently however, new scholarship has challenged this traditional view.  
Jon Stewart’s Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered (2007) offers a definitive 
reassessment of Kierkegaard’s treatment of Hegel.   
 Additional Kierkegaard research emerging recently offers a variety of concentrations.  
Jacob Howland further investigates the influence of Socrates in Kierkegaard and Socrates: A 
Study in Philosophy and Faith (2006).  Jon Stewart edits the multi-volume work Kierkegaard 
and His German Contemporaries (2007, 2008), which investigates the importance of German 
thought for Kierkegaard.  The works are broken up into three tomes consisting of German 
philosophical, theological, and literary influences (Stewart ed., Kierkegaard and His German 
Contemporaries Vol. 6 x).  Central to the study is the contention that “apart from his 
contemporary Danish sources, the German sources were probably the most important in the 
development of his thought generally” (ix).  Ronald M. Green’s article “Kant: A Debt both 
Obscure and Enormous” located Tome I is of importance to this thesis.  Green shows both how 
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Kierkegaard with agrees with Kant on a few issues, while vehemently disagreeing with him on 
others.  Stewart’s own article in Tome I entitled “Hegel: Kierkegaard’s Reading and Use of 
Hegel’s Primary Texts” continues his argument put forth in Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel 
Reconsidered.   
 Craig Hinkson’s article Will the Real Martin Luther Please Stand Up! Kierkegaard’s 
View of Luther versus Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition (2002) published in the 
International Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 21
Research concerning Hamann 
 explores the profound connection between 
Luther and Kierkegaard. Steven Shakespeare’s Kierkegaard, Language and the Reality of God 
(2001) heads toward the direction of establishing a Kierkegaardian theory of language. 
Shakespeare contends that Kierkegaard’s use of language is central to his model of indirect 
communication.  Mark C. Taylor (2000), in his work Journeys to Selfhood, discusses the 
importance of Hegel to Kierkegaard, and the latter’s scathing critique of Hegelianism.  Alastair 
Hannay’s Kierkegaard and Philosophy (2003) is composed of several essays focusing on a 
variety of subjects including the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, the importance of Lessing to 
Kierkegaard, paradox, despair, and humor.  Sean Turchin (2006), in his master’s thesis, 
examines Kierkegaard as the chief influence upon the theologian Karl Barth’s Epistle to the 
Romans.  
Translations of Hamann’s writings and research about him are difficult to obtain in 
English.  In fact, “The task of putting the whole of Hamann into English is virtually impossible” 
(Smith, J.G. Hamann 13).  For this reason, Ronald Gregor Smith writes that Hamann “will 
always remain enigmatic, and illuminating in snatches, like lightening flashing across a rich and 
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mysterious landscape” (13).  Perhaps one reason that Hamann has not been completely 
researched is that he is an extremely difficult writer to translate (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language 
in the Thought of Hamann 8).  Furthermore, as Terrence German points out, “No one will ever 
be able to systematize totally the thought of Hamann” (viii).  Walter Lowrie, the Kierkegaard 
scholar, describes his readings of Hamann: “I was prepared to delve, but had not expected to find 
the digging so hard” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 167).  It remains then, that no 
matter how much we learn from Hamann, and we can actually learn a great deal, he will always 
remain somewhat of a mystery, an enigmatic figure who with keen awareness and insight, wrote 
critically of his own times as a “preacher in the wilderness.”1
Research on Hamann appears to be relegated to religious and philosophical studies.  In 
the English language, writers such as James O’Flaherty (1952, 1979) and Stephen N. Dunning 
(1979) successfully examined Hamann’s language theory, showing its focus on elements of 
communication.  However, after meticulous research, it appears that Hamann has not been 
studied specifically by communication scholars.  Terrence German’s book Hamann on Language 
and Religion (1981) explores the importance of Hamann’s views concerning language and 
communication, and the author deals in depth with the significance of Hamann’s understanding 
in regards to the communicative acts of writing and speaking.  German, as many other scholars 
both before and after him, heavily relies on a few key works in order to complete his task.  These 
include: the Roth-Wiener edition of Hamann’s writings (1924), Joseph Nadler’s edition of 
Hamann’s works (1949-57), and the Ziesemer-Henkel edition of Hamann’s letters (1955-75), 
none of which have been completely translated into English.      
   
At this point it is necessary to mention that two more prominent anthologies in the 
English language are available and used throughout this study.  Ronald Gregor Smith (1960) has 
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translated sections of Hamann’s major works in his J.G. Hamann, while more recently Kenneth 
Haynes (2007), in his book Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language, offers a slightly 
more comprehensive translation.  Haynes, however, is concerned more with Hamann’s writings 
in the areas of language and philosophy, while Smith offers more diverse material by including 
both excerpts from Hamann’s Biblical Reflections and a sampling of his letters.  Gwen Griffith 
Dickson (1995) is also responsible for translating a number of Hamann’s works into English.   
Crucial to this study are the writings of the Hamann scholar James O’Flaherty.  In his 
book Johann Georg Hamann, O’Flaherty gives a detailed biographical account of Hamann’s life 
and examines his thought through the major works.  O’Flaherty deals in depth with Hamann’s 
understanding of Socratic existence, his views on human reason, and shows how Hamann’s 
concern for language “provides the center around which his thought revolves” (O’Flaherty, 
Johann Georg Hamann
In his book Unity and Language: A Study in the Philosophy of Hamann, O’Flaherty 
scrupulously details Hamann’s language theory and examines the concept of unity in Hamann’s 
thought.  He points out that “thought and language are inseparable for Hamann” (47) and gives 
the necessary backdrop for understanding Hamann in relation to the thoughts of his 
contemporaries.  That is, he deals with Hamann’s language theory as a communicative tool used 
to combat the tenets of the Enlightenment.   While, O’Flaherty does not openly deal with indirect 
communication in this text, he does present an insightful and thought-provoking assessment of 
Hamann’s views concerning communication via his language theory.  O’Flaherty also focuses on 
how symbols play a major role in Hamann’s language theory.   
 112).  Of interest to O’Flaherty is also how language is a “reflection of 
the Logos” (112) to Hamann.  O’Flaherty also focuses on Hamann’s understanding of Christ as 
the Paradox. 
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 In his text, German specifically tends to focus on Hamann’s style of creativity and his 
understanding of communication as stemming from God as the Creator.  German eventually 
comes to the conclusion that Hamann’s is so concerned with the idea of communication that “His 
life is a communication” (175).   
 Frederick Beiser, in his book The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to 
Fichte (1987), gives a detailed background of Hamann and shows how influential he was in 
countering the tenets of the Enlightenment.  Beiser acknowledges that Hamann influenced 
Kierkegaard, but he does elaborate in detail on this issue.  To Beiser, what is striking about 
Hamann’s thought is its modernity and “foreshadowing of contemporary events” (17).  He also 
outlines what he views as four points of contention between Hamann and his contemporaries.  
 Other works about or concerning Hamann available in English includes Isaiah Berlin’s 
work entitled The Magus of the North: J. G. Hamann and the Origins of Modern Rationalism 
(1965); Walter Leibrecht’s God and Man in the Thought of Hamann (1966); Walter Lowrie’s 
“Johann Georg Hamann: An Existentialist” (1950); W.M. Alexander’s Johann Georg Hamann: 
Philosophy and Faith (1966); Jonathan Sheehan’s The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, 
Scholarship Culture (2005); and Denis Thouard’s article about Hamann and Socrates entitled 
“Hamann and the History of Philosophy,”, to be found in The History of Scholarship (2007).   
Research Concerning Hamann and Kierkegaard 
In his article on Kierkegaard’s view of Luther, Craig Hinkson (2002) writes that 
Kierkegaard “received a thorough initiation to Luther’s world of thought while yet a student by 
his intensive reading” of Hamann (Hinkson, Will the Real Martin Luther Please Stand Up! 
Kierkegaard’s View of Luther versus the Evolving Perceptions of the Tradition 71).  Hinkson 
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expounds on Hamann’s critique of the Enlightenment, and compares Hamann’s crusade against 
it to that which Kierkegaard battled in his own times.   
In his article “Hamann and Kierkegaard,” published in the journal Kierkegaardiana 
(1964), Ronald Gregor Smith points out the “extraordinary connection” between Hamann and 
Kierkegaard (52).  Smith examines the link between Kierkegaard in the area of humor and 
mentions that Hamann influenced Kierkegaard “in his very existence” (52).  In the end, however, 
Smith contends that Kierkegaard ended an irrationalist, and moved away from Hamann later in 
his career as an author.  However, this researcher contests this view.  The way Smith understands 
it, there exists a major break between Kierkegaard and Hamann in the area of faith, because 
Kierkegaard took faith to extremes.  This researcher challenges Smith’s understanding of 
Kierkegaard in chapter four of this thesis.  Nevertheless, Smith makes note of the fact that the 
relationship between Kierkegaard and Hamann goes deeper than simply their shared 
understanding of indirectness through the use of pseudonyms (63).   
Research Concerning Indirect Communication 
Harry Broudy (1961) in his article “Kierkegaard on Indirect Communication,” published 
in The Journal of Philosophy, examined Kierkegaard’s view of indirect communication via 
subjective thought.  Broudy dealt with the five apparent problems of communicating 
subjectively, and attempted to answer them in detail.  However, Broudy failed to realize the 
importance of communication to Kierkegaard’s view of Christian existence, for he asserts that 
Kierkegaard is “neither clear nor convincing” as to why “the subjective thinker has to 
communicate at all” (228).  Furthermore, he insists that the subjective thinker is interested in his 
own existence and his own thinking alone (226).  Broudy apparently ignores the fact that to 
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Kierkegaard, true subjectivity requires of the individual a relationship in “fear and trembling” 
before an almighty God.   
According to Andrew Herrmann, early attempts by communication scholars to integrate 
the thought of Kierkegaard into the communication field focused on rhetoric (72).  Such 
researchers as Anderson (1963), Scott (1967), and Stewart (1972) all made attempts introduce 
minor aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought into communication studies via rhetorical studies 
(Herrmann 72).  Matthew T. Althouse (2004) also explains Kierkegaard from the standpoint of 
rhetoric in his article entitled “Moving Kierkegaard toward Critical Rhetoric” in The Review of 
Communication.  Herrmann interestingly notes that only two researchers, Schrag (2003) and 
Peters (1999) have attempted to recently establish a Kierkegaardian theory of communication 
(73).  However, he writes that “Kierkegaard is conspicuously absent from most recent 
communication literature” (73).  This thesis differs from that of Schrag and Peters in that this 
researcher is not attempting to establish a new theory, for Kierkegaard’s model of indirect 
communication stands on its own.  Rather, this researcher investigates the importance of indirect 
communication upon Kierkegaard’s authorship and examines that indirectness in the light of 
Hamann’s influence.   
Nerina Jansen, a professor of communication theory, has also presented Kierkegaard’s 
views on communication (1990, 1997).  In the article “Service in Deception of the Truth: 
Magister Kierkegaard and the Problem of Communication,” located in the International 
Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 12, Jansen explains that Kierkegaard thinks of communication as 
a mode of existence (115).  Jansen also attempts to relate Kierkegaard’s views on 
communication to contemporary issues in communication theory.   
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In “The Individual versus the Public: A Key to Kierkegaard’s Views of the Daily Press,” 
in the International Kierkegaard Commentary Vol. 13
Herrmann’s article entitled “Kierkegaard and Dialogue: The Communication of 
Capability,” in the journal Communication Theory (2008), examines the basics of Kierkegaard’s 
model of indirect communication.  Herrmann’s study, while referring to Socrates, does not make 
mention of Hamann.  While Herrmann at least touches on some of the elements of indirect 
communication, he fails to take notice of the relationship of indirect communication to 
Christianity, without which the proper framework for interpretation of Kierkegaard’s model is 
lost.   
, Jansen again deals with Kierkegaard from 
the standpoint of communication, setting the historical stage to present Kierkegaard’s view of the 
media in the light of his battles with the press.   
  J. Kellenberger’s article entitled “Kierkegaard, Indirect Communication, and Religious 
Truth,” located in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (1984), deals with the 
concept of indirect communication and its relation to the religious thinker.  Kellenberger 
discusses the differences between direct and indirect communication and between objective and 
subjective truth.  Kellenberger notes the importance of indirect communication for religious 
understanding and offers personal examples of indirect communication throughout the article.   
A proper approach to Kierkegaard’s use of indirect communication is seen in C. Stephen 
Evans work entitled Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript (1999).  Evans defines indirect 
communication, deals with the subject at length, and presents it in light of Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymous literature, and imperative concepts such as subjectivity, humor, faith, and 
Christian existence.   
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Author Jørgen Bukdahl (1961), in his work Søren Kierkegaard and the Common Man, 
illuminates Kierkegaard’s communicative relationship with the common man in his native land 
of Denmark.  Central to Bukdahl’s study is Kierkegaard’s love of interpersonal communication, 
and how Kierkegaard witnessed the transformation of a society “based on a rigid, hierarchical, 
but “face-to-face” absolute monarchy” into “a modern mass society based on anonymous forces 
of the marketplace and popular sovereignty” (xi).  Naturally, Bukdahl also examines 
Kierkegaard’s own indirect method and contrasts it to his fondness for direct and interpersonal 
communication with the common man.   
 In addition, Thomas C. Oden’s Parables of Kierkegaard (1978) not only anthologizes 
many of Kierkegaard’s most well-known parables, but also gives a necessary understanding for 
parables as part of Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication.  According to Oden, 
indirect communication is Kierkegaard’s main method for communicating in a meaningful 
manner (ix).  Kierkegaard’s use of parabolic communication serves his aim as an author for five 
important reasons, which are discussed in chapter four of this thesis (x).   
 George Pattison examines indirect communication in the thought of Kierkegaard in two 
engaging articles, both published in the journal Kierkegaardiana.  The first, entitled “‘Who’ is 
the Discourse? A Study in Kierkegaard’s Religious Literature” (1993), studies the 
communicative aspects of Kierkegaard’s Discourses, comparing and contrasting them to the 
indirect, pseudonymous works.  Pattison’s later work “The Theory and Practice of Language and 
Communication in Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding Discourses” (1998), discusses the importance of 
language in both Kierkegaard’s direct discourses and his pseudonymous literature.  Pattison’s 
point is that the language of the Discourse serves the purpose of Christian communication (93-4).  
To Pattison, metaphorical language is essential to the indirectness of faith (94).   
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 Research Concerning Hamann, Kierkegaard, and Indirect Communication 
Of particular importance here is Craig Hinkson’s insight concerning indirect 
communication in his work “Kierkegaard, Socrates, and the Maieutic Art” (2001).  Hinkson 
writes that in Hamann’s Socratic Memorabilia (1759), the author practices indirect 
communication “with consummate skill” (4).  If Kierkegaard indeed learned the method of 
indirect communication from Hamann—and Hinkson thinks this is likely—it was through 
reading Socratic Memorabilia (4).  This concept is elaborated on in by this researcher in chapter 
four of this thesis.  Hinkson also points to a relationship between Hamann and Kierkegaard in the 
indirectness of revelation (6), and makes a strong, luminous claim for a remarkable relationship 
between the two thinkers.  Albert Anderson’s article “Hamann,” located in Bibliotheca 
Kierkegaardiana Vol. 10 (1982), principally examines Hamann’s relation to Kierkegaard in the 
area of humor.  Anderson inspects both the writings of Hamann and Kierkegaard, and declares 
the connection between Kierkegaard and Hamann in the area of humor to be one of immanent 
importance.  By examining Kierkegaard’s relation to Hamann in the area of humor, it becomes 
clear that not only did Kierkegaard hold Hamann in high regard because of his humorous bent, 
but also that Hamann “recognizes clearly that humor cannot in principle be expressed in direct 
forms of language” (Anderson 134).  The concept of humor as it relates to Hamann and 
Kierkegaard is dealt with in chapter four of this thesis.   
J. Heywood Thomas also links Hamann with Kierkegaard in his article “Christianity as 
Absurd,” published in Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Vol. 2 (1978).  Thomas writes that 
Kierkegaard owed much to Hamann, including the recovery of his Christian faith as a young 
man, for it was Hamann who “taught him that faith was not an operation of reason,” a subject 
dealt with in the first part of chapter four of this thesis.  Thomas also notes this same significance 
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of Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s thought in general in his book Subjectivity and Paradox 
(1957).   
 James O’Flaherty, in his book Johann Georg Hamann, links Kierkegaard and Hamann in 
two places.  First, he notes that in his Socratic Memorabilia Hamann used a form of indirect 
communication, and that indirect communication was later to be developed and made famous by 
Kierkegaard (88).  Secondly, near the close of his work, O’Flaherty mentions the difficulties in 
reading and deciphering the works of Hamann, and writes that comparatively, Kierkegaard’s use 
of indirect communication is “crystal clarity itself” (167).   
Recently, in the article “Hamann: Sharing Style and Thesis,” found in Kierkegaard and 
his German Contemporaries, Sergia Karen Hay (2008) investigated Kierkegaard’s relationship 
to Hamann based on the former’s use of the latter in both in the published works and in the 
journals.  Hay gives a background to Hamann’s life and works before delving into Kierkegaard’s 
references to Hamann.  Hay writes, “Kierkegaard clearly noticed Hamann’s emphasis on style 
which is particularly remarkable for its use of pseudonyms, metaphor, and references to obscure 
works in foreign languages” (106), and briefly mentions that Kierkegaard adapted some of 
Hamann’s communicative devises as his own.  Hay also states that the relationship between 
Hamann and Kierkegaard is worth more investigation (108).   
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Chapter Three: Historical-Critical Methodology 
The path for conducting an historical-critical analysis is outlined by Raymond K. Tucker 
in his book Research in Speech Communication.  Tucker points to basic four-point model for 
successfully conducting performing such a study. 
1) Discover and Structure the Research Problem 
This was the first step this researcher sought to develop in this project.  This study came 
into being after analyzing Kierkegaard’s theory of communication for well over year.  During 
that time, this researcher sought to understand many of Kierkegaard’s concepts on a personal and 
academic level.  Investigating Hamann’s relation to Kierkegaard’s theory of communication first 
of all narrows the approach.  Secondly, it allows this researcher to make the claim of originality 
in the field of communication.  The importance of discovering and structuring the research 
problem is common to any research method (Tucker 76).  However, “Historical-critical research 
begins when you question some idea, event, development, or experience of the past” (72).   
2) Choose the historical or critical approach to be used 
Step two is vital, because it affects not only this research, but the conclusions as well.  
Here there are three methods which may be used: descriptive, experimental, or historical.  For 
the purposes of this study, this researcher does not merely offer a descriptive look, but hopes to 
shed light onto the issue as well.  A critical approach is necessary to assess Kierkegaard’s 
indirect communication and Hamann’s view of language.  All the while this researcher realizes 
that this choice of the historical or critical “will likely be combined” in the final analysis (78).  
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3) Collect and Verify the Evidence or Data 
Evidence is the backbone of historical-critical research (79).  Evidence related to this 
project has been copiously collected, and that which has not fit the nature of this study has been 
discarded.  Our primary sources include four major works by Søren Kierkegaard: Philosophical 
Fragments, its follow-up Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The 
Point of View on My Work as an Author, plus selected entries from Kierkegaard’s journals, 
mainly in the areas of communication, objectivity and subjectivity, faith, reason, and 
Christianity, to name a few.  While Kierkegaard’s works can be expensive to purchase, this 
researcher has been fortunate enough to personally own many of them.  Other sources come from 
this university’s library.  Hamann’s works, in contrast, are very difficult to obtain.  For sources 
related strictly to Hamann, this researcher focuses on materials such as Hamann: Writings on 
Philosophy and Language, which provide us with several of his collected writings.   
Our secondary sources are in abundance.  The bulk of these which give Kierkegaard the 
proper framework include such as scholars C. Stephen Evans, Jon Stewart, and Craig Hinkson, 
and Hamann scholars like James O’Flaherty.  These provide us the most accurate views of 
Hamann and Kierkegaard available today.   
4) Interpret Data and Draw Conclusions 
According to Tucker, “The conclusions [of the study] should be limited to the available 
data” (77).  However, he also explains the importance of the researcher in relation to his 
information. “They have a better command of the information, a better perspective of the 
problem, and a better idea of how various puzzle parts fit together than do most people” (77).  It 
appears that this “unique perspective” is in fact dialectical. On the one hand the researcher has 
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the “unique opportunity to take command of the research,” while on the other hand, the 
conclusions of the research “should be limited by the available data” (77).   One would do best to 
interpret Tucker’s message as such: the researcher should not take liberties with the conclusions, 
distorting them in relation to the research conducted; however, the researcher’s conclusions 
should also be his/her own.   
The importance of historical-critical research is multitudinous.  Since this researcher 
desires to ascertain the meaning and reliability of past facts, make comparisons of likeness and 
difference, and draw conclusions from an in-depth examination of past facts, it is important to 
use the historical-critical methodology here (68).  Other important reasons for this type of study 
are that it broadens the professional base (66) and allows for a greater understanding of the 
present by examining the past.   
According to Tucker, there are four goals of the critical researcher (78).   
1) The critical researcher should aim for dependability, validity and reliability. 
However, Tucker goes on to make it clear that statistical reliability is not as important to 
the critical researcher as the reliability of the evidence.  He writes, “…often excellent criticism 
distinguishes itself because other critics have not agreed” (78).  This researcher distances himself 
from the liberal scholarship surrounding Kierkegaard.  The main secondary sources used for this 
study are both dependable and reliable: they give insight into Kierkegaard’s work and many are 
unsurpassed scholars in their field.   
2) Dependability relies on clarity and accuracy of style 
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Therefore, this researcher has revised and rewritten this thesis numerous times, so that it 
could be as clear and as accurate as possible.  Tucker makes it clear that it is through 
dependability that this is accomplished.  Furthermore, for the critical researcher to receive 
results, both accuracy and clarity of thought are essential.   
3) Excellence in criticism also results from authenticity of sources 
This researcher has not resorted to use sources that are unscholarly or invalid.  Rather, the 
sources reflect the originality of the topic to communication studies.  Here, Tucker adds an 
important point.  “The critical methodologist has, perhaps, greater freedom in imposing his or 
her personal stamp or mark on the study,” but the expectation is higher as a result. 
4) Excellence is also determined by the criteria of the application: Can the results 
be applied to life? 
Tucker makes it plain that the critical methodologist must always seek to be relevant.  It is this 
researcher’s opinion that this study is relevant in our world today.  Pains have been taken to 
present it as such throughout this thesis.  To communicators, this study is essential, for 
discussion throughout this thesis will go to the very root and meaning of communication.  To 
Christians and Christian communicators, this study is vital, for Kierkegaard’s model builds an 
understanding of knowing ourselves and recognizing the communication between God and man 
through the person of Christ.  Therefore, this study is relevant and has the opportunity to 
contribute to the field of communication. 
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Procedures 
This study came about after researching indirect communication in the thought of 
Kierkegaard for a considerable amount of time.  The following is a step-by-step analysis of how 
this study will be conducted. 
The first real step in this process is the gathering of materials.  This researcher relies 
heavily on collected research from journal articles, commentaries, and books relating to the 
subjects.  In the case of Hamann’s writings, anthologies of his works have been used only 
because they comprise the totality of works available in English to this researcher.  The collected 
materials all aid this research, some more than others. The majority of articles dealing with 
Kierkegaard come from Kierkegaardiana, Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, and The International 
Kierkegaard Commentary.   
The second step that goes into this study is the reading of its major texts: Philosophical 
Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Training in Christianity, and The Point of View 
on My Work as an Author.  All of these works explain Kierkegaard’s model of indirect 
communication and are essential to understanding indirect communication.   
The third step in this study deals with the writing and here it is imperative to understand 
how this researcher has chosen to include or exclude content.  In interpreting both Kierkegaard 
and Hamann, it is necessary to deal with their major concepts.  It is this researcher’s opinion that 
these many of these major concepts can be understood from a communication standpoint.  
Concepts such as knowledge, reason, and language all relate to the field of communication from 
a philosophical point of view.  God, His relation to us, and how we communicate with one 
another all are associated with a Christian understanding of communication.  This researcher has 
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chosen to integrate these concepts so that the validity of this study cannot be questioned.  In 
addition, this researcher has included not only content pertinent to communication, but also that 
which lends itself to a deeper understanding of Kierkegaard in general.  For instance, chapter 
four discusses The Corsair, the newspaper with which Kierkegaard was engaged in a dreadful 
attack, and shows how that event was influential for Kierkegaard’s subsequent thoughts relating 
to communication.  This researcher also touches on Kierkegaard’s principle of subjectivity, since 
it is necessary to an understanding of his model of indirect communication.  In fact, all ideas and 
concepts which may at first glance appear as overtly philosophical are indeed extremely 
necessary to understanding both Hamann’s language theory and Kierkegaard’s conception of 
indirect communication.   
In the fourth step, this researcher has chosen to break things up into what is considered 
the most logical manner.  For instance, it is necessary to first give a background of Hamann so 
that his language theory makes sense.  It is necessary to discuss Hamann before we discuss 
Kierkegaard so that this study remains chronological and it can be seen more easily how Hamann 
influenced Kierkegaard. After discussing Hamann and Kierkegaard, this researcher then moves 
into references to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s writings, in which major ways are presented as to 
how Hamann influenced Kierkegaard.  Lastly, this researcher deals with Christianity as indirect 
communication, in which links are presented between Hamann, Kierkegaard, and the concept of 
faith.  This order appears to best serve the purposes of this thesis.  This study ends with 
conclusions and implications for further research.   
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Chapter Four: Historical and Theological Foundations 
 The first step of an historical-critical study is to establish the proper historical settings.  
There are four main areas of investigation set forth in this chapter. First, this researcher discusses 
Kierkegaard and Hamann from the standpoint of reason and language.  Second, indirect 
communication in the thought of Kierkegaard is examined.  Third, it is necessary to further 
elaborate on Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication given his references to Hamann.  
Lastly, in the section entitled “Christianity as Indirect Communication,” this researcher 
investigates the thoughts of both Hamann and Kierkegaard and their emphases on indirectness in 
the areas of Christian existence, faith, and the Incarnation of Christ.  
 Hamann and the Enlightenment 
Kierkegaard and Hamann: Reason and Language 
 During the mid-to-late 18th century, a course of literary events in Europe not only 
challenged but shook the traditional foundations of both philosophy and cultural thought.  It 
changed the way “not only Europeans but practically the whole world conceived of itself, of 
nature, of religion, of human history, of the nature of knowledge, of politics, and of the structure 
of the human mind in general” (Pinkard 2).  Indeed, the significance of German philosophy 
during the Enlightenment cannot be downplayed, for its remnants have affected countless 
generations.  One solitary tenet was reinforced above all else: the primacy of human reason.  
“Philosophers loyal to the Enlightenment bestowed enormous authority upon reason, which was 
the Enlightenment’s sovereign standard of truth, its final court of intellectual appeal” (Beiser 1).  
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In short, reason became the end-all, the last word of truth, the supreme faculty encompassing 
human knowledge.  Philosophers sought to prove the supremacy of reason, and in doing so, 
offered a system critical of traditional viewpoints in general and of theology in particular.  
However, one seminal figure offered a perspective contra the Enlightenment, a viewpoint which 
sought to put reason in its proper place.   
 It is in Hamann, often referred to as the “Magus of the North2,” that we see the workings 
of a communicative genius both linguistically and philosophically.  As a philologist he 
extensively studied Greek, Latin, English, Hebrew, Arabic, French, to a degree Egyptian 
hieroglyphics, as well as Persian, Tibetan, and Latvian (German 12).  His interests ranged from 
“…ancient and contemporary; sacred and secular; historical, political, economic, theological, 
literary, and journalistic” (Haynes ed. viii).  Early in his writing career, Hamann realized that if 
the Rationalists were correct, i.e. if man’s reason is the supreme lens through which he views the 
world, the concept of faith is then reduced to nothingness.  Since man is depraved, his reason 
capabilities are flawed; therefore, man must be guided by something more than reason alone.  
Ultimately, Hamann says that “the reality of man’s life depends utterly upon God, upon man’s 
response to God’s Word in him” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 
Through Hamann’s conversion to Christianity in 1758 at the age of twenty-nine, his 
thought suddenly and irrevocably turned to Christian doctrine.  Only a year earlier he had 
traveled to London from his home in Königsberg, East Prussia on an obscure “diplomatic and 
business mission” (Beiser 19), which “apparently involved negotiations with the Russian and 
English governments concerning trade in the Baltic” (Smith, 
82).  To Hamann, it is faith which 
“transcends the criticism and demonstration of reason” (Beiser 17).   
J.G. Hamann 29).  It is important to 
understand that Hamann was, at the time, a well-versed student of the Enlightenment.  However, 
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when his mission fell through, he quickly sank into a life of disrepute and “sought to lose himself 
in dissipation” (O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 22).  Through his despair however, Hamann 
began rigorously reading the Scriptures and came to true faith in Christ.  This change brought 
about, according to Ronald Gregor Smith, “tumultuous certainty; grounded on an intense, 
reiterated, highly individual reading of the whole Bible, not once, but twice through, the New 
Testament even three times; and taking him through absolute despair in himself to absolute 
confidence in the Lord of the Word…” (41). Shortly after his conversion, Hamann writes in his 
Biblical Reflections concerning the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy, “In spite of the light which 
God sheds in our souls by his Word, he wants to be near to us himself.  He is where his Word is, 
he is where his Son is.  If his Word is in us, his Son is in us; if his Word is in us, the Spirit of this 
Word is in us” (129).  Hamann, having already developed a strong background in linguistics, had 
now become consumed by God as the Logos and the creator of all communication.  “It is my 
same old tune,” he writes, “but through language all things are made” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, Unity 
and Language in the Thought of Hamann
This…was an insight which he gained principally through his conversion by the Biblical 
word.  Just as the living organisms were called into being by the word of God, so man’s 
spiritual life is re-created by that same word as it is spoken through the Gospel.  But the 
power of the word to create is a characteristic not only of the divine word; it is also a 
characteristic of the human word, in so far as it partakes of the nature of the divine word.  
For Hamann, it is therefore permissible to speak of human speech as “creative energy,” if 
one remembers that the transcendent God of the Biblical revelation is the constant source 
of that energy for him (O’Flaherty, 
 19).  Hamann scholar James O’Flaherty writes:  
Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann
We shall return to Hamann’s conception of language later.  But it is imperative to see just 
how Hamann’s life and work were shaped by his conversion to Christianity, because it provides 
the backdrop for understanding both the laws that govern his thought and his unwavering stance 
against rationalism.
 19). 
3  His conversion proved to be of such importance because it would play the 
predominant role throughout his life and writings.  Author Sergia Karen Hay writes that “This 
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experience was absolutely decisive for the rest of Hamann’s life; it shifted his attention from 
business and writing projects consistent with the goals of the Enlightenment to a thoroughgoing 
commitment to theological concerns and religious life” (98).  Henceforth, he “devoted his life to 
a series of communicating experiences with God which were all conversion experiences, for 
conversion was a sequential experience, a series of great moments” (German 2).  Ultimately, 
Hamann’s critique of reason presents the problems inherent to Christian communication, while 
delineating the necessity of faith.   
 Bearing in mind Hamann’s acknowledgement of God as the supreme communicator, we 
must understand how his major concepts refute those of the Enlightenment.  Hamann struck out 
against the idea that reason alone was man’s self-governing agent in general and against the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant in particular.   
Kant and the Enlightenment 
It is vital to present Kant’s views on reason and God, because without them we severely 
lack the proper framework for interpreting the thought of Hamann in detail.  Since much of 
Hamann’s attack against the Enlightenment is aimed specifically at Kant, it naturally follows that 
Hamann cannot be understood unless the ideas which he refuted are taken into account.  A 
certain understanding of Kant is necessary in order to assess and gain further insight to both 
Hamann’s language theory and his understanding of faith in God.   
The expansion of human reason was not the only product of the Enlightenment.  Indeed, 
the Enlightenment can also be regarded as “a movement of thought based on a basic trust in the 
human being’s capacity to secure its own basis for the traditional supports of human life 
(morality, religion and the state); Enlightenment was to replace a capricious tradition of 
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unsupported appeals to revelation, scriptural authority and the like” (Hannay, Kierkegaard and 
Philosophy
Not only did Kant succeed in forever changing how metaphysics were viewed, but he 
elevated reason to its highest form within the empirical world.  In doing so, he discounted the 
importance of language while damaging concepts in Christianity.  It has been said that “It would 
not be overstating the case to say that Kantian philosophy delivered a severe blow to theology” 
(Turchin 7).  According to C. Stephen Evans: 
 53).   That is, we could say that the idea of Enlightenment celebrated human 
endeavor and human reasoning, while casting away traditional viewpoints.  Kant’s thought has 
exceptional significance here, for after him, nothing would again be the same (Pinkard 15).  With 
the publication of his first major work, The Critique of Pure Reason (1784), he laid out his view 
that “from now on, we moderns had to depend on ourselves and our own critical powers to figure 
things out” (Pinkard 20).  In the Critique of Pure Reason he writes, “Mathematical and scientific 
knowledge find their basis and justification in the intuitions and categories of the understanding, 
since the latter are the necessary conditions of human thought” (Kant qtd. in Gill, “Kantianism” 
223).  According to Kant, man’s faculty of reasoning is limited and relegated within the 
empirical world, those things which can be readily known, observed, measured, and 
experimented with.   
A large strand of theology since Kant has doubted that it is possible to conceive of God, 
has claimed that it is not possible for human language to refer to a God who is not part of 
a temporal, created world.  Of course if we cannot conceive of God, then we also cannot 
conceive of God creating the world or atoning for sin through the person of Jesus.  And if 
such things cannot be conceived they cannot be believed either (Evans, Kierkegaard on 
Faith and the Self
Kant undermined theology by altering metaphysics and through his use of the 
“categorical imperative.”  In his philosophy we have on the one hand, the noumenal realm (or the 
 185).     
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essence of things “as they are in themselves”), while on the other the phenomenal realm (“the 
world of things as they appear to us in sense experience”) (Miller & Jensen D-20, D-22).  To 
Kant, we purely reason to that which lies in the phenomenal realm of experience.  Since we can 
know nothing of things in and of themselves, barricades are constructed to the noumenal world.  
In other words, the noumenal becomes unknowable.  The noumenal is not open to our sense 
experience, and therefore it cannot be known.  To Kant, all knowledge is based on experience or 
empirical data.  This position represented a problem for traditional viewpoints in both philosophy 
and theology.  Kant philosophy represented a direct attack upon theology because “the problem 
was no longer the Lutheran disparagement of fallen reason’s ability to obtain knowledge of God, 
but rather the self-imposed restrictions of reason itself.  God had effectively been relegated to the 
realm of transcendence as the utterly unknowable Ding an sich” (Turchin 7).  From Kant, it 
followed that “No longer do we form concepts based on our experience; rather, the concepts 
exist first and shape all our experience” (Miller & Jansen 254).  Through this viewpoint, Kant 
attempted to reconcile rational thought with empiricism (Shakespeare 3).   
The change brought to the area of metaphysics was severely damaging as well.  What had 
originally been known as “the queen of all sciences” (Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason 41) and 
had traditionally been seen as the “inquiry into the supernatural” or the “quest for God” (Evans, 
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 48) became something else entirely.  Instead, Kant viewed the 
metaphysician as “the alleged purveyor of a synthetic a priori truth” (Evans, Kierkegaard on 
Faith and the Self 48).  This has sweeping ramifications for the existence of God in particular.  
To Kant, God is entirely unknowable because he surpasses the standard for knowledge from an 
empirical standpoint.  So by denying the traditional mode of metaphysics, Kant instead 
constructed his own systematic method. His writings provided the “foundations for the new kind 
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of metaphysics,” which would lead him to the belief that “reason has the ability to give a final 
critique of the powers of the human mind” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self
We have seen how Kant was able, through the Enlightenment, to cast doubt on traditional 
institutions.  The effects of his views are widespread, for they also pose a problem for the subject 
of communication.  It follows that if we can only have knowledge of the phenomenal, then how 
can we communicate what lies beyond that which is observable?  How is it possible to 
communicate what we cannot experience?  Kant’s epistemology appears to leave no room for 
this possibility.   
 52).   
 Even further problems arise for communication from Kant’s philosophy when we take 
into consideration the communication of theological ideas.  Obviously, if reason acts as man’s 
final authority, then there is no reason for him to be held accountable to God.  Since God is 
utterly unknowable and man’s reasoning ability seemingly autonomous, there is no exchange of 
communication between God and man.  To Kant, “the religious individual’s knowledge of God 
is completely derivable from his understanding of moral law” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments 
and Postscript 42).  What is morally good, according to Kant in his categorical imperative, is 
good will itself.  In other words, reason alone constructs that which is good.  Kant’s ground for 
ethics lies in man’s reasoning capacity as it singlehandedly becomes the foundation for morality.  
Kant writes, “In matters of religion, reason is the highest interpreter of Scripture” (qtd. in Green 
180). In his Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant asserts, “I take the following 
proposition to be a principle requiring no proof: Whatever, over and above good life-conduct, 
man fancies that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious illusion and 
pseudo-service of God” (Kant 158).  It is obvious, as Kierkegaard4 would later write, that Kant 
“declares the relationship to God to be a kind of mental weakness, a hallucination” (Kierkegaard, 
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Journals and Papers Vol. 2 515).  Kierkegaard understood that Kant’s moral rationalism had 
reduced God “to a regulative idea and morality…to something already embedded in our actual 
practices” (Hannay, Kierkegaard and Philosophy 13). To Kant, reason only works with that 
which is rational.  Any attempt to go beyond that, to a relationship with God, he deemed utterly 
irrational.  Kant also appears to minimize with the concept of divine revelation in the Scriptures.  
He believes that Christianity can become discoverable apart from revelation and argues that 
“faith in such a revelation is not essential, since the content of that revelation is accessible to 
reason” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript
One can easily observe how Kant’s thought played a pivotal role in the reversal of 
traditional concepts as man’s reason became sovereign.  The philosophy produced by the 
Enlightenment challenged knowledge of anything beyond reason and in doing so, set limits on 
communication as well.  If God is unknown and revelation is a mere product of “religious 
illusion,” then belief is of little use.  Of what use then is communication of God if He is forever 
completely unknowable?  It was Hamann who would offer a scathing critique of Kant’s radical 
ideas, for according to him, Kant had overlooked several key communicative aspects in his 
thought.  No one was more capable of leading the attack against Kant than was he.   
 240).   
An Answer to the Enlightenment: Hamann’s Language Theory  
This researcher gave earlier a brief outline of Hamann’s conversion to Christianity and 
showed how this experience shaped his subsequent thought.  As a contemporary critic of the 
Enlightenment, Hamann recognized that Kant’s appeal to reason raised problems for the 
understanding of communication both verbally and conceptually.  However, he did not seek to 
refute the enlightened philosophical ideals with philosophical arguments (Haynes ed. x). Rather, 
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Hamann’s attack is more indirect in nature.  He employs various literary devices to aid in his 
attack.  Irony, poetry, satire, and humor are all utilized as part of an overall strategy to lead away 
from the teachings of the Enlightenment.  Kenneth Haynes writes that in refuting the enlightened 
view of reason, Hamann relies heavily on “mockery to deny a philosophical problem its status as 
a problem, to be freed from its grip” (x).  This by no means should indicate that Hamann is 
unwilling to address any issue directly, for he often does so with biting wit and craftiness.  For 
example, near the opening of his Socratic Memorabilia (1759), Hamann warns that he has 
chosen to write in Socratic fashion.  “I have written about Socrates in a Socratic way.  Analogy 
was the soul of his reasoning, and he gave it irony for a body” (Haynes ed. 7).  In other words, 
Hamann, who undeniably admires Socrates, wants to embody Socratic style of living when 
writing about Socrates.  Though Socrates himself was no writer, he used a great deal of analogy 
and irony in his thought.  In the same way, Hamann employs these literary devices throughout 
his writings.  This is one way through which he became a creative, original writer.  It has been 
debated as to whether or not Hamann was a philosopher, and indeed it is a label he would 
doubtless vehemently refute, but this much is undeniable: he has a profound, almost subterranean 
understanding of language as his support.  Since Hamann seeks creativity and originality he will 
employ all the methods at his disposal.    
 Hamann understood that language was originally molded on reality, and this 
understanding served to encourage his love of linguistics (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language in the 
Thought of Hamann 23).  That is, language is not based on mere abstraction as voices of the 
Enlightenment would claim, but is shaped in actuality.  Kierkegaard would later claim that it is a 
consideration of language in the abstract that leads us to doubt the possibility of communication 
(Shakespeare 81).  Language conveys meaning, which is in fact, the high purpose for which it 
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was created (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language in the Thought of Hamann
This analogy of man to the Creator endows all creatures with their substance and their 
stamp, on which depends fidelity and faith in all nature.  The more vividly this idea of the 
image of the invisible God dwells in our heart, the more able we are to see and taste his 
loving kindness in creatures, observe it and grasp it with our hands.  Every impression of 
nature in man is not only a memorial but also a warrant of fundamental truth: Who is the 
Lord.  Every reaction of man unto created things is an epistle and seal that we partake of 
the divine nature, and that we are his offspring (Haynes ed. 79).   
 23).  To Hamann, 
language is also symbolic.  Symbols play a significant role in our understanding of language.  
Symbols are powerful because they give us a sense of reality – they can communicate ideas to us 
in an indirect manner.  We associate symbols with both words and concepts.  Therefore, symbols 
can cause us to relate a certain thing to something else.  Signs and symbols can be interpreted, 
and here appears to be Hamann’s fascination with them in relation to language.  Symbols, as 
language, are given by God.  In fact, Hamann’s “whole life can be summed up in the effort to 
discover and interpret, and create ‘language’” (German 34).  He also views language as being 
analogous, and this theme of unity runs throughout his writings.  We have the ability to 
communicate with each other and also with God.  Hamann writes in his Aesthetica in Nuce 
(Aesthetics in a Nutshell): 
Hamann notes that God allowed man to name the animals at creation, and this is evidence of the 
fact that God as the ultimate Creator has also given man the ability to become a creator.  As man 
is made in God’s image, so a certain analogy exists between God and creation.  God “gives all 
creatures their content and character” (Hamann, qtd. in German 40).  To Hamann, the entirety of 
nature echoes God as Sovereign Lord and Creator.  The analogy between God and man exists in 
man’s ability to “partake in the divine nature” and to be called “his offspring.”  Therefore, the 
communication between God and man is not a superficial one, but one of profound mystery.   
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We could say that Hamann is concerned with two aspects of communication.  
Throughout his authorship, he is “dealing first with the ordinary difficulty inherent in 
communication among human beings and secondly with man’s communicative dependence upon 
God” (German 142).  He hails the creativity of man, but recognizes that all creativity comes from 
God alone as the supreme Creator.  Now, Hamann was entranced by both the written word and 
the spoken word, and the best of example as to his formulation of language and communication 
is that of Scripture.  He believes that God, as the divine Word, has always existed.  Through the 
creative act of speaking, God brought all things into existence.  He also inspired man, giving to 
him the ability to write the Scriptures, His Word to mankind.  Hence, man as the recipient of 
God’s creation is also a creator, but only because God has allowed him to be so – for all 
communication derives from God.  “In Hamann’s eyes all divine activities in creation find as 
their goal God’s honor and glory, for God is the acting force in creating” (German 158).  As 
much as anything, this is one idea that permeates Hamann’s writings.  It is one concept he can 
never get away from: God must receive glory for creating us and giving us the ability to create.   
In fact, Hamann’s attack against the Kantian notion of reason is partly aided through his 
conception of God as the almighty Creator.  He saw that in general, the enlightened view of 
reason posed a danger to the reality of faith and understood that many enlightened thinkers had 
not taken language into consideration in their attempts to raise reason to new heights.  While 
expansive in nature, Hamann’s language theory is necessary to understand, for once it is grasped, 
“an understanding of the rest of his thought inevitably follows” (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language 
4).  According to James O’Flaherty, language constitutes the ground for Hamann’s total 
philosophy (4). 
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In his major work Aesthetics in a Nutshell (1762) Hamann writes, “Speak that I may see 
Thee!”  We can gain tremendous insight into his language theory from this statement alone, for 
as we shall see, it has multiple meanings.  Hamann often asked of people “Speak that I may see 
Thee,” because to him, “speech revealed his inner soul” (German 50).  The theme runs 
throughout the course of his works and his life as well.  Author Terrence German points out that 
Hamann sought the unification between his life and authorship.  “Hamann sought to have every 
word he wrote contain a quality that united it with his own physical personality.  He thought as 
much with his belly as with his brain.  He attempted to give his words the physique of his own 
physique” (German 10).  Other writers can perhaps separate their work from their personal life, 
their words from their way of living.  But to Hamann, this is impossible.  He attempts to live, 
breathe and embody his communication with others.  As Ronald Gregor Smith points out, 
Hamann’s thought and actions are “thoroughly integrated” (J.G. Hamann 25).  In communicating 
with others, Hamann “does not make any distinction between his private and public life.  He is 
not different as an author from what he is in his ordinary life” (25).  He must seek to live the 
truth that he believes, and living the truth is for Hamann as important as communicating truth.  
The German writer and philosopher Lessing, a key figure during the Enlightenment, had once 
written, “What does the private life of a writer matter to us?” (qtd. in Haynes ed. 69fn.).  
Hamann says in contrast, “True, one can be a man without finding it necessary to become an 
author.  But whoever expects his good friends to think of the writer apart from the man is more 
inclined to poetic than to philosophical abstractions” (Haynes, ed. 69).  Hamann has the sincere 
desire to create, and as a product of the divine Creator he must live in a responsible manner.  In 
fact, he feels bound to do so by the Creator.  “Speak that I may see thee!”  By speaking through 
the medium of print, Hamann is communicating his true self.   
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Hamann’s attack against the enlightened view of reason is grounded in the importance of 
language.  It is language that appears to precede reason, inasmuch as reason would not be able to 
express itself unless there was a means to do so.  Language gives us an outlet for reasoning, but 
reasoning has its limits.  James O’Flaherty says that language was the “prismatic medium 
through which Hamann saw experience or reality” (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language 4).  In his 
Socratic Memorabilia, Hamann writes and dedicates to his friends, Kant and Berens (both of 
whom tried in vain to bring Hamann back to rationalism after his conversion to Christianity), a 
piece of literature that diametrically opposes their views of reason.  Therein Hamann says, “Our 
own existence, and the existence of all things outside us, must be believed and cannot be 
established in any other way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 
Hamann would eventually state that “Reason is language, logos” (Hamann qtd. in 
German 7).  As Terence German writes, “Reason is based on language as its organ, its source” 
(53).  Hamann himself, in a letter to his friend Herder, exclaims, “All chatter about reason is pure 
wind: language is its organ and criterion…” (Hamann, qtd. in German 53).  Hamann is not 
saying that reason is the written language or even just the spoken language; instead, language 
reaches down into the bones of man (German 7).  Without language and its ability to be 
communicated, reasoning or cognition would be nothing.  Hamann mentions elsewhere that 
language is as the mother of reason.  It would seem that language gives us the ability to reason in 
the first place.  So by holding human reasoning and comprehension in such high regard, thinkers 
of the Enlightenment had denied language as reason’s very source.   Hamann understands that 
language is given to man by God. He also suggests that reason is first and foremost an offense to 
181). Here he is making his claim for faith, 
the foundation of which the rationalist thinkers of the enlightenment would seek to completely 
separate from reason. 
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itself (Anderson 114).  That is, reason has its limitations.  Hence, man cannot know everything 
by the aid of reason alone.  Those enlightened minds who seek to know everything by the 
sovereign aid of reason are deceiving themselves.  The deception lies in the fact that our reason 
can reveal nothing to us directly.  God is the ultimate creator and He has revealed Himself 
through His Word.  This is one way in which God, as Spirit, communicates with man.  Hamann 
writes in Biblical Reflections (1758), “It is the greatest contradiction and misuse of our reason if 
it wants to reveal.  A philosopher who, to please his reason, puts the divine word out of our 
vision is like those Jews who, the more firmly they seem to cling to the Old Testament, the more 
stubbornly they reject the New Testament” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 
Hamann encourages his reader to the particular embodiments and expressions of reason, 
which consist in ways of speaking, acting and writing (Beiser 18).  To the Magus, writing is a 
wonderfully creative talent, but the art of speech is the embodiment of language.  “The written 
word is always deficient to in relation to the spoken word.  The great writer must make the 
written word re-express the sign of his speech” (German 51).  The heart of language is its 
spokenness (53).   
120).   
Hamann believes that speech is the purest form of communication.  Perhaps this insight 
came about from his studies on speech patterns.  He had examined the variance of speech 
patterns amongst different people and different cultures (German 49).  By doing so, he 
understood how “speech varied in the streets, shops, schools, stadiums, and fields; people talked 
differently on different occasions” (49).  Hamann was enamored by both how and why the 
common man, through and across different cultures, used language in the creative and 
communicative act of speech.  By doing so, he had come to realize the significance of language 
not only in human beings, but in the rest of creation as well.  As humans, we communicate 
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differently and speak various languages and dialects.  Humans are diverse as is language, but this 
diversity points back to the almighty Creator as the source.  To Hamann, the tongue, mouth, and 
lips all work together to form human speech with which we communicate with others and most 
importantly, with God (49).  He understood how languages change over time, how they differ 
from culture to culture.  However, speech is always the primary vehicle through which people 
communicate with each other (54). According to Hamann we should always seek to speak better 
(54).  Therefore, we should constantly value our speech and use it correctly, for language and the 
ability to communicate are gifts to mankind, gifts that “have value or worth” (45).  Kierkegaard 
often writes on the beauty of his native language and obviously values the speech process.  He 
writes, “Language is an ideality which every man has gratis.  What an ideality – that God can use 
language to express his thoughts and thus man by means of language has fellowship with God” 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 3
It is evident that Hamann was, according to Terrence German, “in love with the act of 
communication” (42).  He viewed life itself as a communicative, creating experience of flesh and 
spirit (42).  To Hamann, ordinary human language is “molded on reality” (O’Flaherty, 
 13). But Kierkegaard also sees in language a danger as 
well.  It is often by the use of language that man becomes viewed as a hypocrite.  The gift of 
language “permits a person’s life to express the lowest while his mouth prattles on about the 
highest and to give assurances that this is what concerns him” (14).  Kierkegaard understands 
that when language is used incorrectly, it can be just as powerful in a negative way.  “Language, 
the gift of speech, engulfs the human race in such a cloud of drivel and twaddle that it becomes 
its ruination” (14).  Therefore, to both Kierkegaard and Hamann, language must be used 
properly, for its power is great.  Proverbs 18:21 says that “Death and life are in the power of the 
tongue, and those who love it will eat its fruit” (NASV).   
Unity and 
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Language 12) and is not merely abstract.  Mankind is not autonomous, able to communicate and 
create on his own accord as many in the Enlightenment would claim.  Rather, he is dependent 
upon God for all his abilities, and Hamann’s writings always recognize this fact.  He knows his 
abilities to communicate and create as a human being come from God alone, are formed and 
given by Him.  Hamann addresses this theme in “The last will and testament of the Knight of the 
Rose-Cross,” (hereafter KRC) (1772), when he says that the “origin of human language” is 
“certainly divine” (Haynes ed. 100).    Paradoxically, language is essentially and naturally human 
as an activity involving relationships with others (Dickson 239).  We cannot express ourselves in 
any other way than humanly.  Language cannot be extracted from our lives.  Hamann 
understands that language is designed by God as an interpersonal communication.  Hamann 
scholar Gwen Griffith Dickson points out that “language is a matter of human interpersonal 
relations because of the fact that we require instruction in order to possess and use language” 
(239).  To Hamann, this paradox is seen in the principle of the communicatio idiomatum which 
can be defined as the “interchange of properties” (Haynes ed. 99) or “intimate togetherness” 
(O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 128).  The communicatio idiomatum is the theological 
doctrine, made use of by Luther, ‘that while the human and divine natures in Christ were 
separate, the attributes of the one may be predicated of the other in view of their union in the one 
person of the Savior” (Concise Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, qtd. in Haynes 99).  
Hamann often uses this term to relate the close knit between the divine and human elements in 
the process of language (O’Flaherty, Johann Georg Hamann 128).  It is easily observable that 
unity has a predominant role in Hamann’s authorship.  In KRC He states, “This communicatio of 
divine and human idiomatum is the fundamental law and the master-key of all our knowledge 
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and of the whole visible economy” (Haynes ed. 99).  Without the divine intervention of God into 
human activities, there is no human knowledge, creation, or communication.   
The totality of Hamann’s language theory can be viewed in light of his understanding of 
God.  Through God’s creation and condescension He communicates with us.  Hamann can 
admire the spoken word because God first spoke the Word into existence, both in creation and in 
giving the Scriptures to man.  God also speaks through His Son in the person of Christ.  These 
truths became the bedrock of Hamann’s linguistic philosophy; they are the ideas which he knows 
his reason cannot explain, but ones that must be believed.   
 The Logos as Communication 
The idea of the divine Logos so inspired and enthralled Hamann that he could say, 
“Without Thee I am nothing; Thou art my entire being” (qtd. in German 5).  Hamann was 
changed completely by his perception of God, and the Logos dominated his thought and life.  
Ronald Gregor Smith writes, “Everything was for Hamann a sign or symbol of the divine” (J.G. 
Hamann
 First of all, when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to The Word in the form of 
Scripture, both spoken and written.  God spoke the word into existence (Genesis 1:3) and 
continued to communicate His word as an author to men, who are also writers of Scripture.  
Through His word to us, God teaches us how to live; through this word we gain a deeper 
understanding of our sinful condition and of His grace.  Through His word He has chosen to 
reveal to us certain truths.  Through His word, which communicates with us, we in turn learn 
 64).  However, what exactly does Hamann mean by the Logos?  This researcher has 
found that Hamann’s conception of the Logos can be explained in at least three different ways.       
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how to communicate with Him.  Therefore, we can say that “the Word of God is God’s 
speaking” (Barth 15).   
Hamann understands that there can be no act of communication without God’s own 
speaking.  Terrence German writes, “The Holy Spirit was very condescending is His activity of 
writing for man about man, but Hamann is always grateful to the Holy Spirit, because man in 
himself is not capable of any form of communication with God unless God initiates the 
communication” (135).  God’s speech to us throughout Scripture is many things: a creation, a 
declaration, a judgment, a love immeasurable, a poetic gift.  While God’s speaking is all of this, 
it nevertheless remains His mysterious speech.  Hamann recognizes that our reason cannot begin 
to grasp the unfathomable aspect of God’s intervention as the Author.  The Author chose to 
create through “poets and prophets” in the Scripture (Hamann, qtd. in German 148).  These 
poets, prophets, and writers are an “extension of the creative activity of God Himself” (148).  To 
Hamann, God is the ultimate Poet who often seeks to communicate with us through devices 
(such as poetry and parables) we are capable of understanding.  Scripture speaks to us through 
poetry and parables, through prophets and disciples; these are the ones through which God has 
chosen to convey His word.  To Hamann, God’s word is not a dead work of art, but is instead the 
word of truth which is powerfully alive.  God’s word continues to live through its being 
proclaimed and preached.  The theologian Karl Barth says, “…God’s Word is to be regarded as a 
living, actual, and present factor, the Word of God which now both is and should be proclaimed 
and heard” (15).  Preaching is not merely communicating; rather, if done correctly, it is the 
proclamation of Truth communicated to the individual.   Through the foolishness of man5, 
Scripture is communicated as a living Word as it is received and penetrates the heart of man.   
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Secondly, when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to the word as spoken at 
creation.  Hamann places emphasis upon creation because he believes that creation itself speaks 
volumes about its Creator.  It surely must have been of interest to him that God himself, as the 
Word, brought creation into existence by speaking.  In KRC Hamann writes:  
Every phenomenon of nature was a word, -- the sign, symbol and pledge of a new, secret, 
inexpressible but all the more fervent union, fellowship, and communion of divine 
energies and ideas.  All that man heard at the beginning, saw with his eyes, looked upon, 
and his hands handled was a living word, for God was the word.  With this word in his 
mouth and in his heart the origin of language was as natural, as close and easy, as a 
child’s game (Haynes ed. 109).   
Hamann believes that God has placed his stamp upon creation, and that He intended a 
“communion” or unity among creation and the divine.  In the above quote he also relies heavily 
on two scriptures passages.  The first is I John 1:1: “What was from the beginning we have 
heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, 
concerning the Word of Life” (NASV).  The second is John 1:1: “In the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God” (NASV).  Both of these passages 
speak of God’s presence at the beginning of creation.  God spoke all things into existence and 
placed language into both the mouth and heart of mankind.  Terrence German is correct when he 
says that “language reaches down into the bones of man” (7).  Hamann understands that the 
origin of language is easily discernable (“as a child’s game”) because all that man understood at 
creation was the Word.   
 God speaks and says: “Let Us make man in Our own image, according to Our likeness” 
(NASV).  The writer of Genesis says, “God created man in His own image, in the image of God 
He created them” (NASB).  Hamann rejoices in this inscrutable idea of man being formed in 
God’s image.  In Aesthetics in a Nutshell he addresses the issue: 
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The will of the Author in this unravels the most convoluted knots of human nature and its 
destiny.  Blind heathens acknowledged the invisibility which man has in common with 
God.  The veiled figure of the body, the countenance of the head, and the extremities of 
the arms are all visible schema in which we move along; yet in truth they are nothing but 
a finger pointing to the hidden man within us (Haynes ed. 64).   
 That which is hidden within us constitutes the image of God.  David as the writer of the 
Psalms pays homage to this fact by saying “I will give thanks to You, for I am fearfully and 
wonderfully made” (NASV).  Just as God’s word in the form of scripture is a communication to 
us, so is His creation a communication.  In fact, Hamann sees the entirety of creation as an act of 
speech.  “Speak, that I may see you! -- -- This wish was fulfilled by creation, which is a speech 
to creatures through creatures; for day unto day utters speech, and night unto night shows 
knowledge.  Its watchword traverses every clime to the end of the world, and its voice can be 
heard in every dialect” (Haynes ed. 65).  Hamann is referring here to Psalm 19:2-4, which says, 
“Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge.  There is no speech or 
language, where their voice is not heard.  Their line is gone through all the earth, and their words 
to the end of the world” (NKJV).  Hamann’s perception of natural language is founded upon this 
view presented in Scripture.  Natural language, as opposed to abstract language, carries with it 
signs and symbols “for real objects and relations between them” (O’Flaherty, Unity and 
Language 27).  Nature is a sign or symbol through which God conveys and communicates His 
authority as Creator.  We see this in Romans 1:18-20.  Paul writes: “For the wrath of God is 
revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men who suppress truth in 
unrighteousness, because that which is known about God is evident within them; for God made it 
evident to them.  For since the creation of the world His invisible attributes, His eternal power 
and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what has been made, so that 
they are without excuse” (NASV).   
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 One way God has chosen to reveal Himself is via the natural world.  It is this precept that 
guides Hamann’s language theory.  He seeks to communicate through his own writings the 
message that God communicates to us each day.  He is able to exclaim “Nature and Scripture, 
then, are the materials of the beautiful, creative, and imitative spirit” (Haynes ed. 85), because he 
understands that humans are created in God’s image, the same God that wishes to communicate 
his handiwork through nature.  Hamann senses that God formed within nature a necessary and 
recognizable union.  Humans are in unity with God because they are created in His image.  Signs 
and symbols are in unity with language because it is through them that we communicate.  Form 
cannot be divorced from content (O’Flaherty, Unity and Language
The book of creation contains examples of general concepts which God wished to reveal 
to creatures through creation.  The books of the covenant contain examples of secret 
articles which God wished to reveal to man through man.  The unity of the Author is 
mirrored even in the dialect of His works – in all of them a tone of immeasurable height 
and depth!  A proof of the most splendid majesty and total of self-emptying! (Haynes ed. 
75).  
 17).  Hamann writes, “The 
senses and passions speak and understand nothing but images.  All the wealth of human 
knowledge and happiness consists in images.  The first outburst of creation, and the first 
impression of its chronicler; -- --the first manifestation and the first enjoyment of nature are 
united in the words: Let there be light!” (Haynes ed. 64).  The concept of unity plays a major 
theme throughout Hamann’s writings.  The culmination of unity is found in the Trinity – God the 
three in one.  In Him there is “unity in trinity and trinity in unity” (Barth 15).  As Hamann says:  
Again Hamann writes, “If one single truth like the sun prevails, it is day” (78).  The Light of the 
World communicates with us, both by His written word and spoken word.   
 God‘s very breathing into mankind constitutes communication.  The concept of unity 
further plays out in Hamann’s writings when we consider that God breathed the breath of life 
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into mankind (Genesis 1:7).  “The ‘breath’ of God gives union to body and soul.  Body and soul 
should not war against each other because they are in a ‘unity’ by the power of God’s breath as 
He gives us our breath which flows forth from us in speech” (German 55).  To Hamann, the 
creative and communicative act of speech is only possible because God breathed life into us.  
“Man speaks with his breath.  His breath flows from his mouth in the spoken word to others.  His 
breath symbolizes the life which God gave to us” (55).  It is remarkable that Hamann observes 
God’s act of breathing life as communication, especially given the age in which he lived.  Such a 
viewpoint gives precedence to language and speech over the position of autonomous human 
reasoning.  Furthermore, the concepts of language and speech are amplified when we consider 
their source as coming directly from God, who lovingly created man in his image.  
 Lastly, we see that when Hamann speaks of the Logos he is referring to the Word 
Incarnate in the person of Christ.  Hamann’s thinking is guided by the central Christian paradox, 
the Word made flesh, which offers both forgiveness and restoration to mankind (Smith, J.G. 
Hamann
How God the Son lowered himself!  He became a man, the least among men; he took the 
form of a servant; he became the most wretched among men; he became sin for us.  How 
God the Holy Spirit lowered himself, when he became a historian of the smallest, most 
insignificant events on earth, in order to reveal the decisions, the mysteries and the ways 
of the godhead to man in man’s own language, man’s own affairs, man’s own ways (66).   
 65).  In his Biblical Reflections, Hamann says: 
God’s appearing through the person of Christ in the flesh we shall call the Communication of 
Condescension.  The very act of Christ’s condescension to us is the height of communication, for 
God in the flesh speaks through Christ.  Christ’s appearing in the form of man is also the 
lowering of unfathomable love.  Ronald Gregor Smith says, “The condescension of love is not, 
however, a mere tour de force, to attract our attention or engage our admiration.  But it is the 
necessary mode of God’s speech with us” (66).  The incarnation, as Hamann understood it, 
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defies human cognitive powers.  Kierkegaard would later deal with this same concept at multiple 
times throughout his own authorship.  Both Kierkegaard and Hamann would assert that the 
incarnation cannot be described successfully by reason.  Sin has affected human reason.  
Therefore, the incarnation stands as a paradox that must be believed and taken as faith.  Rather 
than assert (as would thinkers of the Enlightenment) that God is utterly unknowable, Kierkegaard 
emphasizes a bridge between the empirical to the noumenal that – that of true faith.   
 This researcher has attempted to explain how Hamann understood that it cannot be 
proven that God is the Author of creation or Scripture, but rather it must be believed.  So it is 
with the Incarnation.  These things must be taken on faith.  The individual is in need of Christ in 
the flesh since because of sin the learner has “become untruth in time” (Kierkegaard, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript
Here reason sinks down, and it is on this basis that the decision of God rests to save fallen 
man, to restore this image.  How much it has cost that I am saved!  Unfathomable God, 
thou hast nevertheless considered this race worthy of the costly ransom.  And that we are 
so worthy in our salvation is due to the worth which thou hast ascribed and 
communicated to us in creation.  To restore this likeness God had to assume the likeness 
of men.  Both are equally great mysteries (Smith, 
 32).  To restore this relationship which sin has damaged, the 
Communication of Condescension is necessary.  Sin has severely injured our being made in the 
image of God.  Hamann writes:  
J.G. Hamann
Here Hamann recognizes the inscrutable acts of creation and incarnation.  Man was created in 
the image of God, but sin separates man from the Creator.  Christ comes into the world and says 
“I am the Way”
 125).  
6 offering salvation.  Through His “costly ransom” He renews man.  It is 
unfathomable to Hamann that Christ chose to take on human form and communicate with 
humans as one of them.  On this point he says, “You come to me? Oh!  God and His Son are so 
gracious that They come to us” (Hamann, qtd. in German 159).  The Word becomes flesh, and 
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communicates with created beings in order to “make all things new.”7
 It is interesting that Hamann and Kierkegaard both refer to Christ as a “stumbling block” 
and a “sign of offence,”
 “God not only created 
heaven and earth for us, but He came into the world to be with us in flesh and blood.  The 
creativity of this act consists in His self-communication” (German 159).  
8
Reason is inclined to serve an unknown God, but is infinitely remote from knowing him.  
It does not wish to know him – and what is even more astonishing, when it does know 
him it ceases to serve him.  This is why God discloses himself so late and so slowly, for 
he knows that knowledge of him is a stumbling-block and an offence to man, that he is 
foolishness and a thorn in the flesh to him as soon as he wishes to reveal himself and 
make himself known (Smith, 
 (as further expounded upon in this chapter under the heading 
“Christianity as Indirect Communication”).  In his Biblical Reflections Hamann writes:  
J.G. Hamann 136).
That is, Christ’s revealing of Himself, His communication with us in the flesh mankind views as 
foolishness.  Man cannot understand the paradox of the God-man.  We can harken back to 
Hamann’s idea that “reason is first and foremost an offence to itself” (Anderson114).  Human 
reason takes offence at the very Creator who gives man the ability to reason in the first place.  
Kierkegaard deals with Christ as a sign of offense in the pseudonymous works Philosophical 
Fragments and Training in Christianity.  In Training Kierkegaard (through the pseudonym Anti-
Climacus) sets out two distinct ways in which the offence takes root.  The offence either has to 
do with the God-Man’s “loftiness” and “exaltation” (Kierkegaard, 
9 
Training in Christianity 84, 
96) or it has to do with His lowliness, “that He who is God is this lowly man, suffering like a 
lowly man” (84).  Man is offended in the first sense by the fact that the man speaking claims to 
be equal with God (84).  Here, human reason is offended and may say, ‘An individual man like 
us wants to be God’ (105).  In the second instance man is offended by His lowliness, by the fact 
that “one who gives Himself out to be God shows himself to be the poor and suffering and at last 
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the impotent man” (105).  The man who takes offence at God’s lowliness in the flesh may speak 
thus: “Supposing for an instant that thou art God, what folly and madness it is that thou art this 
lowly, poor, impotent man!” (105). To Hamann, Christ chose to reveal Himself regardless of His 
knowledge of man’s offence towards Him.  Hamann would stand in agreement with Kierkegaard 
who writes, “The possibility of offence is…every instant present, and constitutes at every instant 
the yawning gulf between the individual and the God-Man, across which only faith can reach” 
(139).   
 The Error of Human Reason 
 This researcher has explained how the Enlightenment sought to heighten the reason of 
man while defining God as utterly unknowable.  In refutation, Hamann sought to combat the 
Enlightenment’s views with his own theory of language which was based in the divine Logos as 
Creator and Redeemer of mankind’s fallen nature.  In order to do so, Hamann placed great 
importance upon God as the origin of communication with mankind.  Enlightened reason would 
seek to counter this viewpoint.  Hamann sought to combat rationalism in his own day while 
Kierkegaard focused on the errors of Idealism during his time.  However, Kierkegaard and 
Hamann would both seek to present man’s reasoning capabilities as flawed by depravity.  
Hamann’s critique of thinkers of the Enlightenment, as has been shown, centers on the concepts 
of language, the Logos, and faith.  To him, the Enlightenment’s fundamental flaw was to deny 
these three concepts their proper roles. 
 To Hamann, the rationalists constantly search for truth. However, their searching is in 
vain because they believe God as the Truth remains unknowable.  In Aesthetics in Nuce Hamann 
writes, “Yes, you delicate critics of art!, you go on asking what is truth, and make for the door, 
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because you cannot wait for an answer to this question” (Haynes ed. 77).  Since rationalism has 
chosen not to consider the Divine, it can only offer hopeless solutions.  To the rationalists, 
human reason offered freedom from existing norms.  However, Hamann would say, “All the 
colors of the most beautiful world grow pale once you extinguish its light, the firstborn of 
creation” (78).  Without God there would be no reasoning ability in the first place.  To Hamann, 
everything becomes dim when we seek to place faith solely within our reasoning and cognitive 
powers.  The world then indeed appears a much different place, for we have then failed to take 
into account its Creator and the sustainer of all life.  This Creator seeks to communicate with us, 
but the rationalists fail to take this into account. 
 Enlightened philosophers are content in their attempts to follow their own system.  
Hamann says that even “The devils believe and tremble!—but your senses, crazed by the 
subtlety of reason, tremble not” (Haynes ed. 90).  Rather, “You congratulate yourself secretly on 
your blindness when God on the cross is numbered among the criminals…” (91). The one who 
thinks he lives by reason alone is foolish, blind, and arrogant.  He has not taken into account 
God’s laws or His communication with mankind.  He does not understand that God gave him the 
ability to become a creator, that God gave him language which proceeds reason.  The rationalists 
do not understand the concept of language in the biblical sense.  “The enlightened rationalists 
who seek to explain speech without recourse to the breath of God interfere with God’s 
manifestation to us through speech” (German 56).  God does speak, through signs and symbols; 
He speaks through nature, through the Scriptures, through His Son, and through the continuing 
proclamation of his Word.  The rationalists are the “healthy who need no physician” (Smith, J.G. 
Hamann 121).  God communicates with mankind, but that does not mean that all things are 
revealed to us.  In his Biblical Reflections Hamann writes, “The curiosity to know things which 
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are too high for us, which are beyond our horizon, which are unfathomable precisely because of 
the weakness which makes the future so obscure to us, has led men into many such ludicrous 
methods and errors” (123).  The Enlightened philosophers deny their own human weaknesses 
and fail to understand that they are living in error.  The same reason which they seek to exalt has 
erred and failed them.  Still, they vehemently deny the possibility of communication with 
anything beyond the empirical realm.  Hamann writes in KRC, “Come on, do you not know by 
now, philosophers!, that there is no physical connection between cause and effect, means and 
intent, only a spiritual and ideal one, that is, blind faith, as the greatest earthly chronicler of his 
country and of the natural church has proclaimed!” (Haynes ed. 103).  To Hamann and (as we 
shall see) Kierkegaard, individual faith is the key to a personal, communicative relationship with 
Christ.  It is the Son of Man who came to communicate His message of redemption and salvation 
from the fall, from depraved reason.  Therefore, we are commanded to fear Him and keep His 
commandments, which is the whole duty of man10.  
 Parabolic Communication: A Relational Tool 
Indirect Communication in the Thought of Kierkegaard 
 Excepting his use of pseudonyms, one of the most easily recognizable forms of 
indirectness in Kierkegaard’s authorship is his use of parables.  Kierkegaard had an amazing 
ability to tell stories, and from his parables we can glean many invaluable truths.  In fact, 
Thomas Oden has remarked that no writer in Western tradition has made more persistent use of 
the parable as a means of communicating moral and spiritual insight than Kierkegaard (Oden 
vii).  According to Oden, “Kierkegaard is one of the few writers…who was himself a literary 
critic, who himself offered a detailed theory of (indirect) communication that accounted for his 
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writing in parable and story form under pseudonyms, and who clearly envisioned parabolic 
communication as an integral part of his philosophical method” (Oden viii).  Above all, parabolic 
communication is a relational tool to Kierkegaard.  It is a device that constitutes indirectness 
since it removes the communicator and allows the recipient to focus on that which is being 
communicated.   
 That Kierkegaard used stories to illustrate his message I think, can be traced back to a 
very influential period of his life—his childhood.  Kierkegaard’s father had a unique gift of 
story-telling as well, and his manner of doing such was influential to Kierkegaard as a young boy 
(Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.1
 One of Kierkegaard’s best known parables comes from his private journals and has to do 
with the attack upon the Established Church of his time, which he believed failed to resemble the 
Christianity in the New Testament.  It is entitled “The Obedient Hound” and I quote it in full 
here for two reasons: first, that it may show the power behind Kierkegaard’s parables as a 
relational form of communication; secondly, to demonstrate that it can aid our perspective when 
later in this chapter we discuss Kierkegaard’s attack upon established Christendom. 
 32).  So at an early age he learned the art of epic narrative, drama, 
and dialectics.  They all became sources of his story-telling when he became an author.   
Imagine a big, well-trained hunting dog.  He accompanies his master on a visit to a 
family, where, as all too often in our time, there is a whole assembly of ill-behaved 
youths.  Their eyes hardly light upon the hound before they begin to maltreat it in every 
kind of way.  The hound, which was well trained, as these youths were not, fixes his eye 
at once upon his master to ascertain from his expression what he expects him to do.  And 
he understands the glance to mean that he is to put up with all the ill-treatment, accept it 
indeed as though it were sheer kindness conferred upon him.  Thereupon the youths of 
course became still more rough, and finally they agreed that it must be a prodigiously 
stupid dog which puts up with everything.  The dog meanwhile is concerned only about 
one thing, what the master’s glance commands him to do.  And, lo, that glance is 
suddenly altered; it signifies—and the hound understands it at once—use your strength.  
That instant with a single leap he has seized the biggest lout and thrown him to the 
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ground—and now no one stops him, except the master’s glance, and the same instant he 
is as he was before.—Just so with me (Kierkegaard, Attack Upon Christendom
The parable obviously has application to Kierkegaard’s attempt to speak directly, as he 
did later in his career, about the problems in Christendom.  Another such parable comes from 
very early in Kierkegaard’s authorship and appeared in he beginning of Either/Or.  Entitled “The 
Happy Conflagration,” it shows “what happens to those who try to warn against the present age” 
(Oden 3).  “In a theater, it happened that a fire started offstage.  The clown came out to tell the 
audience.  They thought it was a joke and applauded.  He told them again, and they became still 
more hilarious.  This is the way, I suppose, that the world will be destroyed—amid the universal 
hilarity of wits and wags who think it is all a joke” (Kierkegaard, Either/Or 30).   
 x).   
 Now, according to Thomas Oden, Kierkegaard used parabolic communication for five 
reasons (x).  First, the practice was an “excellent weapon in his philosophical-polemical arsenal.  
A second reason is that “he quite evidently relishes meeting his reader in this way.  He takes 
delight in leading his readers along a path, only to arrive at an unexpected junction where he 
suddenly leaves them to make a decision about a set of events” (xi).  This has the affect of 
disarming the reader, “putting him or her in a non-defensive, receptive frame of mind that allows 
the author to enter more deeply into personal communication with the reader” (xii).  A parable 
requires a deep self-examination (xii) and can be personally related to one’s situation very easily.   
 The third reason Oden believes Kierkegaard uses parables is that they are an essential 
part of indirect communication, which is in turn a central part of Kierkegaard’s authorship.  
“Each parable aims to challenge the subjective consciousness of the individual reader in its own 
way” (xiii).  Oden writes that parables fall clearly into Kierkegaard’s model of indirect 
communication because “they confront us with a choice between possibilities of self-
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understanding, so that in the process of having to choose, we discover ourselves, or something of 
ourselves” (xiii).  The fourth reason has to do with the third, in that Kierkegaard uses parables to 
bring about self-awareness in his readers.  The fifth reason according to Oden is that “they are by 
the author’s intention, designed to serve oral traditions” (Oden xvi).  Oden explains:  
As a distinctive literary genre, the parable, by definition, is intended to be remembered, to 
lend itself to oral retelling.  Memorability is thus a crucial criterion for any parable.  
Therefore an austere writer of parables has precisely in mind the detachability of the 
parable from its original context, otherwise his purpose is defeated.  If, before telling or 
commenting upon the parable of the prodigal son, one were required to place it in its 
original historical context, the parable would seldom be told or remembered.  But, it has 
been remembered, and it has been appropriated in and out of many historical contexts… 
(xvi).   
The point here is that parables direct themselves particularly to memory, oral repetition, and 
adaptation (xvii).  
 Kierkegaard’s use of parables certainly plays a major role in his indirect communication 
model.  While he frequently uses parabolic communication as indirectness, it is also obvious that 
parables serve another purpose when they are used by the pseudonyms.  When a pseudonym is 
the author of a work, Kierkegaard is once removed from the communication.  However, when a 
pseudonym utilizes parabolic communication in a pseudonymous work, Kierkegaard is then 
doubly removed from the communication instead.   
 Hamann also shows a love for parabolic communication.  In Aesthetics in a Nutshell he 
writes likely his most famous words: “Poetry is the mother-tongue of the human race, as the 
garden is older than the ploughed field; painting, than writing; song, than declamation; parables, 
than logical deduction; barter, than commerce” (Haynes ed. 63).  Here, Hamann gives us an 
example of his preference for analogical rather than logical thinking.  James O’Flaherty explains 
the importance of analogical thinking to Hamann.  “Whereas the rationalist establishes a 
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principle, whether deductively or inductively, and thereupon proceeds to draw inferences from it, 
the intuitive thinker establishes a model on nonrational grounds, as, for example, instinct or faith, 
and thereupon proceeds to draw parallels to the model” (O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 87).  Hamann 
thinks “it is more natural for man to think in metaphors or parables, which involve analogical 
thinking, than to arrive at deductions” (88).  In his Biblical Reflections, Hamann writes, “All 
mortal creatures are able to see the truth and essence of things only in parables” (qtd. in 
O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 87).  Parabolic communication helps us understand things in an 
indirect manner.  Parables give us a mental image of that which is being communicated.  Thus 
Hamann writes, “Senses and passions speak and understand nothing but images” (Smith, J.G. 
Hamann
Concepts of Indirectness in the Authorship 
 196).  Parables allow us to see things from a symbolic point of view.  It is worth noting 
here that Hamann and Kierkegaard after him both stress the importance of parabolic 
communication, as form of indirectness.  
 Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms throughout much of his career as an author is both well 
known and extensively researched.  However, its nature is often misunderstood.  Throughout 
postmodernity, as Kierkegaard’s thought has been interpreted and applied to various educational 
disciplines, the Christian aspects of his thought have often been disregarded.  In such cases, the 
answer as to why Kierkegaard employed pseudonyms as part of his method of indirect 
communication remains ignored as well.  When Kierkegaard’s overtly Christian message is 
either disregarded or misinterpreted, danger in turn arises; for without taking into account the 
Christian message of his writings, the proper perspective for interpretation is lost.  Louis Pojman 
writes, “Sometimes Kierkegaard is interpreted as a poet, sometimes as the Father of 
Existentialism, sometimes as the scourge of Idealism.  The important thing is to see that 
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Kierkegaard’s fundamental purpose was to make eminently clear what Christianity is all about” 
(Pojman 4).  Conversely, such writers as Roger Poole have claimed that there is no correct way 
to read Kierkegaard, whose writings will always remain ambiguous and mysterious since, 
“Kierkegaard’s writing has made all solutions impossible” (Poole 1).  From his perspective, 
Poole groups Kierkegaard with such Deconstructionist thinkers as Jacques Derrida, by claiming 
that Kierkegaard “demonstrates that a meaning can be so long deferred that it would finally be 
merely naïve to ask about it” (2). According to Poole, “Kierkegaard writes text after text whose 
aim is not to state a truth, not to clarify an issue, not to propose a definite doctrine, not to offer 
some “meaning” that could be directly appropriated” (7).   This view is an example of the kind of 
misinterpretation which fails to take into account the Christian aspect of Kierkegaard’s 
authorship, of which indirect communication plays an integral role.  Rather than defer or fail to 
present meaning, Kierkegaard takes his receiver on a journey through the categories of the 
esthetic and ethical in order to arrive to the religious.  A definite, concrete process, one through 
which Kierkegaard seeks to move the individual reader toward Christianity, is pervasive 
throughout the authorship.   
 Kierkegaard’s “first authorship” (1841-1846) he refers to as esthetic writings because 
they represent not only various literary and poetic opinions of the pseudonyms, but also 
characterize the categories in which most people live.  In an amazingly short period time, 
Kierkegaard wrote the bulk of his pseudonymous literature.  From 1843 to 1846 his major works 
included Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of 
Anxiety, Stages on Life’s Way, and CUP, as well as the Discourses accompanying each work.  
Until “A First and Last Declaration” was appended to the end of CUP in 1846, he had made no 
“official acknowledgement” that the pseudonymous works actually belonged to him (Swenson 
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17).  Although the majority of Denmark regarded Kierkegaard as the author of the 
pseudonymous works, his “Declaration” is nevertheless imperative to understanding the thought 
behind the pseudonyms.  Kierkegaard writes: 
My pseudonymity or polyonymity has not had an accidental basis in my person…but an 
essential basis in the production itself, which, for the sake of the lines and of the 
psychologically varied differences of the individualities, poetically required as 
indiscriminateness with regard to good and evil, brokenheartedness and gaiety, despair 
and overconfidence, suffering and elation, etc., which is ideally limited only by 
psychological consistency, which no factual person dares to allow himself or can want to 
allow himself in the moral limitations of actuality.  What has been written, then, is mine, 
but only insofar as I, by means of audible lines, have placed the life-view of the creating, 
poetically actual individuality in his mouth, for my relation is even more remote than that 
of a poet, who poeticizes characters and yet in the preface is himself the author.  That is, I 
am impersonally or personally in the third person a souffleur [prompter] who has 
poetically produced the authors, whose prefaces in turn are their productions, as their 
names are also.  Thus in the pseudonymous books there is not a single word by me.  I 
have no opinion about them except as a third party, no knowledge of their meaning 
except as a reader, not the remotest private relation to them, since it is impossible to have 
that to a doubly reflected communication (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript
The opinions presented by the pseudonyms are theirs alone.  In order to serve the purpose 
of indirect communication, Kierkegaard must distance himself from the production of the 
pseudonymous authors.  This concept allows the array of pseudonymous authors such as 
Johannes Climacus, Johannes de Silentio, Victor Eremita, Frater Taciturnus, Constantine 
Constantius, and Vigilius Haufniensis to present their own opinions on such subjects as 
philosophy, religion, poetry, art, and literature.  Kierkegaard “is not the author of their opinions, 
but only the responsible individual who has given poetic life to the authors, each one of whom 
speaks for himself” (Swenson 17).  The fact that Kierkegaard refers to his fictitious authors as 
“individuals” is significant as well.  The pseudonyms are individuals in the Kierkegaardian 
sense.  The opinions they represent are their own.  Although the reader may be able to see traces 
of Kierkegaard in some of the pseudonyms, it would not be fair to attribute their opinions to him, 
 625). 
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since at times the pseudonyms present life-views contrary to one another.  Therefore, the 
argument that Kierkegaard simply used the pseudonyms as a mask for presenting his own views 
simply does not apply.  David Swenson says:  
One guiding idea runs through this maze.  His purpose is to explain and solve the riddles 
of the life of reason and freedom.  Not, however, in such a way as merely to increase the 
store of human knowledge.  He had diagnosed the evil of his day as a confusion of 
knowledge with life, and he did not intend to contribute to this confusion by adding a few 
more paragraphs to help make a systematic result.  It was necessary to teach men what it 
means to live, and to this end he wished to place before them living personalities who 
think and speak for themselves (Swenson 17).   
Rather than using the pseudonyms to present his own opinions, Kierkegaard in effect, turns them 
into living writers with opinions of their own.  The pseudonyms represent different characters on 
different paths of life.  If the reader examines what the pseudonyms have to say, he or she may 
recognize something of themselves (McPherson 158).   In this sense, “Kierkegaard’s 
pseudonymity is the curtain separating him from the drama he stages” (Taylor 102). 
 Kierkegaard’s aim throughout his writings is displayed in The Point of View.  
Kierkegaard’s “first authorship” is often categorized as his esthetic production, while his “second 
authorship” (1846-1855) represents the religious.  However, as Kierkegaard writes, “The 
religious is present from the beginning.  Conversely, the aesthetic is present again at the last 
moment” (Kierkegaard, The Point of View 12).  Clearly, he anticipated the denouncement that 
he had become a religious writer only after running through the esthetic stage. “The first group 
of writings represents the aesthetic productivity, the last group is exclusively religious: between 
them, as the turning point, lies the Concluding Unscientific Postscript.  This work concerns itself 
with and sets ‘the Problem,’ which is the problem of the whole authorship: how to become a 
Christian” (13).  Throughout The Point of View Kierkegaard maintains that he had been from the 
beginning a religious author; he had not become one with age or passing time.  That from the 
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beginning of his authorship he had been a religious writer concerned with how the single 
individual becomes a Christian is evidenced by the “Upbuilding Discourses.”  Even during the 
esthetic production, characterized by indirect communication, Kierkegaard published these 
overtly theological writings under his own name, employing direct communication.  The 
Discourses, each one as an accompaniment to a major work were generally published around the 
same time as the pseudonymous works.  For example, the pseudonymous “twin” works 
Repetition and Fear and Trembling found their way to the printer on October 16, 1843 under the 
pseudonyms Constantin Constantius and Johannes de Silentio, respectively.  On the same day, 
the work Three Upbuilding Discourses appeared.  This allowed Kierkegaard the ability to 
publish the pseudonymous works as indirect communication while presenting his own thought in 
the Discourses.  The very structure of the authorship itself proves Kierkegaard a religious author, 
indeed a Christian one.  Here we have one example of a dialectical approach to Kierkegaard’s 
authorship.  On the one hand, we have Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous writings which are bound in 
indirect communication and through which various life-views are often presented.  (One must 
remember the reason these life-views are presented: In order to bring the individual reader to the 
point of choosing whether or not to accept Christianity.)  On the other, the Discourses, to which 
Kierkegaard readily attaches his name.  In the introduction to Edifying Discourses, Paul Holmer 
writes, “Each discourse is calculated to bring the reader, whatever his aesthetic and intellectual 
capacity, into conversation about religious and Christian concerns” (Kierkegaard, Edifying 
Discourses
 However, we cannot alienate the Discourses from the rest of Kierkegaard’s authorship.  
Neither can we completely isolate his pseudonymous authorship from his direct, signed works.  
Rather, it is important to view the entire authorship in totality.  Only then can one begin to 
 vii).   
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understand the fullness of Kierkegaard’s Christian message.  Kierkegaard’s aim was to lead 
away from speculative thought and from Christianity simply as objective adherence, as he 
believed Christendom had become during his day.  He understood that the majority of people in 
his times considered themselves Christians; however, they did not know what it means to exist in 
Christianity.  To Kierkegaard, Christendom as he saw it in Denmark had become nothing more 
than a ritualistic claim accepted by the mass public.  Individuality had become widely ignored.  
Christendom as a type of popular folk religion denied personal examination and appropriation 
which is central to the very teachings of Christianity. We can easily make parallels to our own 
times by understanding what Christendom had become in Denmark according to Kierkegaard.  
He saw how “it is difficult for anyone to become a Christian in truth because everyone is a 
Christian of a sort.  Being a Christian is confused with being a nice, respectable person who 
works hard, fulfills family responsibilities, and perhaps even goes to church on Sundays now and 
then” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 4).  In this respect, the truth of Christianity is 
hidden from view.  People may have objective knowledge of Christian principles, but they 
deceive themselves into believing that these acts alone constitute the whole the whole truth of 
what it means to be a Christian.  “Such a Christianity makes no real difference to anything or 
anyone, and Kierkegaard saw very clearly that its major function was simply to legitimize the 
status quo of an emerging bourgeois culture” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 4).  In 
order to reform and “reintroduce Christianity into Christendom,” Kierkegaard understood that 
the individual must be made aware of his or her existence, and ultimately see what it means to 
exist as an individual in Christianity.  Hence, we have Kierkegaard’s focus on subjectivity and 
inwardness.  It is individual and personal belief in God which brings about faith.  Kierkegaard’s 
focus on “the single individual” then, is an attempt to lead others toward what it means to exist 
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“alone face to face before God” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2 402).  Kierkegaard’s 
call to “live as an individual” always involves living as an individual before God.  He writes, 
“But the all-knowing One, who in spite of anyone is able to observe it all, does not desire the 
crowd.  He desires the individual; He will deal only with the individual, quite unconcerned as to 
whether the individual be of high or low station, whether he be distinguished or wretched” 
(Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart
Hermann Diem points out that it is the “greatest possible misunderstanding” of 
Kierkegaard’s teaching to say that he “seeks truth in the subjective (psychological) sphere” or 
that he makes the subjective an object of personal feeling
 185).  One can certainly gain objective knowledge of Christianity 
by being part of the crowd, but one can never become a Christian by its aid.  Each man only 
finds true faith by being alone before God.  By mere objective knowledge, as we will see shortly, 
one does not come to any personal appropriation of the truth.  That is, objective knowledge 
cannot make any eternal decision to accept Christianity.  Christianity can only be accepted 
subjectively through individual terms.   
11 (Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of 
Existence 38f).  Rather, “the point is not to think truth but to live in truth.  This means that truth 
is no longer to be conceived as an objective statement about certain relations of being, but as a 
form of existence in which such relations are actualized” (38).  The pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus writes, “Christianity wants to give the single individual an eternal happiness, a good 
that is not distributed in bulk but only to one, and to one at a time” (Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript 
Faith is not gained through the imposition of another’s belief into one’s own life.  Rather, 
the Gospel must be believed through inwardness and personal appropriation of the truth.  In his 
writings on communication, Kierkegaard distinguishes between objective knowledge and 
130).   
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subjective existence and between direct and indirect communication by introducing “the 
communication of knowledge” and the “communication of capability.”  We can gain further 
insight into the Kierkegaardian concepts of inwardness, objectivity, and subjectivity by 
examining his understanding of communication. 
Background to the Lectures: The Effects of the Corsair Affair on Kierkegaard’s View of 
Communication 
 In 1847, Kierkegaard wrote as part of his planned lectures on communication:  
But I also find everywhere that men are preoccupied with the WHAT which is to be 
communicated.  What occupies me, on the other hand, is: what does it mean to 
communicate—of this I know I have read nothing at all in the productions of the modern 
period, nor have I heard anything spoken about it.  Once long ago, in antiquity, primarily 
in Greece, I find that men occupied themselves with this problem (Kierkegaard, Journals 
and Papers Vol. 1
Drafted but never published or delivered, these lectures nevertheless play an important role in 
Kierkegaard’s thinking concerning the area of communication.  The date 1847 is itself important 
because the author had already published CUP (nearly a year before), which addressed what it 
means to become a Christian and in which he dealt with the problem communication in great 
detail.  The lectures, then, did not constitute the complete formulation of his thoughts on 
communication; rather, they serve to further illuminate the subject.  Hence, the lectures are 
extremely important in order to fully grasp Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication.  
Although the lectures on communication have traditionally been examined far less than many of 
Kierkegaard’s major works, they are necessary to understanding his model of indirect 
communication, for as he says, “If anyone were to ask me how I regard these lectures in 
relationship to my whole effort as an author, I would answer: I regard them as a necessary 
concession, for which I intend to bear responsibility” (302).  Before examining the lectures in 
 304).   
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detail, we must catch a glimpse of an event which affected Kierkegaard’s life both personally 
and as an author during 1846-47.   
 By 1847, Kierkegaard was in the midst of his attack on The Corsair, the Danish 
comic/gossip newspaper of which it has been said, “…its real editors hid behind the blackguards 
who were ready to suffer the penalties of the law for libel.  All reputable men declared that it was 
a scandal which ought to be abated—yet secretly read it with malicious enjoyment” (Lowrie, A 
Short Life of Kierkegaard 176).  Kierkegaard eventually would suffer a great deal of public 
ridicule and became nothing more than a caricature at the hands of the powerful newspaper with 
“the largest circulation in Denmark” (176).  In fact, the paper had achieved a circulation that 
greatly outnumbered any in Denmark (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 347).  The weekly paper had 
attained such vast readership and circulation by “providing for the common people the delectable 
spectacle of the upper classes exposed to the vilest derision” (The Point of View
Under the ownership and operation of Aaron Goldschmidt, a talented Jewish writer and 
journalist (Bukdahl 147), The Corsair amassed such a large circulation by appealing especially 
to the “lower classes” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 10).  The paper mixed “fact, 
rumor, and gossip” (Kjӕr-Hansen, qtd. in Jansen 10) in order to attract readership.  Its power as a 
product of mass consumption stemmed from the facts that it was not only read by everyone but 
also feared by all, for “nobody knew when he or she would appear in it” (Jansen 10).  
 164).  David 
Swenson writes concerning The Corsair: “It dealt in attacks on public men, in caricatures and 
satires, and even exploited the secrets of private life.  Evidence is not wanting that it frequently 
descended to the level of blackmail.  No one respected it, but everyone feared it; it was read 
everywhere, by high and low alike” (19).  The Corsair appeared to never miss the slightest 
chance to single out and slander certain individuals, much to the secret delight of the public.   
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Goldschmidt himself hid behind The Corsair, and he and his fellow journalists cloaked 
themselves in anonymity.  The paper’s “effectual editor,” P.L. Møller12
Goldschmidt himself was given to the political liberalism of the times, and he 
“represented the young Denmark that had been inspired by the French revolution of July 1830 
, did the same.  But how 
could The Corsair operate under anonymity, given the fact that in Denmark “all periodicals were 
obliged to supply the name of a person to be held legally responsible for everything that 
appeared in the relevant issue” of a paper (Bredsdorff 129)?  The answer is quite simple.  During 
Goldschmidt’s six-year reign at The Corsair, the names of at least fourteen different people 
appeared as legally responsible editors (129).  The names were those of real, existing persons; 
however, these individuals were not connected to the paper or responsible for its content.  As 
Elias Bredsdorff explains, “Most of the editors at The Corsair were mere stooges: shop 
assistants, sailors, and dock workers who were paid for the use of their names, thus covering up 
for the real editor, whose name never appeared on the journal” (129).  This anonymity afforded 
Goldschmidt, Møller, and other journalists the luxury of spreading gossip and slandering others, 
but it just as importantly removed them from being held responsible for the paper’s content.  As 
a result, no one dared stand up to criticize or ridicule The Corsair’s practices, for doing so meant 
certain slander.  The Corsair stands out as only one example of mass media in Kierkegaard’s 
Denmark, but its importance cannot be overstated.  It has been written of the state of journalism 
at the time: “Proper journalists would hardly have worked for the daily press, which was in fact 
served by failed students, mediocre people who did the job as a sideline, often somewhat 
unsavory types” (Stangerup 124). Nevertheless, the press had an enormous impact on society.  
As a widely-read newspaper, The Corsair specifically succeeded in affecting both the state of 
journalism and the perception of journalism in Denmark at the time.   
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and had now turned against what it called ‘men of stagnation’” (Bukdahl 84).  His newspaper 
demanded the complete abolition of the institution of monarchy (Bredsdorff 129).  The contents 
of The Corsair reflected its political leanings.  “Without being linked to any political party it 
expressed extreme radical views; in some respects it may even be regarded as a precursor of 
socialist ideas.  Most of all, The Corsair aimed at being witty – and often was, though many of 
its jokes have lost their flavor today.  Its humor ranged from the very crude to the very 
sophisticated…” (130). Jørgen Bukdahl writes that “Kierkegaard viewed aristocratic National 
Liberalism, with its army of journalists and its command of the press, as a deception of the 
people, misleading and actually insulting to the common man…” (85). Goldschmidt was likely 
motivated to appeal to the common man by pushing his agenda of national liberalism.  The 
paper’s popularity was doubtless aided in part by its political stance. Since The Corsair was 
largely based on French radical periodicals, it was the kind of journal the likes of which 
Denmark had never seen (Bredsdorff 128).  It would certainly appear as if dawning liberalism 
had found its mouthpiece (Stangerup 120).   
The Corsair debacle had sweeping ramifications for all parties involved.  As Howard and 
Edna Hong acknowledge in the introduction to The Corsair Affair, the event has been called “the 
most renowned controversy in Danish literary history” (Kierkegaard, The Corsair Affair vii).13 
The events that unfolded between Goldschmidt, Kierkegaard, and Møller through the medium of 
print reverberated throughout Copenhagen and “was as wrenching as it was decisive for each of 
them in ways that were completely unexpected” (Perkins, The Corsair Affair xiv).  For our 
purposes, we shall see that the battle particularly had enormous effects upon Kierkegaard and his 
subsequent thought.  Throughout the entire affair we have two very distinct and separate views 
represented.  On the one hand we have Kierkegaard’s view that The Corsair disrupted and 
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confused society with its appeals to the masses through disreputable content.  It was well known 
that The Corsair singled out and slandered certain individuals for the purpose of stirring up 
gossip. This was all done in the name of readership and circulation.  Kierkegaard believed that 
the purpose of the paper was “merely to make money by fair means or foul” (Lowrie, 
Kierkegaard Vol.2
There is a sense in which journalism is a business like any other practice.  Writers, 
editors, and publishers alike rarely are willing to give away what power they have obtained.  As 
a result, they often adhere to those ideals which will best serve their own interests.  One goal of 
the daily press is to reach the greatest amount of people possible.  Its power to influence public 
opinion, to sway the masses, is almost unprecedented.  So, on the other hand we have the views 
of Goldschmidt and Møller, both of whom doubtless desired to remain shrouded in anonymity 
and perceived Kierkegaard a threat to the basic tenets of journalistic practice.  They were likely 
comfortable with the status quo, for the greater the circulation, the more people they reached.  
The greater the level of reach, the more influence the paper gained in society.  The greater this 
influence, the more money The Corsair could make.  The practices of The Corsair represented a 
dark side of journalism, but unfortunately a very real side—and one that is to a certain extent still 
recognizable today.   
 348).  He writes that the paper attacked “peaceable and respectable men, who 
in honorable seclusion follow their vocations in the service of the state; excellent men, in many 
ways deserving well, and in none having made themselves worthy of ridicule” (Kierkegaard, qtd. 
in Swenson 98).   
Now, Kierkegaard scholars are somewhat at odds over exactly who should be held 
responsible (Goldschmidt or Møller) for the leveling of Kierkegaard in the press (Perkins ed. 
xxiii).  The general view is that Møller initiated the attack while Goldschmidt perpetuated it.   
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For our purposes it is necessary to shed light on the details of the affair, for it became a driving 
force behind Kierkegaard’s view of communication.   
Kierkegaard had previously received favorable reviews from The Corsair.  Goldschmidt 
had praised both The Concept of Irony (1841) and Either/Or and certainly respected Kierkegaard 
as a brilliant author whose pseudonymous literature was unsurpassed in Denmark (Bredsdorff 
131).  For his part, Kierkegaard had befriended Goldschmidt when the latter lacked any person 
of distinction with whom he could converse (Lowrie 348).  In fact, it is clear that Kierkegaard 
recognized Goldschmidt’s talent and often encouraged him to quit The Corsair (348).  He likely 
recognized that Goldschmidt was capable of producing literary material which could greatly 
surpass any success through The Corsair.  In any event, the two often discussed articles that had 
appeared in The Corsair and Kierkegaard made suggestions for new subjects to Goldschmidt 
(Bukdahl 83).  However, we shall see that from Kierkegaard’s point of view newspapers should 
appeal to the individual rather than the masses.  They should strive to aid the individual’s 
development in a positive way.  He believed that a newspaper, even a satirical one like The 
Corsair, could be used “to address the individual reader as a human being” (Jansen, “The 
Individual Versus the Public” 11).  “In The Corsair, or any other satirical newspaper, 
Kierkegaard foresaw the possibility of using satire and irony to awaken the reader.  But this is 
precisely what Goldschmidt did not do.  Kierkegaard thus accused Goldschmidt of cowardice: 
instead of using the potentialities of his medium, Goldschmidt made himself a nonentity by 
hiding behind The Corsair” (12).  One mistake of the daily press was its insistence to write for –
and thereby actually create—a mass public.  As Kierkegaard says:  
The whole population of Copenhagen had become ironical and witty…This irony was of 
course nothing but, in essence, vulgarity; and in spite of a not inconsiderable degree of 
talent in the man who was its originating force, by passing over to these thousands of 
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people it became, essentially, a mob trait which is always only too popular.  In view of 
the proportions of the little country, it threatened a complete moral dissolution 
(Kierkegaard, qtd. in Swenson 96).   
Denmark was a small country and could not withstand such a force as The Corsair in 
Kierkegaard’s view.  Goldschmidt may have been a talented young man, but he had helped to 
produce a crowd that secretly welcomed the vulgarity of The Corsair.  By allowing themselves 
to be taken in by the publication, people were actually permitting it to control the way they 
thought, acted, and lived.   
Although The Corsair had been favorable to Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous literature in 
the past, he did not welcome the paper’s praise.  Given his already dim view of The Corsair, 
Kierkegaard would rather have his pseudonyms attacked than acclaimed—and he said so.14 
Møller began the actual attack in 1845 by writing an unfavorable, overly-critical review of part 
of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous Stages on Life’s Way (1845), which appeared in the annual 
publication Gœa.  It was obvious that Møller had failed to rightly understand the work or the 
view of one of its pseudonymous authors, Frater Taciturnus.15   Kierkegaard responded promptly 
with a pseudonymous article of his own printed in the daily paper The Fatherland.  In the article 
he spoke of Møller’s position as The Corsair's effectual editor.  In doing so, Walter Lowrie 
writes that Kierkegaard thereby revealed Møller’s secret connection with the “disreputable 
paper” (The Point of View 164) and ruined Møller’s opportunity to “attain the university chair he 
so coveted” (164).  However, there is some contention between scholars on this view.  Robert 
Perkins points out that there is evidence that Møller’s position at The Corsair could have at least 
moderately been known to those with whom he sought such a decorated position months prior to 
Kierkegaard’s response (The Corsair Affair xviii).  According to Perkins, Goldschmidt himself 
attempted to transfer the blame for Møller’s non-appointment to Kierkegaard, perhaps because 
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he had personally told Kierkegaard of Møller’s involvement with the paper (xx).  However, if 
Goldschmidt had broken silence and related the issue of Møller to Kierkegaard, how many other 
people had he told as well?  Perhaps Kierkegaard’s article succeeded in making it more widely 
known that Møller was intimately involved with the scandalous paper, but it would appear that 
evidence of his association was already not lacking.   
In any event, The Corsair struck back with ferocity, as Møller began the attack on 
Kierkegaard that would last for an extended period of time.  His first article, Lowrie notes, 
included a caricature of Kierkegaard.  Lowrie writes that “for the course of about a year almost 
every number of the Corsair carried one or more caricatures designed to make Denmark’s 
greatest writer ridiculous in the eyes of the vulgar” (A Short Life of Kierkegaard164).  A week 
rarely passed without the production of at least one or more (and sometimes four) articles 
mocking Kierkegaard’s physical appearance (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 351).  These articles 
and caricatures were of such interest to society that other papers printed them as well (351).  
Constant references were made to Kierkegaard’s unique attire and he was often depicted as 
unkempt and slightly deformed in the caricatures.  His pseudonymous characters were attacked 
repeatedly, but always in such a way as to make it painfully obvious that Kierkegaard was the 
intended subject of ridicule.  As a result, he became a “standing comic figure” to the public.  
Rather than understanding that The Corsair stooped to malice and slander in order to gain 
readers, the public took delight in the depictions of Denmark’s greatest writer.  David Swenson 
says that the attack sunk deeply into the consciousness of Copenhagen (21).  He writes, “The 
articles were illustrated with pictures of Kierkegaard walking through the streets, his umbrella 
under his arm, and one trouser leg depicted as considerably longer than the other.  The result of 
this campaign was that Kierkegaard could not show himself on the streets without being 
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followed by a gaping and howling mob of boys and young men” (20).  Elias Bredsdorff 
describes the situation this way: “The Corsair’s cartoons had made SK the target of mob-ridicule 
in Copenhagen.  Prostitutes accosted him in the streets as ‘Mr. Either/Or,’ and people stared at 
his trousers and laughed knowingly.  SK suffered unspeakably” (141).  The effects of the affair 
far outlasted the debacle itself.  Kierkegaard would publically suffer the effects for two more 
years, and he was mocked, laughed at and taunted for the rest of his life (Lowrie, Kierkegaard 
Vol.2
They have infected the air for me…Curiosity surrounds me everywhere.  I travel five 
miles out to my dear forest district—ah! everywhere curiosity. And so I am wasted upon 
Denmark…My Christian name exists as a nickname for me which every school-boy 
knows.  Ever more frequently the same name is now used by authors, in comedies it now 
appears regularly, and everybody knows that it is I (qtd. in Lowrie 354).   
 353).  The derision begun by one newspaper had infected the mob (354).  Kierkegaard 
wrote of the struggle in 1848:  
 Lowrie relates the story of the attack which likely affected Kierkegaard the most.  It deals with 
the event in Kierkegaard’s life which caused him considerable suffering: the breaking of his 
engagement to his fiancé Regina Olsen in 1841. 
But to the most shameful of all the attacks of The Corsair (he was pictured sitting astride 
a young girl and beating her, and the motto was ‘Frater Taciturnus chastises his girl’) his 
reaction was anything but extravagant: “Here now, little Corsair!  It is womanish to 
torment a man with his love-affair; it is a womanish thing under the impression of love 
disdained to continue to run after a person in the street and call him names.  Be a man, 
hold your peace” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2
In a separate depiction, Frater Taciturnus “is surveilling his battle forces (a pitiable crowd 
without arms and legs,” and yet another shows Kierkegaard as “the centre of the universe” 
(Bredsdorff 139).   
 356).   
During the period of the attack against The Corsair, Kierkegaard’s journals became 
extraordinarily voluminous (Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard181).  His writings on the press 
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and the state of journalism in Denmark could fill multiple volumes and as a result could be 
studied almost inexhaustibly.  Indeed, “Few people have devoted so much time and space to the 
press as did SK, and written as critically about it as he did” (Stangerup 119).  Although 
Kierkegaard had previously maintained an unfavorable view of the press in general and 
journalists in particular, the affair of the Corsair appears to have considerably coarsened that 
view.  Through the Corsair, we see Kierkegaard’s most obstentious critique of the media.  
During the period he wrote, “The tyranny of the daily press is the most wretched, the most 
contemptible of all tyrannies; it is the begging tyranny—in the same way that a beggar to whom 
we all say “No” eventually extorts something from us by running up and down the street after 
us” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2
The government cannot prohibit the natural powers which a man possesses, but it can 
forbid the possession of dangerous weapons, because they are too powerful and go 
beyond the human.  Accordingly, the government cannot prohibit oral communication, 
which is a gift of God, but it could very well prohibit the daily press, because is it a much 
too gigantic means of communication (479). 
 478).  It is clear from another journal entry a year 
later that Kierkegaard believed the press possessed too much power – power to slander the 
individual and negatively influence the public.   
One must think that Kierkegaard specifically had The Corsair in mind when he wrote in 1847: 
The daily press is and remains the evil principle in the modern world.  In its sophistry it 
has no limits, since it can sink to ever lower and lower levels of readers.  Consequently it 
stirs up so much foulness and meanness that no state can cope with it.  There will always 
be only a few who truly see the untruth in the existence of the daily press, but of these 
few, again, there will be very few with the courage to express it, because it is outright 
martyrdom to break with the majority and the large audience who will immediately 
persecute the one that does (479). 
 Yet this is exactly what Kierkegaard did.  He attacked the press for its hostility and in 
turn found himself the subject of ridicule, which caused him much public and inward suffering.   
Kierkegaard loved and valued interpersonal communication.  His daily walks through the streets 
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of Copenhagen were of great enjoyment to him because he could directly speak with common 
people, whom he loved and appreciated.  Jørgen Bukdahl gives an example of how important 
personal communication was to Kierkegaard: “In matters concerning the common people he was 
direct, without ulterior motives or condescension…He had a rare capacity for sharing the 
thoughts of common people, for entering into their mental universe” (86).  However, the same 
public now stood to deride him.   Rather than be pleased by his company, “people joined in the 
general laughter with malicious glee, mocking the defenseless Kierkegaard…” (90). 
Nevertheless, he remained a friend to the people (Bukdahl 90).   
While there are countless references to the effects The Corsair had upon Kierkegaard’s 
communication with others, it is necessary to point out two journal entries which sum up the 
suffering he endured through the attack.  The first is from 1849, the second from 1850. 
O, the way I lived with the common man; there perhaps is not one in the whole 
generation who could do it, and how few are they who understand him and understand 
the callousness and cruelty of class distinctions that ordinarily underlie associations with 
the common man.  And then to have this forbidden me, to have it regarded as ridiculously 
overplaying the part, and that I cannot ever do anything more for the common man, 
because for him I exist as a sort of half-looney.  And that this has come about by means 
of those “who take the part of the common man against the aristocrats.” How tragic! 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 6
He goes on to lament the loss of this intimate interpersonal communication: 
 231).   
But the common man whom I loved!  It was my greatest joy to express some measure of 
love to the neighbor; when I saw this loathsome condescension toward less important 
people, I dared say to myself, “I do not live like that.”  It was my consolation to alleviate 
this when possible; it was my pleasure, my blessed diversion.  My life was made for that.  
So when I have to bear the derision of the common man it saddens me indescribably.  
There was in fact hardly anyone around here who loved the common man this way—and 
now to see him turned against me in hostility.  A journalist who tricks the common man 
out of his money and in return give him confused concepts is regarded as a benefactor—
and the person who sacrificed so much, every advantage of solidarity with the upper 
class, is represented as an enemy of the common man, as someone to insult (311).   
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The effects of The Corsair attack were great, for even after the ordeal was long over, 
Kierkegaard still endured humiliation from the very public to which he had reached out.   
 It has been noted that Kierkegaard’s battle with The Corsair is the hinge on which his 
canon pivots (Bukdahl 83).  Indeed, his confrontation with The Corsair and his view of the press 
are both important for several reasons.  First of all, I mention them here because they give the 
backdrop to the times in which Kierkegaard wrote his lectures on communication.  Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of communication vastly differed from those typical of an age in which the natural 
sciences had been accepted and “proclaimed as the way in which the human being, through 
his/her own intellectual efforts, could discover the whole truth about himself/herself and his/her 
world” (Jansen, “The Individual Versus the Public” 5).   He doubtless saw this shift as degrading 
to the individual, for he “lamented this state of affairs by pointing out that the distinction 
between knowledge (science) and the art of existence had disappeared and the art of existence 
was now communicated as scientific knowledge” (5).  The effects were detrimental to the 
individual.  “The individual, who had become anonymous as a result of social transformations, 
could now be studied as an ‘object’ without any real intervening ‘spiritual qualification’” (5).  
Second of all, the communication Kierkegaard writes about relates to inwardness, ultimately to 
Christianity, and differed vastly from the type of communication offered by The Corsair as a 
representative of the press, with its biases, libelous content and malicious insults.  Kierkegaard 
writes that the press, as a “disproportionate medium of communication” (Journals and Papers 
Vol. 6
Thirdly, The Corsair may have given Kierkegaard a renewed reason to continue with his 
model of communication and further expound on the relation of indirect communication to 
 483), failed to understand or accept his teachings concerning the single individual (481).  
If this is true, it also failed to recognize his teachings on inwardness, subjectivity, and existence.   
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Christianity.  Whether or not this was the case, the affair with The Corsair eventually 
rejuvenated him as an author.  He had previously considered CUP to be his last work as an 
author (hence the ‘Declaration’ in which he acknowledges himself to be the author of all the 
pseudonymous works), and he had hoped to take a position as a pastor in the country (Lowrie, 
Kierkegaard Vol.2 362).  Now he knew he must endure and continue as an author.  From 
Either/Or, edited by the pseudonymous Victor Eremita, to CUP, by the pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus, pseudonyms had been artfully employed as one function of indirect communication.  
After the debacle with the Corsair things would be different.  From then on Kierkegaard instead 
mostly communicated directly with his audience and sought to deal exclusively with religious 
themes.  However, it is important to note that indirect communication still remained a decisive 
theme in his writings inasmuch as he used direct communication to expound on this model of 
indirect communication.  The effects from the Corsair were severe, but they eventually gave 
Kierkegaard renewed strength as an author.  He realized he must stay the course and continue 
writing.  He still desired to communicate with the single individual “whom with joy and 
gratitude” he called “his reader” (Kierkegaard, Edifying Discourses 1).  In particular, the entire 
experience fixed his attention upon the influence of the press, which had the effect of reducing 
individuals to a mass, “the public” (Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard 184).  Through the 
event with the Corsair, Kierkegaard reached an important conclusion well before our current 
time.  The power of the press, if unbridled and uncontrolled, could filter down through society, 
influencing and changing the way people thought and acted.  For example, he noticed that the 
public did not claim responsibility for the content they had received, but then again neither did 
the journalists accept responsibility for the content they printed and released to the mass public 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 6 516).  The concept of journalistic responsibility (or the 
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lack of it) of the times is seen in the example of The Corsair.  By hiding behind anonymity the 
editors denied responsible for the paper’s productions.  However, if the editors would not take 
responsibility for the content, what kind of message was being sent to the public?  Could it serve 
to enrich the lives of others, or was it a collective effort of negative messaging actually working 
against the interests of the people?  In a strict sense, the objective of newspapers to get hold of 
the public en mass was in direct opposition to Kierkegaard’s main goal of aiding the individual 
to ponder his or hers’ existential relationship to Christianity through inwardness.  Rather than 
give up his authorship, he decided to stay the course.  He felt it his duty before God to do so.  
“There is a word which for me is a magic formula: Obedience is more precious to God than the 
fat of rams.  If my meager effectiveness, a nothing compared to the task, disappears, humanly 
speaking, I shall still keep on: Obedience is more precious to God than the fat of rams” (Journals 
and Papers Vol. 1
Lectures on Communication and the Meaning of Indirect Communication 
 481).    
We have seen that Kierkegaard was concerned with what it means to communicate.  To 
expound further on this concept, we could say that he was concerned with communicating truth 
subjectively, i.e. through personal appropriation to the truth.  His pseudonymity is such an 
excellent example of indirect communication because any interference from the communicator is 
thereby removed, allowing the receiver to dwell on the communication itself.  In order to 
communicate indirectly, Kierkegaard realized that he must not hinder the communication by 
being the focus of attention.  Instead, the individual must personally relate to the communication.  
This is especially true in matters of ethical-religious communication.  This mode differs from the 
purely objective one, through which the individual may learn and gain knowledge of concepts.  
However, objective or direct communication does not require reflection upon the communication 
76 
 
– it is simply knowledge without productive, personal results.  In order to get hold of the 
individual, Kierkegaard employed the indirect method through which he hoped to make people 
aware of their conditions and to allow them to reflect personally on the message received.  His 
communication lectures assist us in better understanding this principle.   
Section one of the lectures “describes the problem of communication in modern society,” 
while the second part deals with the “dialectic of ethical and ethical-religious communication” 
(Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 117).  Kierkegaard begins by presenting what he 
understood as the dishonesty of his time-period. This dishonesty takes the form of self-deception, 
rather than intentional deception.  Society, as Kierkegaard saw it, lacked the proper perspective 
of understanding the concept of existence.  To him, the mass majority of people deceive 
themselves into being unconcerned with their existence. Kierkegaard recognized that people 
“cling to the generation,” or adapt themselves to that which the current generation deems popular 
or essential.   The “dishonesty of the modern age” is, in one sense, its “lack of primitivity” 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 292).  C. Stephen Evans says that Kierkegaard’s use 
“primitivity” is best understood as “authenticity” (Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 236).  “It 
does not mean that an individual should necessarily forego modern conveniences or ‘return to 
nature.’ Rather, the idea is that there is something within the self that is not merely the creation 
of society, a set of potentialities that is truly God-given.  The individual must try to discover 
what God intended him or her to be and must then become this…” (236).   Kierkegaard observed 
that modern society demands the attention of the individual.   With each generation comes an 
ever-changing, accelerated lifestyle.  In such haste, the concept of the individual is ignored.  
Rather than seeking what it means to live as an individual, one usually adapts to the demands of 
the age.   “One of the tragedies of modern times is precisely this –to have abolished the “I,” the 
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personal “I” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 1
If I were to imagine a human being who was brought up in such a manner and lived out 
his life in such a manner that he never got any impression of himself but always lived by 
adaptation and comparison—this would be an example of dishonesty.  And this is 
precisely the state of affairs in modern times.  The history of the generation runs its 
course, it is true, but every single individual should still have his primitive impression of 
existence—in order to be a human being (292).   
 302).  The result is that everyone simply 
becomes part of the crowd.  There is no personal examination when one is simply part of the 
crowd; one does not “occupy himself with the problem of what it is to be a human being” (304), 
what it means to communicate, or with what it means to personally be a Christian.  Kierkegaard 
writes: 
As society becomes more advanced, confusion increases.  People begin to devalue the meaning 
of their own existence before an almighty God.  They lack the authenticity individuals, and by 
doing so, deceive themselves.   
What haste, what confusion—as if by an earthquake!  Young people, even children, are 
aware of how fraudulent everything is and what nothingness it is to be a human being, 
how everything depends on clinging to the generation, following the demands of the age, 
which nevertheless are always changing.  Thus the life of the generation hisses and fizzes 
uninterruptedly; although everything is a whirlwind, a single-shot is heard, the ringing of 
bells, signifying to the individual that now, this very second, hurry, throw everything 
away, reflection, quiet meditation, reassuring thoughts of the eternal, or if you come too 
late you will not go along on the generation’s expedition, which is just pulling out… 
(293).   
Kierkegaard’s critique of his times by no means indicates that he was “insensitive to new 
possibilities for individual self-expression in his day” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the 
Truth” 117).  As Climacus writes in CUP, “…because of the copiousness of knowledge, people 
in our day have forgotten what it means to exist, and what inwardness is…” (249). Climacus is 
concerned in this passage with what it means to exist religiously.  He writes, “If people had 
forgotten what it means to exist religiously, they had probably also forgotten what it means to 
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exist humanly” (249).  Therefore, Kierkegaard deemed it necessary to bring the individual along, 
step by step, towards Christianity, the highest mode of existence.  In order to accomplish this 
task, he had to employ an indirect method.  “The movement described by the authorship is this: 
from the poet (from aesthetics), from philosophy (from speculation), to the indication of the most 
central definition of what Christianity is…” (Kierkegaard, The Point of View
 Thus, while technology and “the means of communication” can serve positive purposes, 
they do not come without certain dangers when used incorrectly.  It is clear to see from reading 
the lectures that Kierkegaard was a critic of the mass media.  To him, technology advances and 
demands the individual’s attention.  When what is needed is comprehension of individual 
existence before God, reflection on Christianity and the Word, and “reassuring thoughts of the 
eternal” (Kierkegaard, 
 142).  He believed 
that personal appropriation to the truth had been lost in modernity.  In addition, “Modernity 
eliminates the possibility of religious subjectivity and inwardness which are definitive of 
authentic existence” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 117).   
Journals and Papers
The means of communication become more and more excellent, printing can be done 
more and more rapidly, with increasing speed—but the communications become more 
and more hurried and more and more confusing.  And if anyone dares, both in the name 
of primitivity and God, to resist it—woe unto him!  Just as the individual is seized by a 
whirlwind of impatience to be understood immediately, so a generation domineeringly 
craves to understand the individual at once.  This produces dishonesty (293).   
 293), instead the individual begins to regard science, 
scholarship, and the news of the day as all-important themes worthy of the most acute attention.  
He writes,  
The dishonesty of which Kierkegaard speaks is the failure of the generation to be guided by a 
higher power.  Instead, it places faith in man’s achievements rather than taking into account the 
slow process of becoming an individual in the Christian sense.   
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 Tracing the steps of this confusion, Kierkegaard interestingly points to scholarly 
periodicals and the daily press as two great hindrances to becoming an individual.  First, he 
discusses how the scholarly periodicals in his day had deviated from their original course.  “The 
idea of the periodicals was to aid in perspective, but then the periodicals proceeded to become an 
independent literature.  This is the modern age’s misfortune.  The periodicals became more and 
more ephemeral; ultimately the demands of the age became the demands of the moment” 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 
Second, the daily press provides further means for instantaneous communication.  It is 
particularly fascinating to examine Kierkegaard’s critique of media from its historical 
perspective.  In our own times, as instantaneous communication via the mass media appears to 
demand our attention more and more, Kierkegaard’s warning of the power of media to distort 
and define human existence should be given attention.  However, his position has been widely 
ignored by the field of communication.  It should be noted that the daily press was the only real 
means of mass communication in Kierkegaard’s day.  Hence, we have the popularity of 
newspapers such as the Corsair, which could easily reach the masses.  While newspapers have 
dramatically changed in both style and content since Kierkegaard’s day, their power nevertheless 
294).  According to Kierkegaard, the periodicals have “the 
power of the moment and the power of circulation” (294).  The scholarly periodicals had erred 
from their original purpose by attempting to reach the masses rather than tailoring content toward 
the individual.  He explains that now “Journal literature abandons criticism and writes for the 
mass” (294). We can see why Kierkegaard was so concerned with the state of communication.  
He understood how people want to be communicated to directly in the moment; they want to 
immediately grasp the communicated message without examining first what it means to 
communicate.  His critique of the modern age is that they demand everything “in the moment.”   
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has not decreased.  Kierkegaard’s criticism of the daily press can still be applied today.  Nerina 
Jansen writes: 
Nowadays public opinion can be employed effectively by the wielders of power—on an 
international, national, or local scale—to control people’s thoughts and actions, and 
nobody thinks of questioning the legitimacy of the explanations and justifications that are 
offered; they operate in the name and in the interest of “the public”…The immense power 
of the mass media in manipulating the content of people’s lives has not diminished since 
Kierkegaard’s time; it has increased (Jansen, “The Individual versus the Public” 19).    
The press focuses on the power of circulation (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
 The power of the press is its ability to create the crowd and then to control its thoughts.  
In the swarming crowd, the individual becomes anonymous.  Personal identity vanishes.  “Face-
to-face interpersonal communication between two people or a small group of people was no 
longer the only form of communication.  The daily press addressed a large audience that was 
normally unknown both to the journalist and to the other readers” (Jansen, “The Individual 
Versus the Public” 5).  Kierkegaard had his pseudonyms, but we have seen how they serve the 
purpose of bettering the existence of others by showing them in a personal way the categories in 
which they abide, in hopes that they would become individuals and be transformed by the truth 
 294) and fails to 
take responsibility for its content.  We have seen how Kierkegaard believed that neither the press 
nor the public was willing to take responsibility for the content produced and received.  In 
particular, he witnessed how the journalist failed to take responsibility for the production of 
content by hiding behind anonymity.  But the journalist defends himself against all attacks by 
pointing to the fact of daily readership.  Kierkegaard writes, “…the journalist defiantly points to 
his thousands of subscribers and his power at the moment.  Nor is there a redeeming outlook for 
the near future, for the journalist has become a type; the individual dies but the journalist never 
dies—there only get to be more and more of them” (295).   
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of Christianity.  In stark contrast, the press operated sometimes under anonymity as a way of 
avoiding responsibility for content.  The daily press exposed the personal lives of others in a 
strange mix of fact and fiction in the name of consumption.  Kierkegaard writes that the press 
was influential in forming public opinion, deceiving others into believing that their opinions 
should mirror those of the press.  In 1853 he wrote in his personal journals:  
The demoralizing character of the press can also be seen in the following way. In each 
generation there are hardly ten who, Socratically, most of all fear to think wrong, but 
there are thousands and millions who are all too afraid of standing alone with an opinion, 
be it ever so right.  But when something is printed in the newspaper, this is eo ipso sure 
proof that there is a goodly number who want to have or express the same opinion—ergo, 
you may well venture to have the same opinion.  In fact, if the daily press, like some 
other occupational groups, had a coat-of-arms, the inscription ought to be: Here men are 
demoralized in the shortest possible time, on the largest possible scale, at the cheapest 
possible price (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2
And in 1848 he wrote: 
 489).   
That the press which has demoralized the states can also be seen in the following way: 
Only a person of wide culture can read the newspapers and remain unscathed, and there 
are not many of these in any generation—and the few there are scarcely read newspapers 
any more.  But the mass read the newspapers, the mass for whom this unwholesome diet 
is in and of itself most pernicious.  The same thing can be seen in another way.  The press 
wants to influence by means of coverage, but coverage is simply the power of the lie, a 
sensate power of fists.  One is reminded of Goethe’s words: We have abolished the devil 
and gotten devils (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol.2
The press operated under the assumption that it was a friend of the people, but it really worked 
against them.  It succeeded in deceiving men and women through lies, slander, and gossip.  
There is an overwhelming amount of greed and lust for power at work here.  As the daily press 
became more popular and etched its mark into society, the generation became “trapped in the 
perplexity of existence as never before” (Kierkegaard, 
 483). 
Journals and Papers 295).  Because of the 
press, people became increasingly concerned with what the papers had to say on issues such as 
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social reform.  They were more interested in stories of gossip than with what it means to become 
an authentic individual self.   
 Above all, Kierkegaard denounced the press because he believed that as an organization, 
it kept people from coming to genuine faith in Christ.  People formed their opinions based on the 
material presented in the pages of the newspaper rather than seeking out for themselves the truth 
of Christianity.  Kierkegaard’s scathing critique of the media points to its power to inhibit others 
from realizing the essential quality of Christian inwardness.  It led people into a demoralizing 
existence and kept them from realizing that living in Christianity is the highest form of existence 
attainable.  In a journal entry from 1849 he writes: 
Even if my life had no other significance, well, I am satisfied with having really 
discovered the absolutely demoralizing existence of the daily press.  Actually, it is the 
press, more specifically, the daily newspaper, and the whole modern way of life 
corresponding to it, which make Christianity impossible.  Think of Christ.  The idea that 
he would use a newspaper to proclaim his teaching is nonsense and blasphemy on 
seventeen grounds, and this is one of them: the imprint of the personality of the I who is 
speaking must fall upon every word he says—but communication by means of journalism 
is an abstraction, which supposedly is superior to individual personality—and with Christ 
the very opposite is the case (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol.2
It is worth recalling that Kierkegaard considered it his chief task in life to help others improve 
the quality of their own existence.  To him, the answer to the existential dilemma of life could 
not be found within vogue philosophy, or in the press masquerading lies as truth.  It could not be 
found in the crowd, for it bred irresponsibility and loss of personality.  Rather, to be aware of 
one’s own existence is to consider one’s helpless state before the almighty God.  The single 
individual, therefore, is “principally a Christian concept, which played a decisive role in his 
declaration of the sole re-medium, the only way in which it should be preserved; that is, through 
the imitation of Christ.  Only as the single individual is a man able to imitate Christ” (Thulstrup, 
“The Single Individual” 11).  As the press evaded the thoughts and opinions of others, it gained 
 485). 
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the masses.  However, Kierkegaard considered the crowd to be untruth.  Only the single 
individual existing before God recognized and sought to obey truth.  Kierkegaard gives a good 
summary of what he means by ‘the single individual’ in his journals. 
“The single individual”—of course, the single individual religiously understood, 
consequently understood in such a way that every one, unconditionally every one, yes, 
unconditionally every one, just as much as every one has or should have a conscience, 
can be that single individual and should be that, can stake his honor in being willing to be 
that, but then also can find blessedness in being what is the expression for true fear of 
God, true love to one’s neighbor, true humanity, and true human equality… 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2
How this category is to be taught and communicated Kierkegaard deals with in the lectures.  
There are two main categories we shall examine in detail within the lectures: the communication 
of knowledge and the communication of capability.   
 415). 
 The lectures are designed to contrast the communication offered by the mass media to the 
majority of society with Kierkegaard’s own views on ethical and ethical-religious 
communication.  However, his main point is to present ethical-religious communication as the 
highest form of communication, since it is communication of truth.  Certainly he envisioned 
actually presenting the lectures, for he writes that throughout the course of the address he would 
communicate directly the concept of indirect communication (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
 
 
300).  His purpose is to show how “the ethical and ethical-religious have to be communicated 
existentially and in the direction of the existential” (301).  We will see in this discussion how 
Kierkegaard accomplishes this goal, and also that that which he considers “existential” differs 
vastly from the conventional application of the term in postmodernity.   
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 The Communication of Knowledge 
 In his journals on communication Kierkegaard writes that “All communication of 
knowledge is direct communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 308).  Direct 
communication is the communication of objective knowledge from the communicator directly to 
the receiver.  More specifically, direct communication aims at objective understanding (Evans, 
Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 96).  In the communication of knowledge the object is 
reflected upon.  Objective thinking differs from subjectivity because the former “seeks to impart 
truth by simply communicating results” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 630).  In CUP the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus writes, “Objective thinking is completely indifferent to 
subjectivity and thereby to inwardness and appropriation; its communication is therefore direct” 
(Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 75).  Objective thinking is concerned only with 
results (73) rather than personal appropriation.  The goal of objectivity is pure knowledge.  
Reflection on that which is being communicated takes place in the objective sense when the 
learner grasps the concepts intellectually (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97).  
This differs from subjectivity, which requires double-reflection upon the communication.  
Double-reflection, as we will see, is “rooted in the character of existence” (96).  C. Stephen 
Evans writes: “Direct communication, which aims at objective understanding, does not require 
this doubleness.  What is communicated directly is essentially intellectual content, and when the 
recipient of the communication understands the ideas (possibilities), the communication is 
successful.  The recipient only has to grasp the possibilities intellectually (first reflection); no 
double reflection is necessary” (96).  Thus in CUP Climacus says, “To objective reflection, truth 
becomes something objective, an object, and the point is to disregard the subject.  To subjective 
reflection, truth becomes appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse 
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oneself, existing, in subjectivity” (192). Double reflection in Kierkegaardian terms is “An 
instance of indirect communication requiring artful suppression of the communicator, who as a 
‘subjective existing thinker’ becomes aware on second reflection that the truth he has acquired 
‘interests’ his existence, and that it cannot simply be appropriated by another without being 
acquired by the same process of reflection, which the indirect method is designed to stimulate” 
(Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2
 For Kierkegaard, objective thinking is a theoretical and detached kind of thinking that is 
indifferent to a specific individual person (Jansen, “Deception in Service of the Truth” 118).  
Kierkegaard does not want to do away with direct communication.  Viewed as objectivity, it may 
at times be a necessary form of communication.  From CUP onward, he would employ direct 
communication as a way of presenting religious truth.  That is, he would speak to his audience 
directly.  Kierkegaard understood that direct communication is a “suitable mode for conveying 
knowledge hitherto unknown to the recipient” (119).  However, it has its limits in that it can only 
convey knowledge.  Jansen writes, “What is required from the communicator in direct 
communication is competence and an ability to transmit knowledge to the recipient, while the 
only requirement for the recipient is to be in a position to receive the knowledge” (119).  As we 
have seen from Evans, the communication is successful when the receiver does understand the 
intellectual content being transmitted.   
 631).  Reflection is a key aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought in general, 
and plays a decisive role in his model of indirect communication.   
 Kierkegaard does not think that direct communication should never be employed.  
Indeed, it is a “necessary first step in ethical-religious communication where recipients need to 
become acquainted with the contents of the Christian message” (Jansen, “Deception in Service of 
the Truth” 119).  However, Kierkegaard notes that this knowledge is only a preliminary step 
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(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
Kierkegaard’s argument against the objective in the lectures is based on the fact that “The 
modern age has—and I regard this as its basic damage—abolished personality and made 
everything objective” (Kierkegaard, 
 289).  He writes, “Here is an element of knowledge and to 
that extent an object.  But it is only a first thing.  The communication is still not essentially of 
knowledge but a communication of capability.  That there is an element of knowledge is 
particularly true for Christianity; a knowledge about Christianity must certainly be 
communicated in advance” (289).  So Kierkegaard is not denying that direct communication can 
be used in matters pertaining to the objective knowledge of Christian principles.  However, such 
knowledge is only preliminary.  If an individual does not subjectively appropriate the truth of 
Christianity to his own life – if he remains unaware of the power of this truth to personally 
transform his own existence, then the truth eo ipso does not become truth to him.  Mere 
knowledge of the ethical-religious is not enough to make one a Christian.   
Journals and Papers
We have seen that the communication of knowledge has no care for the individual and 
does not answer the fundamental problem of what it means to exist.  Since it is unconcerned with 
existence, objective thinking does not require a double reflection, whereby the individual 
personally appropriates the message.  In CUP Climacus writes: 
 304).  We have seen that in the lectures 
Kierkegaard is concerned with what it means to communicate.  He understood that by making 
everything objective “men do not come to dwell upon the thought of what does it mean to 
communicate but hasten immediately to the what they wish to communicate” (304).  We will see 
shortly that by making everything objective, the communicator is “saved from the pangs of 
delay” (304).  That is, the communicator ignores the fact that coming into subjective relation to 
the truth proves to be a long, tedious process.   
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The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into something accidental 
and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing something.  The way to the 
objective truth goes away from the subject, and while the subject and subjectivity become 
indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this is precisely its objective validity, 
because the interest, just like the decision, is subjectivity.  The way of objective reflection 
now leads to abstract thinking, to mathematics, to historical knowledge of various kinds, 
and always leads away from the subjective individual, whose existence or nonexistence 
becomes, from an objective point of view, altogether properly, infinitely indifferent, 
altogether properly, infinitely indifferent…(193).   
Objective reflection leads away from the subjective individual and is indifferent towards him.  
Objective reflection sees the individual as “something accidental,” merely as an object, rather 
than an existing subject.  When something is communicated objectively, the learner or recipient 
may in fact gain quite a bit of knowledge.  However, especially in the case of ethical-religious 
communication, there is a difference between merely having objective knowledge and being able 
to apply knowledge of something to one’s own life.  In objective communication, “the learner 
gains the ability to parrot what the communicator says but has no genuine understanding of the 
content” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript
 In his communication lectures, Kierkegaard writes that the modern age has forgotten 
what it means to exist because science and scholarship, which work in their proper sphere, have 
invaded ethics.  He writes, “Everything has become science and scholarship…there is a whole 
aspect of art which science and scholarship have taken possession of—or wish to take possession 
of—this is the ethical” (Kierkegaard, 
 97).   
Journals and Papers 268).  However, science, as objective 
understanding, cannot address the fundamental issues of man’s existence.  An individual’s life 
can only be qualitatively improved by receiving, reflecting upon, and appropriating ethical-
religious truth.  Pure objective knowledge amounts to nothing in the realm of Christian truth 
unless that knowledge is backed up by genuine faith.  “Knowledge, theoretical sentences, can be 
communicated in a way which is unsuitable for practical capability” (Bejerholm 54).  
88 
 
Kierkegaard allowed himself to write under the pseudonyms for this very reason.  He believed if 
he had communicated that specific material directly, the point would be missed.  “Then the 
reader is led into misunderstanding—he gets something more to know, that to exist also has its 
meaning, but he receives it as knowledge so that he keeps right on sitting in the status quo” 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
The Communication of Capability 
 260).  The communication of ethical-religious truth is 
concerned with individual appropriation, practical application, examination, and action.  It is in 
this sense that Kierkegaard views it as subjective.  
 We have seen that direct communication has the ability to transmit knowledge of 
concepts, but only in an impersonal way.  However, ethical-religious truth is subjective in 
Kierkegaard’s thought, since it is truth which has not only been received but has been doubly-
reflected upon.  He understands truth as subjective because it relates to the individual – it desires 
to get hold of the individual.  It is existential truth because it concerns existence.  It is imperative 
to understand that that which Kierkegaard understands as ‘existential’ differs dramatically from 
modern or postmodern interpretations of the term.  Existential thinking is “dialectical and 
paradoxical” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 631) and deals with “Christianity as a way of 
existence” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 30).  The one who has received the 
ethical-religious as truth must be concerned with existence, must have come to the realization 
that Christianity is a way of living.  Obviously Kierkegaard’s use of the term ‘existentialism’ 
relates to individual existence, the highest and most authentic form of which is existence in the 
truth.  However, human beings are flawed.  Therefore, existence is “namely finitude, 
imperfection, process of becoming, and effort” (Lønning 147).  Existence is a continual striving.   
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 In the lectures Kierkegaard writes, “All communication of capability is more or less 
indirect communication” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
1. When the emphasis is equally upon the communicator and the receiver, then we 
have the communication of esthetic capability (283). 
 308).  He then proceeds to break 
down the communication of capability into three parts: 1) The communication of esthetic 
capability, 2) The communication of ethical capability, and 3) the communication of ethical 
capability (282).  It is necessary for us to view these three types of indirect communication as 
distinct from one another. Kierkegaard’s model calls for the breakdown in the following way: 
2.  When the emphasis is predominately upon the receiver, then we have the 
communication of ethical capability (283). 
3. When the emphasis is predominately upon the communicator, then we have the 
communication of religious capability (283).   
For our purposes we shall examine the last two modes of indirect communication in detail.   
 Kierkegaard describes ethical communication as “training or upbringing” (279).  The 
emphasis is upon the receiver in communication here because the communicator is in the 
Socratic sense acting as a midwife, assisting in the birth of knowledge.  Kierkegaard differs from 
Socrates in that Socrates believed that “basically every human being possesses the truth” 
(Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 13).  Kierkegaard would take a different approach to 
Socrates, and this is especially seen in Philosophical Fragments.  Kierkegaard explains that the 
learner is not truth but is untruth.  Only the teacher (God) is truth, and between the learner and 
God there is an infinite qualitative distinction.  In a journal from 1849, Kierkegaard writes, 
“There is an endless yawning qualitative difference between God and man.  This signifies, or the 
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expression for it is: A man can do nothing at all, it is God that gives all, it is He how bestows 
upon man faith, &c. This is grace, and here lies Christianity’s first” (qtd. in Lowrie 9).   
 However, in the communication of ethical truth, the communicator comes into a maieutic 
relationship with the receiver, who learns to “stand alone by another’s help” (Kierkegaard 280).  
While the communicator or teacher offers assistance to the learner, the learner must come to the 
knowledge of truth in a personal way.  The maieutic keeps the communicator from merely being 
mimicked and instead the receiver of the communication personally appropriates the truth 
(Jansen “Deception in Service of the Truth” 121).  The communicator as the object is removed, 
he “in a sense disappears, steps aside” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
 “When the ethical communication also contains initially an element of knowledge, we 
have the ethical religious, specifically Christian communication” (Kierkegaard, 
 283).  The maieutic 
teacher is in a sense a servant.  He “makes himself serve only to help the other to become” (307).  
Ethical communication is indirect communication because the communicator drops away.  The 
communication of the ethical takes place in “the medium of actuality” (275), meaning that “the 
communicator or teacher himself exists in it and in the situation of actuality, is himself in the 
situation of actuality that which he teaches” (275).  The ethical requires that the communicator or 
teacher must live what he communicates as truth.   
Journals and 
Papers 307).  Kierkegaard describes ethical-religious communication as direct-indirect.  This 
differs from ethical communication which is “unconditionally indirect” (Jansen, “Deception in 
Service of the Truth” 123).  There is some objective knowledge, as we have seen, that is 
necessary in Christianity.  Jansen writes, “Although the communication of religious capability is 
indirect, a direct communication of some knowledge is first required.  After the initial 
communication of knowledge the same relationship as in the ethical obtains” (123).    Unlike 
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objective communication, ethical-religious communication (the communication of Christian 
truth) reduplication is necessary.  Evans writes, “Here the aim of the communication is self-
understanding.  The individual in this case must not only understand the intellectual content (first 
reflection) but also relate that content to her own existence (second reflection)” (Kierkegaard’s 
Fragments and Postscript 97).  However, “being in truth implies a process which is never 
complete” (Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence 38).  Therefore, “the communication 
cannot simply be in the form of ‘results,’ but must itself reflect the ‘process,’ ‘the way’… 
(Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 97).  The receiver is “not only aware of certain 
possibilities (ideas), but in her existence actualizes those ideas reduplicates them” (97).  
Kierkegaard interestingly points out that ‘receiver’ is an active word, rather than a passive one 
(Journals and Papers
 In ethical-religious communication the emphasis is on the communicator.  According to 
Kierkegaard, the teacher has authority in ethical-religious communication “with respect to the 
element of knowledge which is communicated” (
 270).  The term implies that the receiver is acting upon the communication, 
appropriating it.  This is not to say that truth can be whatever one wants it to be, but rather that 
the receiver appropriates truth to the extent that he makes it personal, relating to it in a personal 
manner.  Through the process of examination, he or she accepts it as truth and then begins to live 
in that truth.   
Journals and Papers 289).  However, the 
communicator of ethical-religious truth must realize that God is his master.  The true 
communicator is the One who has given men the knowledge and ability to communicate (271).  
Kierkegaard writes in the lectures, “There remains only one communicator: God” (272).  This 
brings important questions as to whether or not the communicator has the right to influence 
directly.  Kierkegaard writes, “The communicator always influence only indirectly, (1) because 
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he must always express that he himself is not a master-teacher but an apprentice and that God, on 
the other hand, is his and every man’s master-teacher, (2) because he must express that the 
receiver himself knows it, (3) because ethically the task is precisely this—that every man comes 
to stand alone in the God-relationship” (273).  God is truth and because He has chosen to reveal 
Himself to us, we can live in truth.  Evans writes, “…The point of the story is that we humans 
lack the truth, and that we need a divine Teacher who not only brings us the truth, but transforms 
us into the kinds of beings who are capable of receiving the truth” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith 
and the Self
Yet the communication of the essentially Christian must end finally in “witnessing.”  The 
maieutic form cannot be the final form, because, Christianly understood, the truth doth 
not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it), but in revelation which must be 
proclaimed.  It is very proper that the maieutic be used in Christendom, simply because 
the majority actually live in the fancy that they are Christians.  But since Christianity still 
is Christianity, the one who uses the maieutic must become a witness.  Ultimately the 
user of the maieutic approach still remains rooted in human sagacity, however sanctified 
and dedicated in fear and trembling this may be.  God becomes too powerful for the 
maieutic practitioner and then he is a witness, different from the direct witness only in 
what he has gone through to become a witness (Kierkegaard, 
 13).   Truth does not lie in the subject, and hence the maieutic form by itself is not 
enough in the communication of Christian truth.  As Kierkegaard writes:  
Journals and Papers Vol. 2
Kierkegaard makes an important point here that the Christian communicator must eventually 
become a witness for the truth.  By becoming a witness, the Socratic maieutic takes on a new, 
higher form.   
 
383).   
 From reading Kierkegaard’s lectures on communication we can come to a deeper 
understanding of his ideas on indirect communication and Christianity as ethical-religious 
communication.  It must be noted, however, that the process of becoming an authentic individual 
may indeed be a long process.  One does not immediately become that, but does so over time.  
This is Kierkegaard’s viewpoint and it is presented near the end of the first communication 
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lecture.  He says that those who hasten to communicate their message are “happily saved from 
the pangs of delay” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
The importance of the idea that God calls us to be individuals is that it keeps in focus the 
primacy for human beings of the task of relating to God.  Furthermore, it reminds us that 
God is a personal being, and that we can relate to him in a personal way, not merely as 
the issuer of universal edicts or commands, or the creator of universal traits and qualities.  
God’s omniscience is quite capable of conceiving a task for every individual as that 
unique individual (Evans, 
 304).  Pure objective thought ignores a 
basic Christian concept—that of individual reflection and primitivity (or authenticity).  
Primitivity in Kierkegaard’s thought is based on being an individual before God.  Becoming an 
individual before God can change our conception of communication.  Communication then 
becomes a way of existence as the individual comes to terms with his existence before his 
Creator. Evans writes: 
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self
To Kierkegaard, an individual who seeks primitivity may not advance in his communication and 
his living as quickly as others.  That individual would rather reflect on what it means to 
communicate, what it means to be a human being, what it means to be a Christian—for these are 
the “certain fundamental questions which otherwise are usually so taken for granted that it does 
not occur to anybody to dwell upon them” (Kierkegaard 
 236).   
Journals and Papers
Take the ultimate.  How would it go in life with the person who only moderately 
seriously took Christ’s command to seek first the kingdom of God.  I wonder if he would 
not soon come to stand as if abandoned and infinitely far, far behind all the others!  For 
the others scramble for the take; everyone takes his share of the finite and usually takes it 
first; but poor pious poky Peter, he immerses himself more and more in this “first the 
kingdom of God.”  And even if he does not take hold of God’s kingdom, it will always 
have the result that his life becomes tried in the spiritual trials of Christianity.  For soon, 
soon he will be ridiculed, pitied, laughed at, he who became nothing at all—and this one 
 305).  The primitive 
individual would rather seek out what it means to communicate or what it means to live in 
Christianity, because then he will not attempt to advance unknowingly through life, but will 
rather have a better idea of what it means to be a Christian.  Kierkegaard writes: 
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becomes for sure by taking seriously seeking God’s kingdom first.  –But this seeking first 
the kingdom of God is nevertheless real primitivity (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 
305). 
 Earlier in this chapter this researcher investigated the concepts of reason and language 
and showed that Hamann and Kierkegaard shared a certain understanding in these areas.  We 
then took leave of Hamann in order to examine Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication.  
Now, we shall see how the relationship between the two runs deeper than has previously been 
mentioned.  Kierkegaard references Hamann on multiple occasions throughout both his 
published works and personal journals.    The content of Kierkegaard’s references to Hamann 
coupled by his use of Hamann’s major concepts suggests that the relationship is one of 
exceptional importance.  For our purposes, there are four ways to investigate Hamann’s 
influence on Kierkegaard’s thought: Socratic ignorance, the idea of humor, indirect 
communication, and Christian existence.   Indirect communication as it relates to Christian 
existence is discussed mainly under the heading “Christianity as Indirect Communication.”   
Kierkegaard and Indirect Communication: References to Hamann 
 Some scholars raise interesting questions by suggesting that Kierkegaard became less and 
less reliant upon Hamann as time went by.16  However, Hamann appears in Kierkegaard’s 
journals from 1836 to 1850.  This means that Kierkegaard had read Hamann well before 
defending his thesis, The Concept of Irony with continual references to Socrates, and was 
affected once again by the Magus’ thought during the writing of Training in Christianity.  
References to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s major works are to be found in Either/Or, Fear and 
Trembling and Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, The Concept of Anxiety (1844), and CUP.  
The concepts he may have learned from Hamann were well in place by the time he wrote 
Training in Christianity, in which Kierkegaard deals in detail once again with indirect 
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communication.  According to Craig Q. Hinkson, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
Kierkegaard read Hamann exhaustively (Hinkson 17).   In a journal entry corresponding to 
Training in Christianity (hereafter Training), he harkens back to a previous journal entry from 
1839 when he writes: “Here a passage in one of my oldest journals (from the time I was reading 
Hamann) could be used: Young man, you who still stand at the beginning of the way, oh, turn 
back in time” (Hay 99).  Here we see two important points.  First, that even as late as 1850, 
Kierkegaard was still making use of Hamann’s writings.  Kierkegaard had not by-passed 
Hamann; rather the latter had affected him so that he still recalled Hamann’s words.  Secondly, 
Kierkegaard notes the specific period when he was engrossed with reading Hamann (Hay 99).  
Whether or not he read Hamann during the latter period of his writing career, it is clear that 
thoughts of Hamann nevertheless lingered.  Another reason Kierkegaard appears to have read 
Hamann comprehensively is found in a journal article from 1844-45.  One immediately will take 
note of how closely Kierkegaard appears to have read Hamann.  He writes, “There is something 
rather curious about this: Hamann says that God forgets nothing but that there are ideas and 
flashes which men get no more than once in a lifetime—and this statement appears twice in the 
third and in the fifth volumes.  I have marked them in my copy” (Kierkegaard, Journals and 
Papers
 As well as offering references to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s writings, this chapter seeks to 
uncover the myriad ways in which the former influenced the latter.  Since Socratic existence, the 
concept of humor, and Christian existence are all major themes throughout the entirety of 
Kierkegaard’s works, it would seem that Hamann’s influence was not merely a passing phase.  
When one admires another so much, as Kierkegaard did Hamann, the influence does not simply 
cease.  The proposal of this thesis, to state again, is to find Hamann’s influence upon 
 204).   
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Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication.  Although Kierkegaard himself used direct 
communication exclusively in his “second authorship,” he nevertheless still applied indirect 
communication to Christianity.  If he was so strongly influenced by Hamann in the area of 
indirect communication, then Hamann’s importance cannot be underestimated.   
Opposition to System 
Now, one way in which Kierkegaard uses the writings of Hamann is, according to 
Terence German, as part of his arsenal to discredit the philosophy of Hegel17 in matters of 
language and religion.  By the time Kierkegaard began his writing career, Hegelian philosophy 
had already entrenched itself in European thought.  Its basic tenets were visible in Denmark as 
well, and reverberated throughout the Church and Christendom.  But Kierkegaard offered a 
definitive break from the Hegelian movement, and in doing so, he presented a view of 
Christianity markedly different from the present age.  To Hegel, “all history was governed by a 
completely undeviating development following certain laws, a development which it is possible 
with absolute certainty to show in an irrefutable and convincing way” (Thulstrup 58).  Hegel’s 
philosophy was characterized by the claim to have raised philosophy to the level of science by 
making it systematic (Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 18).  From this point of 
view it becomes at least vaguely apparent that Hegel wished to show through his system how 
philosophy leads to truth, truth that is both knowable and definite.  As he says, “true philosophy 
leads to God” (Hegel, qtd. in Crites 99).  Such a viewpoint stands in direct opposition to 
Kierkegaard, who says, "Away from speculation! from the system, etc., -- to become a Christian” 
(Kierkegaard, The Point of View 75).    
97 
 
Whether or not Hegel intended to do away with philosophy all together, he certainly 
attempted to sum it up via his elaborate System.  For this reason Mark C. Taylor writes, “All of 
modern philosophy is a footnote to Hegel” (ix).  A pivotal figure in the history of Western 
thought and culture, Hegel developed a system that marks both a noteworthy closure and a 
seminal opening (Taylor ix).  Indeed, Hegel’s system of philosophy directly influenced 
nineteenth-century thinkers such as Fichte, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher, while notably, and 
most importantly, providing the basis of Marxist doctrine (ix, 9).  Hegel’s detailed system of 
thought did not only affect philosophy, but was carried on and applied to other fields of study.  
Taylor explains that the pioneering work of Hegel has left an indelible impress upon the areas of 
philosophy, religion, sociology, phenomenology, hermeneutics, existentialism, structuralism, and 
liberal Protestantism (9).  From a communication standpoint, Hegel’s influence also extends to 
the area of cultural communication, or, “how communication actually makes communities” 
(Shepherd & Rothenbuhler 9).   
Based on his broad interpretation of Kant towards ethical-religious matters, Hegel 
formulated the idea of a “folk religion” and proposed the idea that the duty of religion must be to 
“nourish the common spirit of a whole culture” (Crites 35).  Kierkegaard had observed first-
hand, and therefore knew well, the affects that such a brand of Christianity had on believers in 
his day.  In Hegel’s view, religion then becomes a cultural expression (35), and is markedly 
rooted in the existence of the group, or system.  Kierkegaard claimed that as the individual 
became more wrapped up in Hegel’s system, he lost the individual mark of Christianity; that is, 
Christianity became a fashion instead of the type of inward reflection necessary for the 
individual to understand his existence and duty before the eternal God.   
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We have seen how Hamann developed a severe hatred of the system of the 
Enlightenment after his conversion to Christianity.  Just as he struck out against the 
Enlightenment, so Kierkegaard opposed German Idealism and particularly the effects of the 
Hegelian system of existence.  Indeed, both men shared a hatred of the “system” and of 
speculation (Smith, “Hamann and Kierkegaard” 54).  In CUP, Climacus discusses how 
Hamann’s genius has gone unrecognized, mainly because his thought has been summarized and 
categorized by Michelet, the historian.  The injustice done to Hamann is great, since he who 
fought against the system merely becomes part of the system.  Climacus writes: 
I will not conceal the fact that I admire Hamann, although I readily admit that, if he is 
supposed to have worked coherently, the elasticity of his thoughts lacks evenness and his 
preternatural resilience lacks self-control.  But the originality of genius is there in his 
brief statements, and the pithiness of form corresponds completely to the desultory 
hurling forth of a thought.  With heart and soul, down to the last drop of blood, he is 
concentrated in a single word, a highly gifted genius’s passionate protest against a system 
of existence.  But the system is hospitable.  Poor Hamann, you have been reduced to a 
subsection by Michelet.  Whether your grave has ever been marked, I do not know; 
whether it is now trampled upon, I do not know; but I do know that by hook or by crook 
you have been stuck into the subsection uniform and thrust into the ranks” (Kierkegaard, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Climacus expresses grief over Michelet’s systematizing of Hamann into a single 
paragraph, through which the historian thereby enlists him in the ranks of the existential system.  
Both Kierkegaard and Hamann abhorred the idea of the system in which the individual is 
ignored.  Climacus writes, “…the system is hospitable—there is plenty of room” (250).  
Terrence German writes, “Kierkegaard disliked historians who sought to describe earlier creative 
thinkers within the confines of a paragraph of their uncreative thought, just as Hamann despised 
so-called historians who could encapsulate earlier ages in a systematically constructed, unliving 
fashion” (10).  James O’Flaherty points out on numerous occasions Hamann disclaims a desire 
for system on the grounds that it is a hindrance to the truth (
 250).   
Unity and Language 4).  Perhaps 
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Hamann’s detestation of system is found in its attempt to sum up everything in whole – a power 
which lies beyond human cognition.   O’Flaherty writes: “On his [Hamann’s] view, unaided 
reason cannot arrive at an adequate conception of the whole, for reason is essentially analytic and 
divisive in nature.  Appealing to Paul’s word concerning the atomistic nature of reason (I 
Corinthians 13:12)18 Hamann says, ‘Our thoughts are nothing but fragments.  Indeed we know in 
part’” (Unity and Language
 Socratic Ignorance 
 5).  Hamann was also highly critical of those who constructed and 
held to the system of the Enlightenment.  Enlightened thinkers not only clung to Reason as their 
god, but sought to gain and confuse the crowd.  Here, the parallel to Kierkegaard runs even 
deeper.  Both men despised the system: Hamann the Enlightenment, Kierkegaard the tenets of 
Idealism and the influx of Hegelian thought into Christendom.  Hamann believed that the 
Enlightenment had brought about a dramatic change in society, whereby people stopped thinking 
for themselves.  He thought that ‘the public’ had lost the very kind of written and spoken 
experience it needed (136).  He sought to “lead people to see that they should view their 
existence in this world in time in a new manner” (136).  If people rather than having faith in their 
own cognitive powers realized that their existence depended solely upon God, they would be led 
to a higher form of living.   
Any discussion of Hamann and Kierkegaard would be incomplete without examining the 
importance of Socrates to both thinkers.  We noted in chapter one of this thesis that Hamann’s 
Socratic Memorabilia was written to Kant and Berens in an attempt to show them the error of 
their ways in regards to the enlightenment.  For this reason, Socratic Memorabilia has been 
dubbed a “desperately serious declaration of war upon the spirit of his age” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 
53).  That Hamann had the claims of enlightened thought and Kant and Berens in mind is evident 
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from the title page of the work, which reads: “With a double dedication to Nobody and to Two” 
(Haynes ed. 3).  Denis Thouard says that Hamann’s double dedication plays on the relationship 
with the reader and provides for oblique channels of communication (Thouard 421). The 
‘Nobody’ is Hamann’s double dedication represents ‘the public,’ which accepts en mass the 
teachings of the enlightenment without examining its major tenets.  German writes, “’Nobody’ 
stands for the god who really is a nobody because he (it) is composed of the ignorance of the 
public masses.  It (he) is the spirit of the age which worships something which really cannot be 
found in the nothing which it really is.  Everybody knows this Nobody and yet Nobody cannot be 
identified” (33).  The danger of enlightened reason is its ability to set up a false god instead of 
worshiping the one true God as the giver of life and reason.   
In the dedication is an example of Hamann’s dialectical “coincidence of opposites” in 
that the work is written to “Nobody and to Two.”  It is as if the title, Socratic Memorabilia, and 
the dedication itself are both “the face of the work, but a masked face” (Thouard 421).  This 
keeps in unity with Hamann’s use of pseudonyms throughout his career.  The second part of the 
dedication is aimed at Kant and Berens, with “the hope that it can free them from Nobody” (33).   
 But why write to Kant and Berens about Socrates?  Socrates was “much in vogue in the 
Enlightenment” (Thouard 414).  Thinkers of the enlightenment misinterpreted Socrates and 
claimed him as their own.  They claimed to understand Socratic ignorance and applied it to their 
own rationalistic views (German 34).  Doubtless Hamann, as an admirer of Socrates, wanted to 
show how rationalism had erred in choosing Socrates to be its representative.  However, by 
choosing to write about Socrates, Hamann turns the tables on the enlightenment by showing how 
Socratic ignorance differed dramatically from modern-day perceptions.  This in turn afforded 
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him the opportunity to show the error of human reason and proclaim faith as the highest form of 
existence.  O’Flaherty writes: 
It is highly significant that Hamann formally commenced his attack on the Enlightenment 
in the year 1759 with the Socratic Memoirs.  For precisely by choosing Socrates, the 
favorite philosophic paragon of the rationalists, he declared most effectively his purpose 
“to deceive others in their faith.”  While his contemporaries…were being swept along by 
the flood tide of confidence in human reason, pregnant with “eternal truth,” Hamann 
alone raised his voice in defiant protest.  This protest took the form of a reinterpretation 
of Socrates to the eighteenth century reader…just at the time when the Enlightenment 
was at its zenith, to offer, like a bolt from the blue, such a challenge to the pervading faith 
of the age (Unity and Language
In order to write about Socrates correctly, Hamann had to take on a different persona
 42). 
19. Thouard 
says, “…in the refusal of the ideas of his time Hamann takes on the disguise of his preferred 
precursor, Socrates…” (421). When Hamann says that he has “written about Socrates in a 
Socratic way,” he is essentially employing the Socratic ideas of analogy and irony as forms of 
communication.  “The analogy is supposed to direct the reader towards a typological 
interpretation, elements within the work being related to elements outside it, e.g. Socrates 
himself.  Irony works here as a parody of rhetorical accommodation, the adaption of the orator’s 
discourse to his audience” (Thouard 422).  Of Socrates Hamann says, “Analogy was the soul of 
his reasoning, and he gave it irony for a body” (Haynes ed.7).  Both analogy and irony are two 
forms of indirect communication, which Kierkegaard recognizes Socrates as exemplifying 
through the concept of the maieutic.  Hamann recognizes that the irony in Socrates’ thought was 
essentially his ignorance.  He had not only coined the phrase “Know Thyself!” but sought to live 
it out.  In order to teach others to become cognizant of their existence, Socrates always claimed 
he was ignorant—he could only aid others in coming to the truth.  As Kierkegaard, via Climacus, 
would suggest, the way of the Socratic presents an interesting approach to the interpersonal, 
communicative relationship between teacher and learner.  Climacus writes, “Between one human 
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being and another, this is the highest: the pupil is the occasion for the teacher to understand 
himself; the teacher is the occasion for the pupil to understand himself” (Kierkegaard, 
Philosophical Fragments
 Hamann recognizes ignorance to be a genius quality belonging to Socrates, and it is the 
idea of this ignorance which he uses against Kant and Berens.  He writes, “Socrates, gentlemen, 
was no mean critic…he distinguished what he did not understand from what he did understand in 
them, and he made a very equitable and modest inference from the comprehensible to the 
incomprehensible” (Haynes ed. 8).  So through Socrates, Hamann is showing the limits of human 
reason.  The very notion of Socratic ignorance is the recognition of a distinction between what 
one knows and what one does not know (Hay 106).  Hamann’s portrayal of Socrates doubtless 
made an impression on Kierkegaard.  He “not only credits Hamann with being the one who 
really understood the meaning of Socratic ignorance, but he also interprets Hamann as a living 
example of it” (Hay 107).   
 24).  The maieutic allows for the wall between teacher and learner to be 
broken down, because the teacher recognizes that he has not the power to directly lead the 
individual to the truth.  If the learner is to come to the truth, he must do it himself.  Craig 
Hinkson writes that “Socrates came to regard the attainment of self-knowledge as his divinely 
imposed mission.  Moreover, he held that this was the life-task of every human being.  But what 
was the point of such self-knowledge?  For Socrates, it could be but one thing: to serve as a 
guide to how one should live” (Hinkson 2).  Climacus notes that Socrates “refused to accept 
honor or honorific appointments or money for his teachings” (23) because he considered himself 
merely the occasion for learning.  
Now, Kierkegaard recognized Socrates to be the greatest ironist who ever lived, and 
Hamann as the greatest humorist.  In a journal entry in 1844, Kierkegaard writes: 
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Is it not remarkable that the greatest master of irony and the greatest humorist, separated 
by 2,000 years, may join together in doing and admiring what we should suppose 
everyone had done, if this fact did not testify to the contrary.  Hamann says of Socrates: 
“He was great because he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not 
understand.”  If only Socrates could have had an epitaph!  Many an innocent person has 
drained the poisoned cup, many a one has sacrificed his life for the idea, but this epitaph 
belongs to Socrates alone: Here rests Socrates; he distinguished between what he 
understood and what he did not understand.  Or perhaps better simply to quote Hamann’s 
words (Journals and Papers Vol. 2
In another entry from the same year, Kierkegaard writes: 
 203). 
The age of distinction is long past, because the system abrogates it.  He who loves it must 
be regarded as an oddity, a lover of something that vanished long ago.  This may well be; 
yet my soul clings to Socrates, its first love, and rejoices in the one who understood him, 
Hamann; for he has said it best that he taught young people and made fun of the Sophists 
and drained the poisoned cup; Socrates was great because he distinguished between what 
he understood and what he did not understand (204). 
In making a distinction between what he knew and did not know Socrates points to the fact that 
human reason has its limits.  In the above quote, Kierkegaard laments the fact that the ‘system,’ 
seeks to sum up and define everything in its own terms.  But to Kierkegaard, both Hamann and 
Socrates stand in stark contrast to those who would hold to any ‘system.’  Hamann rightly 
recognizes that Socrates’ genius was in his ignorance; in distinguishing what he understood from 
what he did not understand, Socrates shows the limits of human reason.  Hinkson writes, 
“Whether his ignorance was pretended or not (and Kierkegaard believes that it was genuine), 
antiquity’s use of the term to describe Socrates indicates that his stance was not merely one of 
ignorance wishing to be instructed, but ignorance used to unmask the sham ‘knowledge’ (3).  
Hamann uses Socrates in just this way, in order to appeal to Kant and Berens, both who both 
make bold claims for knowledge (Hay 103).   
The point is that Socrates, by aid of the maieutic, was able assist others in an indirect 
manner.  Rather than lecture, he conversed (Hinkson 3).  This allowed the learner to come into a 
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personal relationship with that which was being communicated.  Socrates, Hamann and 
Kierkegaard stand in agreement that “the ethical individual is not one who merely talks about the 
ethical: he or she lives it” (4).  Hamann’s purpose in praising Socrates is to show that reason is 
not unbridled but indeed has its limits.  As will later be discussed at length, faith steps in where 
our reasoning ability fails.  To Hamann, Socratic ignorance is of utmost importance because it 
shows that reason is flawed and thereby limited.  For this reason he could write, “Our own being 
and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and cannot be established in any other 
way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann
Kierkegaard shows in his journals how Hamann is regarded by his generation in much the 
same way as Socrates was regarded by the Sophists of his own time.  He writes, “Hamann’s 
relationship to his contemporaries—Socrates’ to the Sophists (who could say something about 
everything)” (Kierkegaard, 
 181).   
Journals and Papers Vol. 2
The views of Socrates may be put in these raw accents when he said to the sophists, the 
learned men of his time, ‘I know nothing.’  That is why these words were a thorn in their 
flesh and a scourge on their backs.  All the ideas of Socrates, which were thrown out as a 
piece of his ignorance, seemed as terrible to them as the hair on Medusa’s head, the 
centre of the aegis.  The ignorance of Socrates was sensibility.  But between sensibility 
and a proposition is a greater difference than between a living animal and its anatomical 
skeleton.  The old and new skeptics may wrap themselves as much as they please in the 
lion-skin of Socratic ignorance, they still betray themselves by their voices and their ears.  
If they know nothing, does the world need proof of it?  Their hypocrisy is ridiculous and 
shameless (Smith, 
 201).  Hamann recognized that the 
rationalists of his day deceived themselves into making Socratic ignorance something it was not.  
He writes in his Socratic Memorabilia: 
J.G. Hamann
Socratic ignorance is therefore important because is shows us that our reasoning ability is 
not autonomous.  Neither then is our communicative ability.  There are some things which 
cannot be reasoned to or communicated completely, because they cannot be understood 
 181).   
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completely.  Rather, they must be believed.  In his journal entry from 1836-37 entitled 
“Something About Hamann,” Kierkegaard pays homage to Hamann by noting that “…in our 
time when the most recognized achievement of thought holds that the important thing is to live 
for one’s age…” Hamann rather refused to simply conform to the times (Kierkegaard, Journals 
and Papers Vol. 2 200).  Rather than praise man’s reason and knowledge to the highest degree, 
Hamann understands that faith in God goes beyond reason.  In a letter to Jacobi on November 2, 
1783, Hamann says, “You know that I think of reason as St. Paul does of the whole law and its 
righteousness—that I expect of it nothing but the recognition of error, and do not regard it as a 
way to truth and life…” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 248).  Hamann then references I Corinthian 220
Hamann draws a most interesting parallel between the law (Mosaic law) and reason.  He 
goes after Hume’s statement: “The last fruit of all worldly wisdom is the recognition of 
human ignorance and weakness.”  Hamann goes on to say “Our reason…is therefore just 
what Paul calls law—and the command of reason is holy, righteous, and good; but is it 
given to make us wise?  Just as little as the law of the Jews justified them, but is to bring 
us over from the opposite, how unreasonable our reason is, that our faults should increase 
through it, as sin increased through the law” (Kierkegaard, 
 to 
back his point that “there is wisdom which is not of earth, or of man, or of the devil, but a secret 
and hidden wisdom of God which God ordained before the ages to our glory—which none of the 
rulers of this world can understand.”(248). In 1836, Kierkegaard writes: 
Journals and Papers
In another entry from 1849, Kierkegaard says: 
 199, 575).   
Hamann rightly declares: Just as “law” abrogates “grace,” so “to comprehend” abrogates 
“to have faith.”  It is, in fact, my thesis.  But in Hamann it is merely an aphorism; 
whereas I have fought it through or have fought it out of a whole given philosophy and 
culture and into the thesis: to comprehend that faith cannot be comprehended or (the 
more ethical and God-fearing side) to comprehend that faith must not be comprehended 
(205).   
As pointed out earlier, Hamann writes in Socratic Memorabilia, “Faith is not a work of 
reason and therefore cannot succumb to any attack by reason; because believing happens as little 
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by means of reasons as tasting and seeing” (Smith, J.G. Hamann
References to Hamann in Kierkegaard’s Early Authorship 
 182).  To Hamann, faith lays 
“outside the sphere of our powers of cognition” (258), and is in fact a mode of existence.  
Through faith we are led into a communicative relationship with God and are able to 
communicate the Word as witnesses to the Truth.   
That Hamann played a major role in Kierkegaard’s development as a Christian thinker, I 
believe cannot be denied.  That he meant much to Kierkegaard’s development as a writer early in 
his career is especially important, as we have pointed out.  For our purposes here, it is necessary 
to examine three early works by Kierkegaard in which Hamann is referenced.  These are 
Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and Repetition.   
In the first part of Either/Or the pseudonymous writer “A” quotes Hamann “to illustrate 
the connection between a reader and writer” (Hay 101).  “That is, if a person belongs to ‘the 
reader’s sect,’ if he in one way or another distinguishes himself as an alert and diligent reader, 
others begin to nurture the notion that a minor author might emerge, for as Hamann says: ‘out of 
children come adults, out of virgins come brides, out of readers come writers’” (Kierkegaard, 
Either/Or 245).  Hamann certainly was in love with the communicative power of language, and it 
shows in the above quotation.  Kierkegaard equates diligence with being a good reader and also 
with becoming a writer.  I do not think it a stretch to say that one can see Hamann’s concept of 
unity as visible and at work in this quote as well.  Just as children become adults, so good readers 
are capable of becoming writers.  An age-old adage is evident: if an individual wants to become 
a better writer, he/she must not only practice writing, but read vociferously as well.   
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 In the introduction to Fear and Trembling, the “dialectical lyric” in which Kierkegaard 
(using the pseudonym Johannes de silentio) deals with Abraham as the ultimate model of faith, 
he uses an obscure quote from Hamann:  “What Tarquinius Superbus said in the garden by 
means of the poppies, the son understood but the messenger did not” (Hay 101fn).  Lowrie 
explains this epigraph in the editor’s introduction to Fear and Trembling: 
In Fear and Trembling the very name of the pseudonym, Johannes de silentio, suggests 
mystery, and the motto on the back of the title page, which he got from Hamann, recalls 
the well-known story of old Rome, which relates that when the son of Tarquinius 
Superbus had craftily gained the confidence of the people of Gabii he secretly sent a 
messenger to his father in Rome, asking what he should do next.  The father, not willing 
to trust the messenger, took him into the field where as he walked he struck off with his 
cane the heads of the tallest poppies.  The son understood that he was to bring about the 
death of the most eminent men in the city and proceeded to do so (Kierkegaard, Fear and 
Trembling
Ronald M. Green writes:  
 xvii).   
From the outset, by means of the famous epigraph drawn from Hamann, Kierkegaard 
signals that not everything that follows is at it seems.  Beyond this, there is evidence that 
Kierkegaard designed Fear and Trembling as a text with hidden layers of meaning.  In 
The Point of View on My Work as an Author, Kierkegaard tells us that the most important 
ethical and religious truths cannot be communicated directly, as though one were writing 
on a blank sheet of paper.  They demand instead creative endeavor by the author and a 
corresponding effort by the reader that involves “bringing to light by the application of a 
caustic fluid a text which is hidden under another text” [PV 40] (Green 257).   
Indeed, not everything is as it seems.  In Fear and Trembling, it appears that the pseudonym 
Johannes de silentio uses the epigraph from Hamann not only to alert the reader to the task of 
thinking dialectically, but also to show the faith of Abraham in his willingness to sacrifice his 
son Isaac.  That which appeared as nonsense, Abraham took instead in faith.  His faith surpassed 
mere reason.  By faith, Abraham trusted that he was to offer his only son Isaac as a sacrifice, and 
believed God able to raise him from the dead21.  Only when Abraham had bound Isaac on the 
altar was it revealed that God had rewarded his faith by providing the sacrifice.22 Johannes de 
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silentio uses the story of Abraham’s unsurpassed display of faith as an example of how faith 
supersedes human reason.  According to Green: 
The use of Abraham also conveys a new emphasis on faith as a way of life.  This 
emphasis is meant to replace the centuries-old understanding of faith as merely an 
acceptance of dogmatic truths.  Abraham is a fitting choice to communicate this lesson 
because his hallmark is not intellectual achievement but a prodigious ability to live 
trustingly and obediently.  In the margin of a draft of the “Eulogy on Abraham,” 
Kierkegaard makes this point even clearer by ending the section with a definition of faith 
“not as the content of a concept but as a form of the will” (Pap. IV B 87 p. 2).  The 
emphasis on willing and acting rather than thinking and reasoning is also highlighted by 
the sheer irrationality of Abraham’s faith, his belief “by virtue of the absurd” that he will 
get Isaac back (Green 259).   
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym communicates to the reader that Abraham is the ultimate 
example of faith’s ability to eclipse reason.  That Hamann is used at the outset of this endeavor is 
indeed intriguing since a basic Hamannian theme is the inability of the rational to reach into the 
realm of faith.  “Without faith we cannot understand even creation and nature” Hamann writes in 
his Biblical Reflections (Smith, J.G Hamann
All our knowledge is in part, and all human grounds of reason consist either of faith in 
truth or doubt of untruth, or of faith in untruth and doubt of truth…But if the 
understanding believes in lies and enjoys it, doubts truths and despises them with disgust 
as bad food, then the light in us is darkness and the salt in us has lost its savor—religion 
is pure church parade, philosophy is an empty word-display, superannuated and 
meaningless opinions, out-of-date rights without power…What is truth?  A wind that 
blows where it lists, whose sound one hears, but does not know whence it came and 
whither it goes—a spirit whom the world cannot receive, because it neither sees him nor 
knows him (Smith, 
 137).  In fact, to Hamann, reason is inclined to 
untruth.  He regards our knowledge as fragmentary and prone to doubt.  However, faith that is 
grounded in something other than God leads to untruth as well.  Only faith in God can lead to 
truth.  Without faith, the world cannot receive the truth. As Hamann writes in his Golgotha and 
Scheblimini:   
J.G. Hamann 231-32).   
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That is not to say that faith does away with reason completely.  To Hamann, both reason and 
faith are necessary for one’s own instruction and for teaching others (255).  “Faith cometh by 
hearing, and hearing by the word of God” (NASV).23
In the twin work Repetition, Kierkegaard (through the pseudonym Constantin 
Constantius) references Hamann once again.  Constantius refers to his work as “an essay in 
experimental psychology” (Kierkegaard, 
 Faith is not the product of human reason, 
but faith is given to man by God.   
Repetition 1).  In CUP Climacus gives us a better 
understanding of this experimental mode.  “The significance of this experimental form is that by 
this means of communication ‘itself forms an opposition (to itself), and the experiment 
establishes a yawning chasm between reader and author, puts the separation of inwardness 
between them, so that direct understanding is made impossible’” (Evans, Kierkegaard’s 
Fragments and Postscript
In Repetition Constantius writes:  
 22).  C. Stephen Evans notes that this experimental form is related to 
indirect communication.  “Not only does Kierkegaard attempt to distance himself from the reader 
via the pseudonyms; some of the pseudonyms attempt to do the same thing by writing in the 
form of an experiment” (22).  It follows that if readers of the pseudonymous literature are to take 
the contents of the book as true, they will be forced to stake themselves to that truth and take 
responsibility for it (22).  In other words, the reader will be unable to simply accept the contents 
as truth without first personally examining them.  The removal of Kierkegaard and to a certain 
degree the pseudonymous Constantius, allows the reader to personally grasp the content, rather 
than simply accepting it because a credible source writes it.  
Let everyone pass what judgment he will upon what I have said with regard to repetition. 
Let him also pass what judgment he will upon the fact that I say it here in this way, 
110 
 
expressing myself after Hamann’s example ‘in diverse tongues’ and speaking the 
language of Sophists, of quibbles of Cretans and Arabians and Creoles, babbling 
indifferently rebus and principles, arguing now in a human way, now in an absolute way 
(Kierkegaard, Repetition
Kierkegaard’s use of Hamann here indicates that he is employing basically the same type of 
literary devices as Hamann.  That Hamann spoke ‘in various tongues,’ I think, can be understood 
in a few different ways.  First of all, Hamann, as a philologist, did speak in different tongues.   
However, he also did so metaphorically, as a way to communicate his message to thinkers of the 
Enlightenment, who likely were not willing to give him a proper hearing or at least, doubtless 
misunderstood his purposes.  He took on a different style of communicating when writing about 
Socrates, and appears to do so as a relational tool at other times.  It is interesting that Hamann 
always writes under pseudonyms, creating a style that must have influenced Kierkegaard a great 
deal.  Both Hamann and Kierkegaard also wants their readers to realize that following their 
writings can prove an enormously difficult task (Hay 102), because they use all the linguistic and 
literary tools available to effectively communicate their ideas.  In Repetition, Constantin 
Constantius does the same thing.  He expresses himself in different ways, some of which may 
not be immediately recognizable to the reader, or which may even appear contradictory at times.  
 35, 163).  
The Concept of Humor 
 As has been mentioned, Kierkegaard viewed Hamann as the greatest humorist to have 
ever lived.  This is evident from an earlier quote in which Kierkegaard ties Socrates and Hamann 
together as “the greatest ironist” and “the greatest humorist,” respectively (Kierkegaard, Journals 
and Papers Vol. 2 203).  In a journal entry from 1837, Kierkegaard identifies Hamann as a 
humorist.  I quote it in full because it shows best Kierkegaard’s perception of humor and how 
Hamann can be viewed as such. 
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Hamann could become a good representative of the humor in Christianity (more about 
this another time), but in him the trend toward humor necessarily developed one-sidedly 
(a) because of the humor intrinsic to Christianity, (b) because of the isolation of the 
individual conditioned by the Reformation, an isolation which did not arise in 
Catholicism, which since it had a Church could oppose “the world,” although in its pure 
concept as Church it probably was less able to be predisposed to do this, and in any case 
it nevertheless could not develop humor to an apex opposing everything and thereby 
rather barren, at least devoid of prolific vegetation and bearing only a dwarfed scrawny 
birch (the reason this was not the case with Hamann is to be found in his profound 
sensibility and enormous genius, which had depth corresponding to the degree of its 
narrowness in width—and Hamann found a real delight in inviting his knowledge-greedy 
contemporaries, platter-lickers, to his long-necked stork flask—but just the same he can 
be a very good representative for the true center of this position), and (c) because of his 
own naturally humorous disposition.  Thus one can truthfully say that Hamann is the 
greatest humorist in Christianity (meaning the greatest humorist in the view of life which 
itself is the most humorous view of life in world-history—therefore the greatest humorist 
in the world) (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2
It is important for us to remember that by humor we are referring to that which is witty or absurd.  
Humor can be described as “that quality which appeals to a sense of the ludicrous or absurdly 
incongruous” (Palmer ed. 497).  To Kierkegaard, humor revolves around what he calls a 
“contradiction” (Evans, 
 251-52).   
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self
The kind of humor that strikes us as deep humor does so because it reminds us of or even 
illuminates the deep incongruity that lies at the base of our own nature.  Every honest 
human being experiences a “contradiction” between the ideal self and the actual self.  
The people whom we regard as the greatest saints are precisely those who do not view 
their own accomplishments all that seriously because they are keenly conscious of how 
far short of their ideals they fall (12). 
 11).  Evans notes that ‘contradiction’ 
in this way is best understood as ‘incongruity’ (13).  He writes: 
Humor is then a communicative tool used by Kierkegaard throughout his writings to help the 
reader realize the importance of personal existence.  Hamann is such a great example of a 
Christian humorist to Kierkegaard precisely because he understands the condition of human 
existence and what it means to strive towards a higher meaning of existence in Christianity.    
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According to Evans, there are three different types of theories related to humor: relief 
theories, superiority theories, and incongruity theories (Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 
Now, Climacus himself is not yet a Christian, but he wishes to become one.  Therefore, 
he is not ideologically opposed to Christianity.  However, Climacus is a speculative individual.  
In CUP we see that Climacus became an author partly because his studies “had led him to the 
conclusion that there was confusion lurking in the relation between Christianity and 
Hegelianism” (Evans, 
82).  
Relief theories “generally focus on humor as a pleasurable experience, which consists in or is 
casually related to a discharge of accumulated tension or energy” (82).  Superiority theories see 
humor as a pleasant experience of oneself as superior (82).  Incongruity theories view humor as 
that which “arises through some contrast between what we would normally expect and the actual 
course of our experience.  The incongruity must be one that is experienced as pleasant, of 
course” (82).  Kierkegaard’s own use of humor is a version of incongruity theory, however, he 
incorporates elements of both relief and superiority theories into his writings as well (84).  “The 
notion of superiority is significant in relation to humor because it is the possession of a superior 
position that enables an individual to experience incongruity as pleasant rather than painful.  
Also implicit in his [Kierkegaard’s] view is the notion that humor provides a relief from the 
vexations of life” (84).  In order to gain a deeper understanding of the communicative and 
literary role played by humor in Kierkegaard’s authorship, we will briefly examine the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus, “author” of both Philosophical Fragments and CUP.   
Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 23).  Climacus wants to 
investigate this to see how true Christianity differs from the vogue Hegelianism of the time.  
Still, Climacus represents an individual who knows what Christianity is but does not necessarily 
understand what it is to be a Christian.  Evans writes, “Climacus respects Christianity because, if 
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true, it is the most serious and important thing a person will face in existence, since Christianity 
claims that a person’s relationship to it will determine his eternal destiny.  He also respects 
Christianity because he can see that it is a strenuous way of life; existing as a Christian requires a 
rare courage and determination” (24).  Climacus’ speculation is found in the fact that he is an 
“existing humorist” (65).  By using Climacus as a humorist, Kierkegaard is “aiming at the 
illusion of ‘Christendom’” (52).  “This illusion is grounded in the idea that being a Christian is 
something easy, something that everyone is as a matter of course” (52).  Kierkegaard uses 
Climacus as a communicator in order to remove this illusion from the reader.  Christianity is 
extremely difficult to live.  It is not something that can be taken lightly, that everyone can claim 
by tradition and without examination.  The communicator’s primary tools for removing the 
illusion are irony and humor (105).  Humor in Climacus’ sense then, is found in its ability to 
communicate “unity of jest and seriousness” (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
Humor in the thought of Kierkegaard is to be understood in relation to the existence 
stages of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious.  Humor lies between the ethical and the religious 
spheres.  It lies before one reaches the religious, not after, as speculative thinkers would claim.  
In CUP Climacus writes:   
 
81), which becomes a riddle to the recipient—a riddle that the recipient must solve for himself 
(Evans 107).   
Thus humor is advanced as the final terminus a quo in relation to the Christian-religious.  
In modern scholarship, humor has become the highest after faith.  That is, faith is the 
immediate, and through speculative thought, which goes beyond faith, humor is reached.  
This is a general confusion in all systematic speculative thought, insofar as it wants to 
take Christianity under its wing.  No, humor terminates immanence without immanence, 
still consists essentially in recollection’s withdrawal out f existence into the eternal, and 
only then do faith and paradoxes begin.  Humor is the last stage in existence-inwardness 
before faith (Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript 291). 
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“Humor arises from juxtaposing the God-idea with the sundry concerns of daily living” 
(Hinkson 13).  Humor is also the “outer costume” of the truly religious individual (Evans, 
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 12).  Kierkegaard intends to describe humor as a pervasive 
feature of human existence and a special “boundary zone” that lies between the ethical and 
religious spheres (12).  Kierkegaard links humor to the ethical way of life and ultimately to 
Christianity because he understands that the humorist “has taken the humor which is a general 
element of life and made it the fundamental ground of his distinctive way of life…The humorist 
in Kierkegaard’s special sense has learned to smile at the whole of life, because she has learned 
to smile at herself” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 
Kierkegaard uses humor as indirect method of relating to the reader.  Humor is also 
indirect communication in the sense that it is used at times through the pseudonymous authors.  
Humor in the religious sense takes on a “higher perspective” than humor as it is normally 
thought of (Evans, 
87).    
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 
This apparent higher perspective, which in the case of the pure humorist is illusory, can 
only be found in the Christian doctrines of grace and forgiveness.  If there is a place for 
humor in Christianity, it must surely rest on these two doctrines.  Despite the fact that life 
is earnest for the Christian, there is also a place for the humorous smile and even for 
laughter.  (Perhaps it is partly because of the fact that life is earnest; I think that the 
incongruities which strike us as most deeply humorous usually relate to what we care 
deeply about.)  That place or humor is provided by the grace of God and the forgiveness 
which is offered freely in Christ.  It is this which makes it possible for the earnest 
individual to smile at the contradiction between his life and the ideal he sees in Christ 
(Evans, 
89).  Evans writes: 
Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self
The Christian humorist is able to understand and relate the concepts of contradiction, 
incongruity, and paradox—all of which are important elements in the Christianity presented in 
the New Testament through the life of Christ.  Hamann, as we shall see, is the representative of 
the ultimate humorist because he recognizes Christ, the God-Man, as the paradox and sign of 
 89). 
115 
 
contradiction.  Hamann uses these themes in an amazing display of wit to combat thinkers of the 
Enlightenment and to show that the highest form of existence—faith —is to be found in that 
which is seemingly absurd.   
In a long journal entry from 1837 Kierkegaard writes,  
The humorous, present throughout Christianity, is expressed in a fundamental principle 
which declares that the truth is hidden in the mystery, which teaches not only that the 
truth is found in a mystery (an assertion which the world generally has been more 
inclined to hear, since mysteries have arisen often enough, although the ones initiated 
into these mysteries promptly apprehended the rest of the world in a humorous vein), but 
that it is in fact hidden in the mystery.  This is a view of life which regards worldly 
wisdom humorously to the nth degree; otherwise the truth is usually revealed in the 
mystery…The humorous in Christianity appears also in the statement: My yoke is easy 
and my burden is not heavy, for it certainly is extremely heavy for the world, the heaviest 
that can be imagined—self-denial.  The ignorance of the Christian (this purely Socratic 
view, as in a Hamann, for example) is, of course, also humorous, for what is its basis but 
a forcing of oneself down in this way to the lowest position and looking up (that is, 
down) at the ordinary view, yet in such a way that behind this self-degrading there lies a 
high-degree of self-elevating (the humility of the Christian which in its polemical form 
against the world increases his own wretchedness, while on the other hand it its 
normative form it involves a noble pride (the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater 
than John the Baptist) or in its abnormality a haughty isolation from the course of events 
(the historical nexus) (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
Kierkegaard is certainly not regarding Scripture as humorous here in our normal 
definition of the word.  Rather, he is saying that the true humorist not only realizes just how 
contradictory Scripture appears to the unbeliever, just how the truth goes against what we as 
humans would expect it to be.  Kierkegaard also gives reference here to the life of the humorist 
which he expounds upon in a later journal entry from the following year: “The humorist, like the 
beast of prey, always walks alone” (263).  The true humorist is embodied in Hamann precisely 
because he did not give in to the demands of the age and remained an individual.  For instance, 
after his conversion to Christianity, he sensed how offensive his new-found faith had become to 
his family and friends (Anderson 113).  “Hamann countered these affronts to his integrity with 
 253).  
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biting wit.  The audacity of invoking unacceptable manners and morals, and particularly of 
human sense and reason in the face of divine revelation, appealed to his sense of humor—a sense 
he discerned as fundamental to his posture” (114).  Hamann does not want to prove his faith. He 
felt it ludicrous “to try to defend Christianity with evidences of human sense and reason 
comparable to the grounds his opponents had chosen” (114).  One sees evidence of Hamann’s 
humor here also.  It would indeed be ridiculous to want to prove by the aid of fallen reason that 
God exists.  Hence, Hamann employed Socrates (114) as one of the greatest thinkers of all time 
because he recognized the limits of his reason.  Hamann holds instead that faith has no need to 
prove God’s existence (an idea further expounded upon later in this thesis).  It suffices to say 
here that for an individual to want proof when belief is all one can have, appeals to Hamann’s 
sense of humor (128).  Albert Anderson points out that the best example of Hamann’s humor is 
his “discovery (which he returns to many times) of how often a particularly prominent writer or 
spokesman will, without his knowledge and even against his will, witness to some profound 
aspect of Christian reality” (124).   Hamann believes that examples of this are evident in 
Scripture and in the everyday world.  It is a testament to the communicative power of the 
Scripture to reach men in ways which defy reason.   
While Kierkegaard sees Hamann as the world’s greatest humorist, he thinks that Hamann 
goes too far in one of his more humorous statements.  In a journal entry from 1837 Kierkegaard 
writes: “Isn’t Hamann being extremely ironical when he says somewhere that he would rather 
hear the truth from the mouth of a Pharisee against his will than from an angel or apostle?” 
(Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 202).  In another entry Kierkegaard makes it clear that he 
believes that Hamann has gone too far in this witty statement.  “Humor can therefore approach 
blasphemy; Hamann would rather hear wisdom from Balaam’s ass or from a philosopher against 
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his will than from an angel or apostle” (257).  Here we witness a break between Kierkegaard and 
Hamann.  However, Hamann’s point may be that the truth from the mouth of a Pharisee would 
be precious simply because of its rarity.   Nevertheless Kierkegaard believed Hamann bordered 
on the blasphemous with the statement.   
Humor in the Kierkegaardian sense, is a form of indirect communication along with 
irony, and both are “employed by persons whose subjectivity has been sufficiently developed 
that they are aware of the infinite ethical demand and/or the absolute nature of the God-
relationship” (Hinkson 14).  That Kierkegaard enlists Hamann as the greatest example of a 
Christian humorist is imperative to our understanding of Hamann’s influence on Kierkegaard’s 
model of indirect communication.   
In the first part of this chapter, this researcher focused on the subject of communication 
and examined the idea of God, the Logos, as the creator and sustainer of human communication.  
There the idea was presented that both Hamann and Kierkegaard placed emphasis upon language 
and believed human reason to be both depraved and incapable of expression were it not for 
language.  Throughout this thesis, this researcher has investigated Kierkegaard’s model of 
indirect communication and shown its importance to his authorship and to both the practice and 
theory of communication.  No discussion of Kierkegaard’s thought and/or relation to 
Christianity, however, would be complete without understanding Christianity as indirect 
communication.  Also, in order to examine to the fullest extent Kierkegaard’s relation to 
Hamann, it is necessary to consider the role of communication in the concept of faith.  In 
Christianity as Indirect Communication 
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particular, I examine how the Word is revealed through the person of Christ in the form of 
indirect communication and the role of faith as existence-communication given this revelation.   
Existence and Christianity 
To say that Christendom in Kierkegaard’s day was a reflection of true Christianity would 
indeed be a pure prevarication.   Rather, Christendom had become the most severe of distortions.  
Christendom had claimed to raise Christianity to the form of mere objective adherence, and the 
result was that the masses claimed to be perfectly fit Christians, but had not the slightest inkling 
of what it meant to exist in Christianity.  To Kierkegaard, the majority of people simply sought 
to keep the “rules” of Christianity while they collectively ignored Christ’s teachings.  Since he 
believed this to be the case, he viewed Christendom as a dangerous misrepresentation of the 
Christianity demanded by the New Testament.  Hermann Diem writes that “the church itself had 
watered down the Christianity of the New Testament, adapting it to the weakness of the natural 
man” (Kierkegaard: An Introduction
The result of this misappropriation of truth in Demark at the time was that people, while 
saying they were perfecting Christianity, sought to “cheat God out of Christianity” (Kierkegaard, 
 101).  Kierkegaard believed that established Christendom 
was not even remotely in the character of striving in the direction of the Christianity in the New 
Testament (Garff 747).   
Attack upon Christendom 33).  A century before, Hamann had sought in his onslaught against 
autonomous reason, to make his contemporaries aware that their reason was limited and flawed.  
By placing primacy upon language and the Word as communicative acts given and constituted 
by God, Hamann hoped to lead individuals to understand that the highest mode of existence was 
composed of faith.  In his attack, Kierkegaard attempted to address the hindrance posed to 
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Christianity by Christendom, thereby making people aware of their situation.  He felt compelled 
by “providence” to do as much (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction 107).  However, he did not 
consider himself a reformer or prophet, but rather likened himself unto “an unusually talented 
police detective” (Garff 748).  “His job was only to reveal the present state of Christendom in the 
full depth of its deception” (Diem, Kierkegaard: An Introduction
So, it was that in 1855, while engaged in his attack on the State Church and established 
Christendom, Kierkegaard wrote in an article published in The Fatherland:   
107). 
And this in my opinion is the falsification of which official Christianity is guilty: it does 
not frankly and unreservedly make known the Christian requirement—perhaps because it 
is afraid people would shudder to see at what a distance from it we are living, without 
being able to claim that in the remotest way our life might be called an effort in the 
direction of fulfilling the requirement…So then we “Christians” are living, and are loving 
our life, just in the ordinary human sense.  If then by “grace” God will nevertheless 
regard us as Christians, one thing at least must be required: that we, being precisely 
aware of the requirement, have a true conception of how infinitely great is the grace that 
is showed us (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom
Before going further, the question must be raised as to why Kierkegaard viewed Christendom the 
way he did.  Certainly he had a keen sense of the Danish mind and culture, for he was “Danish to 
the core of his being” (Skjoldager 147).  We have seen how interpersonal communication was to 
him the greatest enjoyment and played a major role in his conception of the common man.  He 
knew his fellow countrymen, understood the troubles they faced, and recognized the faults 
within society. However, the matter can be taken to a deeper level.  Kierkegaard understood 
human nature and existence.  He also knew that conforming to the requirements of Christianity 
proves to be a rigorous and life-long process.  Therefore, it was his purpose to indirectly help 
individuals overcome the categories in which they lived and the meaninglessness in which they 
strove, in order to help them understand the truth.  To the end of his life he felt it his providential 
task to communicate truth (Diem, 
 38).   
Kierkegaard: An Introduction 107), even if it meant attacking 
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established Christendom in the process.  To Kierkegaard, Christendom had forgotten what it 
means to deny the self.  In a journal entry from 1854 he says, “…to such a degree has self-denial, 
the point of Christianity, been forgotten and to such a degree have earthly well-being and 
comfortable mediocrity been idolized” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 3
Religion in this country consists essentially of getting married and then being active in 
earning a living, acquiring for oneself and his own, and yet—this is characteristic of 
Denmark—not without sympathy for those in need, especially the needy with families, 
for the business of family and livelihood is the earnestness of life.  And if one is so 
fortunate as to acquire wealth, it is assumed in Denmark that he is particularly beloved by 
God.  And then, incidentally, one goes to church occasionally, once or twice a year to 
communion, pays the pastor his dues—and that is Christianity (217).   
 217).  He goes 
on to write: 
 Certainly this must be viewed as the height of irony: that which is the actual state of 
Christianity, Christendom, in no way resembles Christianity.  If Kierkegaard is correct in his 
assertions, then it would follow that those who outwardly express that they exist in Christianity 
and yet are guilty of living in categories foreign to it, really know not what it means to exist in 
relation to Christianity at all.  Living as such is self-deception.  One can also be deceived into 
living in such a way if Christianity is communicated improperly, as Kierkegaard believed was 
often the case.  It is clear, then, that Christianity in Kierkegaard’s day was equated with being a 
decent human being.  However, in order to understand Kierkegaard’s rejection of the established 
norms of Christendom we must briefly investigate what ideas and practices in particular he 
understood as being in opposition to Christianity. 
 That Christendom had come to represent something entirely different than the 
Christianity of the New Testament is evident in the popular teachings of several individuals of 
Kierkegaard’s time.  For instance, first we have the teachings of J.L. Heiberg24, the poet and 
literary critic who “brought the treasure of Hegelian philosophy up from Germany” (Kirmmse 
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139).  Heiberg held the culture which flourishes in literature and philosophy in high esteem, 
while viewing religion merely as “a matter only for the uncultured” (Heiberg, qtd. in Kirmmse 
143).  Secondly, there was H.L. Martensen25, who as author Bruce Kirmmse asserts, was a 
modified Hegelian.  With Martensen, speculative thought stormed, albeit briefly, through the 
university scene (171).  Martensen maintained “religion is a communal activity, a common 
understanding, not a private, individualistic relation to God” (180).  Thirdly, but certainly of no 
less importance, was Grundtvig26
 For our purposes, it is important to understand how these ideas were communicated to the 
public and how they became entrenched in Christendom; for they had profound implications on 
Christian existence, i.e., the way that people thought and lived in Christendom.  To Kierkegaard, 
Christendom had succeeded in gathering the whole of society, and the whole of society 
considered itself Christian.  However, people commonly lived in marked contrast to Christianity 
because Christendom taught them that examination and personal appropriation to the truth were 
unneeded.  The dominance of folk religion was all too real—for it gathered the crowd and then 
failed to teach them the basic truths of Christianity.  Therefore, being a Christian was 
synonymous with being a decent, respectable person.  Kierkegaard’s purpose, to repeat, was to 
, who has been titled “the most gigantic and protean figure of 
the Danish Golden Age” (198).  Grundtvig sought to blend society and history with religion and 
can be properly viewed as one who brought about a new understanding of Christianity and as “an 
awakener of national popular culture” (198).  As far as religion in concerned, Grundtvig would 
emphatically hold to the notion that reason has within it the power to lead us directly to the 
“boundaries of revelation” (205) and believed that the powers of Christianity rested within his 
own communal, folk interpretations (213).   
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act as a “corrective.”  For him, to exist as a Christian was to seek to exemplify the life of Christ.  
Christendom had erred from this in many ways, only a few of which we shall examine.  
 First of all, Kierkegaard understood that in Christendom, the mass of people were 
comfortable with their lifestyle and with the teachings that Christianity was a “gentle, life-
beautifying, and ennobling ground of comfort” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers 199).  
Secondly, people were born into Christendom; that is, from birth they had considered themselves 
Christians simply because they lived in a “Christian land.”  For one to consider him/herself a 
Christian by these requirements is to Kierkegaard utter nonsense.  He writes, “We are all 
Christians by birth—in Christendom” (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers
Imitation, the imitation of Christ, is really the point from which the human race shrinks.  
The main difficulty lies here; here is where it is really decided whether or not one is 
willing to accept Christianity.  If there is emphasis on this point, the stronger the 
emphasis the fewer the Christians.  If there is a scaling down at this point (so that 
Christianity becomes, intellectually, a doctrine), more people enter into Christianity.  If it 
is abolished completely (so that Christianity becomes, existentially, as easy as mythology 
and poetry and imitation an exaggeration, a ludicrous exaggeration), then Christianity 
spreads to such a degree that Christendom and the world are almost indistinguishable, or 
all become Christians; Christianity has completely conquered—that is, it is abolished! 
(Kierkegaard, 
 164).  By hailing 
Christianity as to be precisely this—that one is born into it and quite comfortable—is to make 
Christianity itself into “complete nonsense” (164).  That being a Christian is viewed in this way 
may attract a greater number of people, but has the effect of secularizing Christianity and 
lowering its strict requirements.  Instead of following Christ and imitating him, one gets the 
notion that by simply by living a moral lifestyle, one might find earthly happiness through 
Christianity.  Kierkegaard writes: 
Judge for Yourself!
Instead of making clear the unconditional requirement of Christianity – that one cannot serve two 
masters – those who communicated the message instead taught that Christianity guaranteed “the 
 188).   
123 
 
greatest possible earthly advantage, enjoyment, etc. (189).  “This is a cheap edition of what it is 
to be a Christian.  Yet this is the actual state of affairs, because the preachers’ declaiming about 
the lofty virtues etc. during a quiet hour on Sunday does not alter the actual state of affairs on 
Monday, since people account for such a proclamation as being the preacher’s official job and 
his livelihood, and since many a clergyman’s life certainly is not different from that actual state 
of affairs…(189).  The abasement of Christianity meant that “a whole man’s life is secularized, 
his every thought from morning until evening, his waking and dreaming” (Kierkegaard, Journals 
and Papers 165).  As such, there were no clear lines between Christianity and secularism.  To 
Kierkegaard more and more people may have taken part in established Christendom, but they did 
so without examining what it means to exist as a Christian or understand its requirements.  He 
writes, “let us not gloss over the Christian requirement, so that by suppression or by falsification 
we may bring about an appearance of decorum which is in the very highest degree demoralizing 
and is a sly death-blow to Christianity” (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom
Christian existence is markedly different from human existence, as shown by the life of 
Christ.  Christian existence means that one may indeed be forced to suffer; it means that one 
must live in contemporaneousness with Christ; it means that one is aware of the eternal as having 
infinitely more meaning than this present life.  Rather than focusing on the blessedness of the 
eternal, established Christendom focused on the advantages and gains one could experience from 
Christianity.  In a journal entry from 1853, Kierkegaard discusses this difference.  “Christianity 
teaches that this life is a life of suffering—but then comes eternity…Christendom has invented a 
refinement: Christianity is to enjoy this life, raised to a higher power because there is an eternity” 
(
 39).   
Journals and Papers Vol. 4 471).  To Kierkegaard, Christendom took the teachings of eternity 
and applied them to earthly life (470), the result of which could only be that those who 
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considered themselves Christians existed happily and comfortably in their ignorance of what it 
meant to truly be a Christian.  In a journal entry from 1854-55, Kierkegaard writes how 
Christendom differs dramatically from the Christianity of the New Testament.   
God wants to be loved.  This is why he wants Christians.  To love God is to be a 
Christian.  God, of course, knows best how agonizing this is, humanly speaking, for a 
man.  He says it as clearly as possible.  To love God is possible only by clashing with all 
human existence (hating father and mother, hating oneself, suffering because one is a 
Christian etc.)  “Man’s” rascally interests these days center on securing millions of 
Christians, the more the better, all, if possible, for in this way the whole difficulty in 
being a Christian vanishes; being a Christian and being a human being are synonymous, 
and we stand where paganism left off (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 3
 Paradox and Absolute Paradox 
 58).   
 As J. Heywood Thomas points out, the idea of paradox runs throughout Kierkegaard’s 
authorship (“Paradox” 192).    The idea, however, has special prominence in Philosophical 
Fragments, CUP, and Training.  Paradox can be defined as that which is “contrary to 
appearance, plausibility, or probability” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol.2 633).  Both Hamann and 
Kierkegaard speak of the paradoxical nature of God, and on this point it can said that there is a 
link between the two in the area of indirect communication.  In Philosophical Fragments, the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus uses Socrates as an example of a paradoxical thinker.  To 
Kierkegaard, Socrates always sought to better know himself, a claim evidenced by the Socratic 
maxim.  It was Socrates’ paradoxical nature which inclined him to examine “whether he…was a 
more curious monster than Typhon or a friendlier and simpler being, by nature sharing 
something divine.  This seems to be a paradox” (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments 37).  
Climacus goes on to write, “But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the 
passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a 
mediocre fellow” (37).  In dealing with the idea of paradox in relation to Socrates, Climacus is 
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thereby setting the stage to show the fallibility of human reason in understanding Christ as the 
Absolute Paradox.  A paradox in general challenges both our reasoning capacity and our ability 
to communicate.   
 To both Kierkegaard and Hamann, paradox takes on its highest form in Christ as the 
God-Man.  It appears likely that Kierkegaard found Hamann’s treatment of paradox fascinating, 
and both thinkers would advocate that “paradox was the very thought-form of religion” (Thomas, 
“Paradox” 201).  To Hamann, paradox is the “vehicle for the expression of spiritual truth” 
(O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 90).  As James O’Flaherty points out, “Since God has condescended 
to reveal Himself in lowly, even contemptible form—as the Scriptures everywhere attest—the 
paradox possesses the highest possible legitimation” (90).  In Biblical Reflections Hamann 
writes, “One must view with astonishment how God accommodates Himself to all small 
circumstances, and prefers to reveal His government through the everyday events of human life 
rather than the singular and extraordinary events…” (qtd. in O’Flaherty, J.G. Hamann 90).  
Hamann was so impacted by the idea of the paradox that he would come to an understanding of 
paradoxical language as being markedly opposed to that of rational communication.  “As a 
natural idiom of the spirit, paradoxical language stands in strong contrast to logical discourse, 
which seeks to eliminate the paradox entirely, and in doing so becomes in Hamann’s eyes merely 
empty discourse” (90).  In Socratic Memorabilia (in which it must be recalled how Hamann used 
Socrates to discredit the rationalists of his day), Hamann points out that “even the Greeks 
accepted the paradox as a matter of course when they spoke of the gods, and that it was only the 
rationalists among them who rejected it” (90-1).  Hamann believes that the paradoxical nature of 
Christ as the God-Man is seen in the fact that He reveals Himself to us in the strangest way 
possible, a way which defies human reason.  He writes: 
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What man would, like the Apostle Paul, venture to speak of the foolishness of God, of the 
weakness of God.  None but the Spirit which searches the deep things of God would have 
disclosed this prophesy to us, the fulfillment of which is evident in our own day more 
than ever: that not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble are called 
to the Kingdom of Heaven, and that God willed to reveal His wisdom and power in that 
he chose the foolish things of the world to confound the wise, that he chose the weak 
things of the world to confound the things which are mighty, that he chose what is low 
and despised in the world, even things that are not, to bring to naught those things that 
are…(Hamann, qtd. in O’Flaherty 90).   
It appears that to Hamann, the Paradox defies human understanding; it can only be 
believed upon rather than reasoned to.  Revelation in Christ is cast in the form of a paradox 
(157).  Craig Hinkson notes that Erwin Metzke, the Hamann scholar, elicits a few phrases 
Hamann uses to describe God (6).  “He is the ‘hidden,’ ‘invisible’ one, the ‘incomprehensible’ 
one, ‘the great and unknown’ ‘God’…. There is an ‘infinite misrelationship of man to 
God’….God is the ‘transcending’ and ‘annihilating of all human concepts’” (qtd. in Hinkson 6-
7).  The Paradox then does not directly appeal to man’s reason, for paradox by its very definition 
implies illogicality.  Kierkegaard, heavily impressed by Hamann’s views of reason as being 
inferior to faith, appears affected by Hamann’s idea of the paradoxical nature of faith.  In a 
journal entry (referred to earlier) from 1849, Kierkegaard makes mention of Hamann’s statement 
“Just as ‘law’ abrogates ‘grace,’ so ‘to comprehend’ abrogates ‘to have faith’ (Kierkegaard, 
Journals and Papers Vol.2
 Now, just as Hamann realized that the enlightened thinkers of his day would do away 
with the paradox, so Kierkegaard found himself defending the paradox against the likes of 
Idealism represented in his day by the Hegelians.  “Kierkegaard contends that the Hegelian 
thinkers wanted to dissolve the paradox by saying that viewed eternally it was not a paradox” 
(Thomas, 
 205).  Kierkegaard remarks that this very idea is his thesis, and what 
he has struggled to show is “to comprehend that faith must not be comprehended” (205).   
Subjectivity and Paradox 112).  Perhaps this is one reason Kierkegaard stresses the 
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paradox throughout his writings and especially in Philosophical Fragments.  Another reason 
would evidently be found in his contention that many throughout Christendom had forgotten 
what it meant to exist in Christianity.  “It seems indubitable, then, that the point of talking about 
the Paradox in the Fragments is that it is an answer to the question which was Kierkegaard’s 
great question, namely, ‘What does it mean for me to become a Christian?’” (111). 
Kierkegaard’s own treatment of the God-Man as the paradox appears to have been influenced by 
Hamann.  For example, after making mention of Hamann in Philosophical Fragments, Climacus 
writes that the paradox is “the originator who hands over all the splendor to understanding” 
(Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments
 The God-Man and Indirect Communication: The Sign of Offense 
 53).  The divine Paradox gives us the ability, or inability, 
to reason in the first place.  Having seen the basics of how the concept of paradox plays an 
important role in both Kierkegaard’s writings and Hamann’s, it is necessary to deal with the idea 
from the standpoint of the God-Man as the offense, through which we gain greater insight into 
indirect communication.   
 In the first part of chapter four, this researcher coined the phrase “the Communication of 
Condescension” to describe how God, through the person of Christ, communicates with us.  The 
term is meant to imply that Christ, through his condescension, not only communicates with 
mankind in the ultimate way, but is the very meaning, the definitive structure of communication 
itself.  As the Word, He is communication.  In order to properly understand Kierkegaard’s model 
of indirect communication, we must examine his concept of the God-Man.   
 With the publication of Training in Christianity in 1850, Kierkegaard began his 
campaign against official Christendom (Kirmmse 379).  Training marks the beginning of the 
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movement in which he “no longer takes time to discourse in detail upon ethics or Christian love 
or the psychology of the individual but moves steadily into an increasingly open posture of 
conflict with the established Church and the Golden Age notion of Christian culture” (379).  In 
the outline on the contents page of the book, Kierkegaard makes it clear that the purpose of 
Training is partly “for revival and increase of inwardness” and a “biblical exposition”.  
Specifically, it sets forth the requirements of Christianity, as noted by Kierkegaard in the editor’s 
preface.  “Yet indeed the requirement ought to be uttered, plainly set forth, and heard” 
(Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity
 Technically, Training is written by the pseudonym Anti-Climacus, with Kierkegaard 
appearing as the editor.  Disagreement exists as to exactly how Anti-Climacus stands in relation 
to the other pseudonymous works.  In the introduction to The Sickness unto Death, Howard 
Hong writes, “Obviously the pseudonym Anti-Climacus has a special relation to the pseudonym 
Johannes Climacus…The prefix ‘Anti’ may be misleading, however.  It does not mean ‘against.’  
It is an old form of ‘ante’ (before), as in ‘anticipate,’ and ‘before’ also denotes a relation of rank, 
as in ‘before me’ in the First Commandment” (Hong, qtd. in Perkins, 
 7).  To Kierkegaard, people should be aware of the 
rigorous requirements of Christianity, regardless of whether or not they chose to accept them.  
One thing was certain: these requirements were not be upheld by the established Order.  Thus, it 
has been written that Training was “a sort of time bomb that could only be diffused with an 
‘admission’ or ‘confession’ …that the religion preached officially in Denmark was a 
domesticated, mild form of ‘the Christianity of the New Testament’” (Kirmmse 380).  In 
Training Kierkegaard deals with such concepts as: Christianity as the Absolute, the suffering of 
Christ, absolute paradox, the sign of offense, Christ’s use of indirect communication, and His 
desire to draw all unto Himself.   
International Kierkegaard 
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Commentary: Practice in Christianity 2).  The idea then would be that Anti-Climacus comes 
before Johannes Climacus in the sense that he has taken the necessary step of becoming a 
Christian.  Some scholars, such as Robert Perkins, assert however that the pseudonym is 
explicitly set against Johannes.  Whatever the case, whereas, Johannes is a skeptic, Anti-
Climacus “looks at Christianity from an ideal, committed stance (Evans, Kierkegaard’s 
Fragments and Postscript 216).  Kierkegaard conceived of Anti-Climacus as an ideal character, 
and therefore he was fit to address the severe errors of Christendom27.  Anti-Climacus’ attack 
then is actually a direct one, for since he is a Christian, he can address from within (Kierkegaard, 
Journals and Papers Vol. 6
Johannes Climacus and Anti-Climacus have several things in common: but the difference 
is that whereas Johannes Climacus places himself so low that he even says himself that 
he is not a Christian, one seems to be able to detect in Anti-Climacus that he regards 
himself to be a Christian on an extraordinarily high level…his portrayal of ideality can be 
absolutely sound and I bow to it.  I would place myself higher than Johannes Climacus, 
lower than Anti-Climacus (174-75).   
 175).  As Kierkegaard wrote of his new pseudonym in 1849: 
It is clear then, as C. Stephen Evans states, that Anti-Climacus is distinctively different 
from the earlier pseudonyms and must be considered separately (Kierkegaard’s Fragments and 
Postscript 6).  It is important to note also that Kierkegaard chooses to communicate through 
Anti-Climacus since he expresses the views that “lie at the core of Kierkegaard’s own thought” 
(Evans, Kierkegaard’s Fragments and Postscript 8).   By 1855, five years after the publication of 
Training, Kierkegaard noticed how the situation in Christendom had become even more 
dreadful.  In an article published in The Fatherland that year he writes that if Training could be 
written over, he would have not communicated through the pseudonym but would have done so 
directly.  The article gives us a glimpse of his earlier thoughts as concerns the rebellion of 
Christendom against the Christianity of the New Testament. 
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My earlier thought was: if the Establishment can be defended at all, this is the only way, 
namely, by pronouncing a judgment upon it poetically (therefore by a pseudonym), thus 
drawing upon “grace” raised to the second power, in the sense that Christianity would not 
be forgiveness for merely what is past, but by grace would be a sort of dispensation from 
following Christ in the proper sense and from the effort properly connected with being a 
Christian.  In that way truth would enter into the Establishment after all: it defends itself 
by condemning itself; it acknowledges the Christian requirement, makes for its own part 
an admission of its distance from the requirement and that it is not even an effort in the 
direction of coming closer to it, but has recourse for grace “also with respect to the use 
one makes of grace” (Kierkegaard, Attack upon Christendom
 Now that we have a proper understanding of how Kierkegaard viewed Christendom in his 
day, we turn to his concept of the God-Man and His communication with us through his 
condescension.   
 54).   
 In Training, Kierkegaard places emphasis upon Christ as a stumbling-block28 and the 
sign of offense.29  To those who refuse to accept Him, he is also viewed as “the sign of 
contradiction.”30 It is precisely the embodiment of indirectness that Christ is a sign.  Signs 
convey meaning to us, but only if we understand their meanings.  Kierkegaard writes that “a sign 
is a sign only for one who knows that it is a sign, and in the strictest sense only for one who 
knows what it signifies” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 124).  To Kierkegaard, a sign is 
the negation of immediacy; that is,” it is not the immediate thing it is” (124).  “A nautical mark is 
a sign.  Immediately it is a post, a light, or some such thing, but a sign it is not immediately, that 
it is a sign is something different from what it immediately is” (124).  I may recognize something 
to be a sign.  But to Kierkegaard, the very fact that I recognize it as such means that the sign 
signifies something.  This means that the sign is indeed something else than that which it is 
immediately (124).  A sign of contradiction is that which “draws attention to itself, and then, 
when attention is fixed upon it, shows that it contains a contradiction” (125).  It is the greatest 
contradiction, “the highest, the qualitative contradiction,” to be both God and an individual man 
(125).   Christ is therefore the sign of contradiction, since He as a man, claims to be God.  
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“Immediately He is an individual man, just like other men, a lowly, insignificant man; but the 
contradiction is that He is God” (125).  Kierkegaard uses a variety of terms to describe the God-
Man: the sign of offense, the Absolute Paradox, the absurd.  C. Stephen Evans writes, “Christian 
faith is faith in the incarnation, the fact of the God-man, which he [Kierkegaard] sees as the 
“Absolute Paradox.”  The paradox is called the absurd, and brings with itself the possibility 
offense” (Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self 118).  It is imperative to understand here that 
the God-Man as the Paradox is viewed as being absurd by human reason.  “Instead of the 
paradox being the absurd, it is the understanding that is the absurd or has been made the absurd 
by the paradox” (Walsh 36).  In Philosophical Fragments, Climacus tells us that human 
understanding alone cannot fathom the paradox.  He poses the question: is a paradox such as this 
conceivable? (Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments
The understanding certainly cannot think it, cannot hit upon it on its own, and if it is 
proclaimed, the understanding cannot understand it and merely detects that it will likely 
be its downfall.  To that extent, the understanding has strong objections to it; and yet, on 
the other hand, in its paradoxical passion the understanding does indeed will its own 
downfall.  But the paradox, too, wills this downfall of the understanding, and thus the two 
have a mutual understanding, but this understanding is present only in the moment of 
passion (47).   
 47).  Climacus goes on to say: 
In other words, reason cannot understand the paradox and therefore takes offense at it.  
The “mutual understanding” of which Kierkegaard speaks takes place when the paradox wills the 
downfall of human reason in the moment the learner accepts the paradox in faith as Truth.  Here 
one sees how faith reaches beyond reason in matters pertaining to Christianity, since depraved 
reason is unable lead one to true faith in Christ.  This is in fact, to reiterate once again, Hamann’s 
main point: faith is different from reason, and therefore the primacy must be placed upon belief 
(Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox 57).  Howard Hong points out that to Kierkegaard, the sphere 
of knowledge and the sphere of faith are qualitatively different (Journals and Papers Vol.2 845).  
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This idea is one of which Hamann would doubtless approve.  In a letter to Jacobi, Hamann says 
that he expects nothing from reason “but the recognition of error, and I do not regard it as a way 
to true life…” (Smith, J.G. Hamann
 The Absolute Paradox of which Kierkegaard speaks appears as a contradiction.  
According to Evans, Kierkegaard is not referring to what we would think of today as a logical 
contradiction (120).  Rather, he suggests that “contradiction” can best be thought of as 
“incongruous” (120).  Certainly, to the unbeliever, both Christ and His teachings must be absurd, 
since they require and demand faith, the character of which offends human reason (Thomas, 
“Christianity as Absurd” 58).   
 248).  Hamann says, “Without the word—no reason, no 
world” (248).  While he is referring in this passage to language, the term ‘word’ could easily take 
on a double meaning.  That is, without the Word, God as the Creator of all communication and 
who Himself is the ultimate Paradox, human reason would not have the possibility of existence.   
 Incognito and Indirectness: The Form of a Servant 
 Christ’s indirectness is also seen in his incognito, or what Kierkegaard terms his 
“unrecognizableness.”  He writes: “What is unrecognizableness?  It means not to appear in one’s 
proper role, as, for example, when a policeman appears in plain clothes.  And so 
unrecognizableness, the absolute unrecognizableness, is this: being God, to be also an individual 
man.  To be an individual man…is the greatest possible, the infinitely qualitative, remove from 
being God, and therefore the profoundest incognito” (Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 127).  
Kierkegaard is not saying that God has not revealed Himself to us, but rather that God veils 
Himself by revealing Himself through the person of Christ in the appearance of a man.  To 
appear in this way is Christ’s “almightily maintained incognito” and His will “His free 
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determination” (131).  This is evident in that Christ took on the form of a servant to become man.  
Philippians 2:7 says, “But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a 
servant, and was made in the likeness of men” (NKJV).  To Kierkegaard, Christ appears in this 
fashion because He must be the object of faith (137).  Hamann himself makes mention of Christ 
as a servant on many occasions.  In his Aesthetics in a Nutshell, Hamann writes that the first sign 
by which Jesus reveals His majesty is “in his form of a servant” (Haynes ed. 87).  And again he 
writes, “How God the Son lowered Himself!  He became a man, the least among men; he took on 
the form of a servant; he became the most wretched among men; he became sin for us” (qtd. in 
Smith, J.G. Hamann
If it was immediately and directly recognizable that Christ was God, no faith in Him 
would be required.  To Kierkegaard, Christ binds Himself to His incognito, he wills to be the 
offense and the sign of contradiction in order to save men.  “It was Christ’s free will and 
determination from all eternity to be incognito” (128).  In another passage from Training, 
Kierkegaard writes, “It is a strange sort of dialectic: that He who almightily…binds himself, and 
does it so almightily that He actually feels Himself bound, suffers under the consequences of the 
fact that He lovingly and freely determined to become an individual man—to such a degree was 
it seriously true that He became a real man; but thus it must be if He were to become the sign of 
contradiction which reveals the thoughts of the hearts” (131).  So Christ binds Himself to His 
almighty incognito to the point where it is not directly observable or knowable that He is God.  
To Kierkegaard, Christ does this so as to be the object of faith, whereby man is then faced with a 
 66).  Hamann also recognizes that Christ did so in order to reveal to 
mankind the mysteries of the godhead “in man’s own language, man’s own affairs, man’s own 
ways” (66).   
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choice of whether to believe or be offended at Christ.  This is one of the points Kierkegaard 
believed established Christendom failed to recognize.  He writes: 
But they confuse the Christian conceptions in every way.  They make Christ a speculative 
unity of God and man; or they throw Christ away all together and take His teaching; or 
for sheer seriousness they make Christ a false god.  Spirit is the negation of direct 
immediacy.  If Christ is very God, He must be unrecognizable, He must assume 
unrecognizableness, which is the negation of all directness.  Direct recognizableness is 
precisely the characteristic of the pagan god (135).   
To Kierkegaard, Christ wills to be the essence of indirectness because He is the object of faith.  
“He requires faith, requires that He become the object of faith” (142).  Because Christ requires 
faith in Him, He wants all to believe in Him, and therefore He cannot be directly recognizable. 
No matter how much we as human beings want Christ to be directly recognizable, He must 
remain unrecognizable in order to be the object of faith.  By being the object of faith, He shows 
that human reason has its limits.  Kierkegaard writes,  
But now in the case of the God-Man!  The true God cannot become directly 
recognizable; but direct recognizableness is what the merely human, what the men to 
whom He came, would pray and implore of Him as the greatest alleviation.  And it was 
out of love He became man!  He is love; and yet every instant He exists He must crucify 
as it were all human compassion and solicitude—for He can only be the object of faith 
(Training in Christianity
Christ’s unrecognizableness is inexplicably connected to His indirect communication 
with us, and these two concepts are an offense to reason, they pose the question as to whether or 
not the learner will receive His communication.  To want God to appear in a recognizable 
fashion is to elevate human reason to its highest peak.  However, faith in God defies human 
reason, and therein stems the fact that Christ is the object of offense.  Kierkegaard writes that 
Christ “was very God, and therefore to such a degree God that He was unrecognizable, so that it 
was not flesh and blood, but the exact opposite of flesh and blood which prompted Peter to 
recognize Him” (128).  Rather than appeal to our reason, Christ demands faith for belief in God.   
 137). 
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 There exists “a yawning gulf between the individual and the God-Man” (139).  In 
Training, Kierkegaard refers to the cause of this gulf as the possibility of offense, while at other 
times he refers to this divide as caused by sin.  God’s perfect divinity is the “infinite qualitative 
distinction” between God and man.  Since man’s reasoning capabilities are flawed by sin, he 
cannot reason to God.  Only faith can reach across the “yawning gulf” and bridge the divide 
between God and man.  God is accessible, but only through faith.  Here, one can hear echoes of 
Hamann, for he specifically denounced human reason and its inabilities.   
 Offense can be defined as “a temptation in the sense of trial which might deter one from 
faith” (Lowrie, Kierkegaard Vol. 2
This is one of the countless contradictions in our nature which we cannot solve.  Reason 
is inclined to serve an unknown God, but is infinitely remote from knowing him.  It does 
not wish to know Him—and what is even more astonishing, when it does know him it 
ceases to serve him.  This is why God discloses himself so late and so slowly, for he 
knows that the knowledge of him is a stumbling-block and an offense to man, that he is 
foolishness and a thorn in the flesh to him as soon as he wishes to reveal himself and 
make himself known to him.  When Jesus said that he was the Son of God, thus 
disclosing the most comforting, important and new truth, the Jews lifted stones, rent their 
garments, and condemned him as a malefactor (Smith, 
 632). To Kierkegaard, every paradox of faith is a stumbling-
block to our understanding, but the greatest offense is the incognito of the God-Man (632).  It is 
likely that Kierkegaard was affected by reading Hamann’s approach to reason’s offense at the 
God-Man.  What Hamann has to say in this area sounds almost Kierkegaardian in nature.  He 
writes in his Biblical Reflections: 
J.G. Hamann
To Kierkegaard, everyone must pass through the offense and there can only be two 
results: either an individual is offended and remains in sin, or one accepts Him.  “The possibility 
of the offence is not to be avoided, thou must pass through it, and thou canst be saved from it in 
one way only—by believing” (Kierkegaard, 
 136-37).   
Training in Christianity 100).    For our purposes, 
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we will examine two distinct types of offense through which we as humans view Christ, his life, 
and his communication with us.   
 The first type of offense we examine here has to do with Christ’s loftiness (Kierkegaard, 
Training in Christianity 87).  Here, “the possibility of offense is the fact of being an individual 
man, a lowly man—and then acting in a way suggestive of God” (99).  Niels Jørgen Cappelørn 
dubs this type of offense the first stage of offense proper.  He writes, “…this first stage appears 
when human beings understand Christ to be a completely ordinary person who lacks means and 
whose low status is well known, and yet claims to be God.  Here, the designation “human” or 
“man” in “God-man” is taken for granted, and offense arises because of the category “God” 
(Cappelørn 113).  The believer is not immune from being offended of God in this sense.  Rather, 
“In reality, offense is possible anytime.  For the believer, it can break out at any moment” 
(Cappelørn 113).  Kierkegaard points to Matthew 11:6, which he parallels with Luke 7:23, as 
examples of offense at Christ’s communication.31 Kierkegaard relates the story of how an 
imprisoned John the Baptist sent messengers to Christ to ask whether or not He was the promised 
Savior.32
So Jesus does not answer directly.  He does not say, Tell John that I am the Expected 
One.  That is, He requires faith, and therefore to an absent person cannot make a direct 
communication.  To a person who was present He might well say it directly, because a 
person on the spot, beholding the speaker, this individual man , and because of the 
contradiction involved in His appearance, would not in fact receive a direct 
communication, inasmuch as the contradiction intervenes between what is said and what 
  Christ only answers: “Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see; 
The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the 
dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them.  And blessed is he, whosoever 
is not offended in me” (NKJV).  Christ does not directly answer John’s question.  Kierkegaard 
writes:  
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is seen, viz. what the speaker is, judging by appearances (Kierkegaard, Training in 
Christianity
Kierkegaard’s point here is that Christ did not answer in a straightforward manner 
because it was not directly obvious to the human eye that Christ was indeed who He said He was 
(97).  The offense, to reiterate, takes place in this instance when an individual perceives that 
Christ equates Himself with God (His loftiness).   Kierkegaard, through the pseudonym Anti-
Climacus, dwells on Christ’s miracles and teachings, which are usually taken as proofs of 
Christianity (Cappelørn 113).  John certainly understood by Christ’s answer that He was God, 
but are Christ’s miracles proof that Christianity is Truth?  Christ’s concluding sentence to John, 
“blessed is he who is not offended in me,” Kierkegaard takes as a “decisive expression: Christ 
invokes these proofs, but in the same breath, he rejects the idea that they can serve as the basis 
for establishing a true relationship with Him” (Cappelørn 113).  However, the whole aim of 
apologetics is to want to communicate and prove Christ’s validity.  Kierkegaard writes, “But 
behold how different is the custom in Christendom!  There they have written these huge folios 
which develop the proofs of the truth of Christianity.  Behind these proofs and folios they feel 
perfectly confident and secure from every attack; for the proofs and the folios regularly with the 
assurance, ergo Christ was what he said He was” (Kierkegaard, 
 96).   
Training in Christianity 98).  
However, to attempt to prove what Christ demands we take upon faith is to do a disservice to 
Him.  For He says, “Blessed is He who is not offended in me.”  Kierkegaard writes, “That is, He 
makes evident that in relation to Him there can be no question of any proofs, that a man does not 
come to Him by the help of proofs, that there is no direct transition to this thing of becoming a 
Christian, that at the most the proofs might serve to make a man attentive, so that once he has 
become attentive he may arrive at the point of deciding whether he will believe or be offended” 
(Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity 98).   
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Proofs cannot lead a man to faith in Christ.  The only way to come to faith in Christ is to 
believe.  Hamann stands with Kierkegaard on this point.  In a letter to Jacobi in the winter of 
1786, Hamann wrote, “For if it is fools who say in their heart, There is no God, those who try to 
prove his existence seems to me to be even more foolish.  If that is what reason and philosophy 
are, then it is scarcely a sin to blaspheme it” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 253).  In his Biblical 
Reflections Hamann writes, “it is the greatest contradiction and abuse of reason when reason 
itself tries to reveal” (119).  To Hamann the fact that Christ is God is the communicatio 
idiomatum, the “interchange of properties” to which we made reference earlier.  The 
“communication of idioms” finds its origin in Luther’s “The Word Made Flesh” (Haynes 99f).  
This can also be seen as a dialectical statement; for something that is the Word, is also something 
that is the Flesh.  How can we as human beings offer proofs on how such a divine act is 
possible?  It supersedes our reason, so that we can only make two choices, as Kierkegaard would 
point out: either believe or reject Christ.  In his work Philological ideas and doubts, Hamann 
writes that “Nothing could be more ridiculous than to conduct a proof that is the contrary of a 
truth that has been not firmly proven” (Haynes, ed. 119).  Hamann writes in Socratic 
Memorabilia, “Our own being and the existence of all things outside us must be believed and 
cannot be established in any other way” (Smith, J.G. Hamann 181).  A few sentences later he 
expounds on this statement.  “What one believes has for that reason no need to be proved, and a 
proposition can be irrefutably proved without for that reason being believed” (182).  To Hamann, 
to want to prove something is to do so strictly by the aid of reason.  If it could be proven that 
Christ was the God-Man then belief in him would not be required.  To want to prove this matter 
is to turn Christ’s indirect communication into direct communication, doing away with the 
necessity of belief.  This does not mean that God can only be speculated of or is somehow a 
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theory.  Rather, quite the opposite is the case.  He is nevertheless the Truth, but He is Truth 
which must be believed.  “Flesh and blood are hypotheses,” writes Hamann.  “The Spirit is truth” 
(qtd. in Smith, J.G. Hamann 54-5).  According to Ronald Gregor Smith, Hamann would seek to 
show that “truth is not to be measured by human opinions, or taste, or probability” (54).  Hamann 
writes, “Lies and novels, hypothesis and fables, must be probable; but not the truths and basic 
teachings of our faith” (qtd. in Smith 54).  It is this statement that Kierkegaard would uphold in 
making his claim on the indirectness of faith.  The Truth comes only through faith, despite the 
desire of human reason to prove that which can only be believed.  Thus Hamann and 
Kierkegaard stand in agreement that rather than being proved, Christianity must be believed, 
with Christ as the object of faith.  Kierkegaard makes clear that proofs such a miracles can only 
aid the receiver to become attentive of the Absolute Paradox (Kierkegaard, Training in 
Christianity
The second form of offense in Training has to do with Christ’s lowliness.  Here, one is 
offended by the fact that God is man, or that “the one who gives Himself out to be God shows 
Himself to be the poor and suffering and at last the impotent man” (Kierkegaard, 
 98).  The cause of this offense, to reiterate again, is in this sense that a man equates 
Himself with God.  To Kierkegaard, one who is offended in this situation may say ‘An individual 
man like us wants to be God’(105), and therein lies the offense.   
Training in 
Christianity 105).    In His lowliness, Christ suffers (106). In His lowliness Christ communicates 
to us that He is actually God.  To question this is to take offense.  Christ’s lowliness is seen in 
the fact that He is poor and must suffer.  One takes offense at these qualities because Christ is 
God.  Our reason might be inclined to say that He should not have to suffer in this way, or that 
He should be rich rather than lowly.  However, once again Kierkegaard writes that Christ must 
be the object of faith.  It is His divine will to be so.   
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Revelation as Communication: God’s Own Speaking 
 Throughout this thesis I have shown how Hamann was enamored by the spoken and 
written word.  He also places primacy upon language, which is given to man by God and used by 
Him to communicate with us.  To Hamann, God’s speech with us is seen throughout nature and 
through the Word, both written and embodied in the form of Christ.  God’s veiled revelation to 
us in the person of Christ is to Hamann the most mysterious of all paradoxes.  Ronald Gregor 
Smith writes that Hamann is adamant that Christ’s condescension is not meant merely “to attract 
our attention or engage our admiration.  But it is the necessary mode of God’s speech with us” 
(J.G. Hamann
Precisely because there is such a thing, one must say that the God-man idea is not merely 
an object of cognition but is also an edifying or up-building thought which disperses all 
dissatisfaction with the world, rectifies every mistake, a thought which steps forth 
consolingly when even the great in the world seem so petty, when the mind is alarmed 
over how the insignificant in the world can still get their rights, too (Kierkegaard, 
 66).  Hamann rejoices in the fact that the God-Man would condescend to our level 
and communicate with us.  Kierkegaard, in a journal entry from 1839, shows how affected he 
was by Hamann’s conception of the God-Man.  He writes: 
Journals and Papers Vol.2
That Christ indirectly communicates with us as one seemingly insignificant is an astounding 
paradox.   
 201).   
Kierkegaard makes further use of his communication model to describe Christ’s 
indirectness through His own speaking.  Parabolic communication, which Christ uses quite often 
in Scripture, is an example of indirect communication.  However, Christ’s indirectness can be 
seen through all that he says.  For example, in Training Kierkegaard uses the example of the 
statement “I and the Father are One” to express Christ’s indirectness.  The fact that Christ 
expresses He is God is indeed a direct statement.  However, when Christ makes this statement, 
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He who is Himself the essence of indirectness, the statement is communicated indirectly.  
Kierkegaard writes: 
When one says directly, ‘I am God; the Father and I are one,’ that is direct 
communication.  But when he who says it is an individual man, quite like other men, then 
this communication is not just perfectly direct; for it is not just perfectly clear and direct 
that an individual man should be God—although what he says is perfectly direct.  By 
reason of the communicator the communication contains a contradiction, it becomes 
indirect communication, it puts to thee a choice, whether thou wilt believe Him or not 
(134).   
 In a journal entry from 1850, Kierkegaard deals with indirect communication.  He also 
acknowledges that he has begun to doubt whether or not he, as a mere human being, had the right 
to use indirect communication.   
It is not true that direct communication is superior to indirect communication.  No, no.  
But the fact is that no man has ever been born who could use the indirect method even 
fairly well, to say nothing of using it all his life.  For we human beings need each other, 
and in that there is already a directness. Only the God-Man is in every respect indirect 
communication from first to last.  He did not need men, but they infinitely needed him; 
he loves men, but according to his conception of what love is; therefore, he does not 
change in the slightest toward their conception, does not speak directly in such a way that 
he also surrenders the possibility of offense—which is his existence in the guise of a 
servant (Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers Vol. 2
 Another journal entry from two years earlier gives us another example of how the God-Man 
embodies indirect communication and how indirectness can be used in Christianity. 
 384). 
Unqualified indirect communication belongs to being more than human, and no man, 
therefore, has the right to use it.  The God-man cannot do otherwise, because he is 
qualitatively different from man.  In paganism it is demonic, but this has no place in 
Christendom.  In paganism, therefore, the abstract indirect method could certainly be 
used, for the possibility of offense was not present.  And also thus in relation to 
Christendom (which is very far from being purely Christian, but is closer to paganism) [it 
may be used] by one who has not unconditionally stepped forth as personally being 
Christian in the decisive sense.  For where the proportions are such as these, offense 
cannot become more than a kind of awakening (383).  
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Christ’s indirectness represents problems for our understanding of communication both 
verbally and conceptually.  Even Christ’s claim in John 8:32, “And ye shall know the truth and 
the truth shall set you free” is certainly uttered directly, but when Christ utters it, it becomes 
indirectness.  What truth?  Whose truth? Christ’s truth.  The Absolute Truth.  But how shall we 
know it?  By our cognitive abilities?  No, we have already seen how human reason cannot reason 
the things of God.  We know this truth indirectly because of faith.   The truth can only be 
understood indirectly, since it is communicated indirectly.   
 Christ at all moments binds himself to his incognito (Training in Christianity
 
 131), so that 
He must communicate indirectly.  To Kierkegaard, He can do no other, since He must be the 
object of faith.  The fact that He is the object of faith is an offense to reason.  However, if Christ 
communicated directly, He would then cease to be the object of faith (140).  So, He equates 
Himself with God, but it cannot be proven that He is God, for He appears on earth as an 
individual man.  To attempt to prove Christ is God is to do so by human reason, a reasoning 
ability which is fallen and sinful.  But Christ would dispel all human reason by offering the 
existing individual faith.  Christ’s indirect communication with us is an attempt to draw us to 
Him in faith.  It is one central point in which Hamann and Kierkegaard stand together.  Primacy 
is placed upon faith as the highest mode of existence.  We receive this faith through indirect 
communication.  
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Chapter Five: Results 
 Results are of crucial importance to the historical-critical study.  This project has yielded 
several findings which can prove beneficial to the field of communication.  Specifically, I have 
attempted to deal with communication from a Christian perspective, and this study has produced 
findings in that area as well.  The following results come after presenting this research in light of 
Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication, and understanding this content from an 
historical-critical point of view.   
First of all, the results of this study show that language has primacy over reason.  This 
has sweeping ramifications for our conception of communication.  Hamann’s thesis, that 
language has primacy over reason, means that we communicate through language and not solely 
through our ability to reason.  That is, reason cannot communicate without language (whether it 
be spoken, written, or communicated through symbols) as its guide.  In presenting Hamann’s 
language theory as one based on communication, this research clears the way for the possibility 
of further study in this area.   
Secondly, Kierkegaard’s view of the press allows for an historical and critical look at the 
media, which can easily be applied to the way the media operates in our own time.  I have shown 
how Kierkegaard’s criticism of the media is worthy of study, although it typically receives scant 
attention at best.  Kierkegaard’s belief, that the media had the power to destroy individuality 
while creating a mass public, amounts to a serious look at mass media.  This researcher has also 
found that Kierkegaard’s battle with the press greatly affected his theory of indirect 
communication.   
144 
 
Thirdly, this study has resulted in the application of the Scriptural idea of God as the 
Divine Logos to communication.  To Hamann, God as the Logos is the greatest form of 
communication.  This led to this researcher’s examination of  the various ways in which God 
communicates to mankind.  “The Condescension of Communication,” a term which has been 
coined by this researcher, has resulted from the depths of this research as well.  Kierkegaard’s 
conception of the God-Man as indirect communication has implications far beyond that which 
this researcher could previously imagine.  This researcher was surprised to find the importance 
of this concept to Kierkegaard’s model.  As a result, Kierkegaard’s presentation of Christ as the 
essence of indirectness perfected has implications for how communication is typically viewed as 
well.  
This research has shown several ways in which Kierkegaard appears to be influenced by 
Hamann in the area of indirect communication.  My findings show that Kierkegaard and Hamann 
share a certain understanding of the importance of parabolic communication as a form of 
indirectness.  They both see that parables are a significant mode of indirect communication in 
that parables relate to us a moral or truth in an indirect manner.  Parables are analogical in nature, 
and cause us to see things differently than simply by “discursive thinking” (O’Flaherty, J.G. 
Hamann 87).  Another way Kierkegaard was influenced by Hamann is in the area of humor.  
Kierkegaard placed humor in a high position between the ethical and the religious spheres, and 
this is likely due to the impact Hamann made upon him as a humorist.  Ultimately, humor is a 
communicative tool that plays an important role in Kierkegaard’s model of indirect 
communication.   
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A connection also exists between Hamann and Kierkegaard (as mentioned in the first part 
of Chapter Four), in the area of language.  Language is a powerful tool given by God, and plays 
an important role in the communicative processes of writing and speaking.   
This study has also found a link between Hamann and Kierkegaard which goes beyond 
simply the fact that they shared an understanding of certain concepts.  This link is understood 
only after researching Kierkegaard and Hamann in their historical contexts and understanding 
how they combated certain thinkers.  This thesis set out to examine the influence of Hamann on 
Kierkegaard’s theory of indirect communication.  One link is found in Socrates, whom both 
thinkers admired.  The importance of Socratic ignorance to both Hamann and Kierkegaard 
cannot be downplayed.  My research points to the fact that Kierkegaard was affected by 
Socrates’ method of indirectness, seen most clearly in the concept of the maieutic relationship 
between communicator and recipient.  Hamann also pays homage to Socrates.  Here the link 
between Socrates ad Kierkegaard appears to extend to Hamann as well, for Kierkegaard takes to 
heart Hamann’s view of Socratic ignorance.  This finding is backed by Kierkegaard’s mention of 
Hamann’s understanding of Socrates in his journals.   
Lastly, the greatest link to indirect communication between Hamann and Kierkegaard has 
been found in concept of faith, inasmuch as faith leads to a personal relationship with Christ, 
whereas human reason, because it is fallen in nature, is unable to do so.  This research has shown 
that faith is a form of indirectness to both thinkers.  Hamann is concerned with existence in much 
the same way as Kierkegaard.  Kierkegaard himself shows in CUP faith is existence-
communication.  We can understand this concept by saying that communication becomes a mode 
of living, and faith a form of existence.  Doubtless Hamann, who himself possessed an 
extraordinary view of communication and recognized the primacy of faith, would stand in 
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agreement with Kierkegaard on this point.  Faith is a product of accepting Christ as the paradox 
which surpasses human reason.  Furthermore, Christ demands belief through his indirect relation 
to us.  Therein lies the necessity of indirect communication.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusions 
Implications 
Both Kierkegaard and Hamann practiced indirect communication with excellence.  On 
one hand, they share a common bond of pseudonymity.  While Kierkegaard writes occasionally 
under his own name, Hamann writes exclusively under pseudonyms.  However, Kierkegaard (to 
this researcher’s knowledge) goes to much greater lengths both to explain his pseudonymity and 
to allow his pseudonyms to be living, breathing characters with opinions of their own.  
Hamann’s pseudonymity is a relational tool, but this researcher has found no evidence that 
Hamann actually attempted to create characters for the same reasons as did Kierkegaard.  
Kierkegaard himself perfects this mode of indirectness to such a degree that he could stand at a 
distance, allowing the pseudonyms their poetic license.  To get hold of the individual, to make 
him/her aware of Christianity appears to be Kierkegaard’s ultimate goal.  In this researcher’s 
opinion, misinterpreting Kierkegaard as an irrationalist, as one who advocated complete 
subjectivity, or as the originator of existentialist doctrine, ignores a major fact.  Kierkegaard 
sought to make people aware of their existence by using themes with which they were familiar: 
poetry, literature, ethics, and concepts like irony and humor.  By presenting both the aesthetic 
and the ethical positions, he shows not only how most people exist in these categories, but also 
how these categories (while not all together bad) nevertheless differ from the religious and 
overtly Christian mode of living.  This can be compared with Hamann’s purpose throughout his 
writing career, which is to dispel the notion that human reason is an all-encompassing faculty 
with the ability to transcend or even regulate faith.  For Hamann, rather, faith is the highest form 
of existence, a claim Kierkegaard would later assert himself.  However, as J. Heywood Thomas 
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has pointed out, Kierkegaard cannot be seen as a mere parody upon Hamann (Thomas, 
Philosophy of Religion in Kierkegaard’s Writings 59).  Heywood’s point is an important one:  
Kierkegaard was influenced considerably by Hamann, but also sought out his own unique path.  
Kierkegaard’s admiration of Hamann is not to be viewed as merely a “slavish imitation” 
(Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox
Nevertheless, this research has yielded several ways in which Kierkegaard appears to be 
affected by the thought of Hamann.  Another area Kierkegaard and Hamann share in common 
when it comes to indirect communication is the influence of Socrates.  We have seen in this 
thesis how Socrates, through aid of the maieutic method, practiced indirect communication in a 
nearly flawless manner.  Both Hamann and Kierkegaard respected Socrates and speak of him 
with reverence.  However, they both differed from Socrates in that Socrates would hold that the 
learner possessed the truth in some form and all that the teacher had to do through 
communication was bring that truth to life.  Hamann and Kierkegaard on the other hand, focus 
on man’s depravity and inability to attain truth without the power of God.  Nevertheless, Both 
Kierkegaard and Hamann owe tremendous debts to Socrates.   
 57).   
Perhaps the greatest connection between Kierkegaard and Hamann has to do with faith.  
Hamann would say that faith is not an operation of reason, as we have seen.  Kierkegaard would 
stand in agreement with this statement, adding one fact.  Man is separated from God by sin.  
Hence, there is a divide between man and God that man cannot reach by any capability of 
reason.  Only faith can bridge the gap between God and man.   
Kierkegaard’s conception of both faith and communication are expanded when one takes 
into account the concept of existence.  In CUP, Kierkegaard refers to the fact that faith is 
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existence-communication (358).  In other passages, this researcher has seen that Kierkegaard 
actually refers occasionally to communication as a form of existence.  This is a striking 
conclusion, since he also places such emphasis on existence.  The highest form of existence for 
the individual is living a life of faith as a follower of Christ.  So, it appears that when 
Kierkegaard refers to faith as existence-communication, he is saying that faith is the highest form 
of existence which can be communicated.  However, it is also imperative that the one 
communicating Truth be viewed as a subject and understand his subjective relation to the Truth.  
This means that the one communicating the Truth has personally appropriated it to his/her life.  
This is not complete subjectivity as many would claim.  Rather than taking the Truth for the 
purpose of drawing one’s fanatical conclusions of it, subjectivity to Kierkegaard means that the 
individual personally appropriates himself to the Truth in relation to God.  The individual stands 
only before God in his/her relationship with Him.  All men who wish to become Christians must 
ponder their existence, for sin has affected man’s very existence.  Kierkegaard’s authorship 
shows how the highest form of existence, faith in Christ, is possible.   
This researcher has attempted to show that Hamann had a tremendous influence upon 
Kierkegaard and specifically point out how Kierkegaard’s communication model is valid to the 
field of communication.  Having dealt with the affair of The Corsair, I have dealt with 
Kierkegaard’s relation to the media and also proposed that his own model differs vastly from 
many others in the fact that it is overtly Christian.  It deals with how we communicate knowledge 
and how we communicate Truths which transcend reason.  Lastly, as faith is existence-
communication, Kierkegaard’s model of indirect communication is not a model by which we 
simply assess communication, but is a model by which we should seek to live.  In this thesis we 
have understood that God is the highest form of communication and that the highest form of 
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existence is that of personally being a Christian.  As Christians, our communication is to differ 
dramatically from the rest of the world.  Scripture gives the model for communication in the 
person of Christ, who in indirectly relates himself to us, who loves us, and who lives His life to 
die for us.   
Suggestions for Further Research 
Further research certainly remains to be done in this area.  However, Hamann’s writings 
are still very obscure, and it remains difficult to find very solid interpretations of his work.  This 
could pose a hindrance to further research concerning Hamann.  One must then deal with the fact 
that Hamann is difficult to interpret.  However, Hamann has much to say about communication, 
and I have attempted to, in effect, clear the path for further exploration of his thought from the 
standpoint of communication.  In an age in which our communications get faster and faster, one 
could examine Hamann’s statements concerning reason and correlate them accordingly.  For if 
Hamann was so against the enlightened thinkers of his day, what would he think of science, 
scholarship, and mass communications in our own?  We could ask nearly the same question of 
Kierkegaard as well.  He who battled with the media so much in his day, who attacked it, viewed 
it with scorn, and was a severe critic of the media—how would he view the media and their 
claim of objectivity today?  How would he view the movements we have made in all forms of 
communication away from Christian principles? Kierkegaard research continues to grow 
considerably.  However, his communications model has not been successfully integrated into the 
communication field and his theories have been widely ignored, as I have shown.  However, 
faith as existence-communication is one of the most arresting thoughts which could be explained 
and appropriated to Christian communication.  This researcher has attempted to guard against 
interpreting Kierkegaard and Hamann from a postmodernist point of view, for it appears that 
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would neither thinker justice and would only succeed in taking enormous liberties with their 
thoughts.  Therefore, any discussion of Hamann and/or Kierkegaard in the future, should take 
this to heart, should seek to interpret each man from a theological or religious point of view.  It is 
God which dominates both men’s thoughts.  Therefore, any research in the field of 
communication must take Christianity into consideration and seek to incorporate each writer’s 
major themes into the research.    
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Notes 
1. In his work Golgotha and Sheblimini (1784), Hamann appears under the pseudonymous 
writer who describes himself on the title page as a “Preacher in the Wilderness” (Haynes ed. 
164).   
2. Terrence J. German explains in the Preface of his Hamann on Language and Religion
3. Hamann’s conversion experience is laid out in full by Ronald Gregor Smith in 
 that 
Hamann was frequently called the “Magus” or “Wizard of the North” “because his works 
appear to be enigmatic and perhaps unclear” (vii).   
J.G. Hamann 
which serves as a mini-biography on Hamann.  It also serves a great purpose by presenting 
excerpts of many of Hamann’s best-known works.  See also James O’Flaherty’s Johann 
Georg Hamann
4. For a detailed account of Kierkegaard’s critique of Kant, see Jerry H. Gill’s “Kantianism” in 
 for further research into Hamann’s conversion.   
Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana Vol. 6: Kierkegaard and Great Traditions. Copenhagen: C.A. 
Reitzels Forlag, 1982, and Ronald M. Green’s “Kant: A Debt both Obscure and Enormous,” 
Stewart, Jon, ed. Kierkegaard and His German Contemporaries: Tome I: Philosophy
5. 1 Corinthians 1:21: “For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not 
God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe,” (KJV).   
.  
Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007.   
6. John 14:6: “Jesus saith unto him, ‘I am the way, the truth, and the life; no man cometh unto 
the Father but by me,” (KJV). 
7. Revelation 21:5: “And he that sat upon the throne said, Behold, I make all things new.  And 
he said unto me, Write; for these words are true and faithful,” (KJV).   
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8. 1 Corinthians 1:23: “But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and 
unto the Greeks foolishness.” 
1 Peter 2:7-8: “Unto you, therefore, who believe he is precious, but unto them who are 
disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner, 
And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offence, even to them who stumble at the word, 
being disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed.” 
9. Hamann died on June 21, 1788.  The inscription on his tombstone is 1 Corinthians 1:23, 25.  
Verse 25 reads: “Because the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God 
is stronger than men.”  The story is recounted in James O’Flaherty’s Johann Georg Hamann
10.  Ecclesiastes 12:13: “Let us hear the conclusion on the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his   
commandments: for this is the whole duty of man.”  Hamann makes reference to the verse at 
the conclusion of Aesthetica in Nuce, directly before making mention of Revelation 14:7.  He 
writes: “Let us now hear the conclusion of his newest aesthetic, which is the oldest:  ‘Fear 
God, and give the glory to him, for the hour of his judgment is come: and worship him that 
made the heaven, and earth, and the sea, and the fountain of waters!’” 
 
(1979) pp. 29.   
11. Diem refutes and quotes So H. Höffding, S. Kierkegaard als Philosoph, 1922, pp. 74ff.  
Höffding says that Kierkegaard “sought truth in the subjective (psychological) sphere,” and 
that he “made it an object of personal feeling.” 
12.  
13. Here, the Hongs, in their introduction, quote Paul Rubow’s 
Peder Ludvig Møller (1814-1865) the Danish writer and critic, was the “effectual editor” of 
the Corsair.  Møller was secretly involved with the paper, writing for it anonymously.   
Goldschmidt og Nemesis, pg. 
118.   
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14. The Corsair had praised one of the pseudonyms, Victor Eremita of Either/Or, claiming him 
to be immortal to literature.  Kierkegaard replied directly to the paper under the guise of the 
pseudonym: “…cut short these sufferings—slay me, but render me not immortal.”  Walter 
Lowrie deals with this account at length in his two-volume biography on Kierkegaard. 
15. Møller writes concerning the section ‘Guilty!’/’Not Guilty?’: “He does not care about the 
reader, for he writes for his own comfort; he is not concerned about being known as a classic 
author, for he writes without form.  He moves about in the language as an English clown, 
walking on his hands and turning somersaults in it, but he has no style, for he uses 
superfluous words and says everything that comes to his head,” (Hong, ed.,  100).   
16. See, for instance: Smith, Ronald Gregor.  “Hamann and Kierkegaard.”  Kierkegaardiana
17. Georg Frederick Hegel (1770-1831), the German idealist philosopher of whom Kierkegaard 
was severely critical.  In Kierkegaard’s 
. 
Vol. 5.4 (1962-1964), 53-67.  Smith believes that Kierkegaard moved away from the 
teachings of Hamann, and incorrectly posits that Kierkegaard ended his life an anti-
rationalist. He writes: “What I wish to maintain is that concurrently with the weakening of 
Hamann’s influence upon Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard reached a more and more unsatisfactory 
understanding of Christian existence” (54).  Smith is basically alluding to the possibility that 
not only did Kierkegaard cast off any Hamannian influences later in life, but also that by 
doing so, Kierkegaard became disenchanted with Christianity.  This viewpoint fails to take 
into consideration Kierkegaard’s purpose of acting as a reformer, albeit one without 
authority.  It also misses the point that Kierkegaard always saw Christianity as the highest 
attainable mode of existence attainable.   
Journals and Papers, Vol.2, Howard Hong writes, 
“Kierkegaard’s writings contain from the beginning a polemic against the Danish Hegelians, 
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but they also constitute a reckoning with Hegel’s basic philosophic ideas.  In contesting 
Hegel, Kierkegaard treats him as the chief representative of the trend in the modern world 
which is undermining the beliefs of Christianity” (577).  Scholarship within the last few 
years has emerged, however, to show what an extreme debt Kierkegaard owed Hamann. See 
John Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered.   
18. I Corinthians 13:12: “For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then, face to face; now I 
know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known” (NKJV).  
19. Hamann appears in Socratic Memorabilia as the pseudonymous “Lover of Boredom.”  The 
entire phrase as it appears on the title page is: “Collected for the Boredom of the Public by a 
Lover of Boredom.”  This appears to be both an attempt at humor and irony.  According to 
Terrence German, Hamann foresaw the possibility of his writings being grouped together 
with other ‘enlightened’ works (31).  Having previously been a child of enlightenment 
himself, he “had spent much time in the boring pursuit of the enlightened search for 
knowledge through the reading of vast amounts of material which in itself was trite” (32).  
The irony in the statement appears in the sense that Hamann was actually a “lover of 
creation” (32) and “most assuredly could not be a lover of the type of activity which 
produces the boredom which consistently oppresses the ‘Pubic’” (32). 
20. I Corinthians 2: 6-8: “Yet we do not speak wisdom among those who are mature; a wisdom, 
however, not of this age nor of the rulers of this age, who are passing away; but we speak 
God’s wisdom in a mystery, the hidden wisdom which God predestined before the ages to 
our glory, the wisdom which none of the rulers of this age has understood; for if they had 
understood it they would not have crucified the Lord of glory” (NASV).   
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21. Genesis 22:1-2.  “And it came to pass after these things, that God did test Abraham, and said 
unto him, Abraham: and he said, Behold here I am.  And he said, Take now thy son, thine 
only son Isaac, whom thou lovest, and get thee into the land of Moriah; and offer him there 
for a burnt offering upon one of the mountains which I will tell thee of.” 
Hebrews 11:17-19.  “By faith Abraham, when he was tested, offered up Isaac; and he that 
had received the promises offered up his only begotten son, Of whom it was sad, In Isaac 
shall thy seed be called; Accounting that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead, 
from which also he received him in a figure.” 
22. Genesis 22: 11-13.  “And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of heaven, and said, 
Abraham, Abraham: and he said, Here am I.  And he said, Lay not thine hand upon the lad, 
neither do anything unto him; for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not 
withheld thy son, thine only son from me.  And Abraham lifted up him eyes, and looked, and, 
behold, behind him a ram caught in a thicket by his horns: and Abraham went and took the 
ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering in the stead of his son.” 
23. Romans 10:17. 
24. Johan Ludvig Heiberg (1791-1860). 
25. H.L. Martensen (1808-1884), the “modified Hegelian” whose Moral Philosophy 
encompassed Hegelian views, including that “the state is the true developmental medium of 
the self” (Kirmmse 173).   
26. N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783-1872).  According to Kirmmse, Grundtvig was “surely the most 
gigantic and protean figure of the Danish Golden Age.  Poet and pastor; politician and 
prophet; theologian and philologist; historian and popular educator – this titan broke all 
normal boundaries in his relentless and almost unlimited productivity” (Kirmmse 198).   
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27. In a journal entry from 1849 Kierkegaard wrote concerning how Anti-Climacus stands as a 
judge against established Christendom:  
If I have represented a person so low that he even denied being a Christian, then the 
opposite also ought to be represented.  And Christendom does indeed greatly need to 
hear the voice of such a judge—but I will not pass myself off as the judge, and 
therefore he also judges me, which is easy enough and quite appropriate, for anyone 
who cannot represent ideality so high that he is judged by it himself must have a poor 
understanding of it (Journals and Papers Vol. 6
28. I Corinthians 1:23. “But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and 
unto the Gentiles foolishness” (NKJV). 
 178).   
29. Mark 6:3.  “Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joseph, and 
of Judas, and Simon?  And are not his sisters here with us?  And they were offended at him.” 
I Peter 2: 7-8.  “Unto you, therefore, who believe he is precious, but unto them who are 
disobedient, the stone which the builders disallowed, the same is made the head of the corner, 
And a stone of stumbling, and a rock of offense, even to them who stumble at the word, 
being disobedient; whereunto also they were appointed” (NKJV).   
30. A reference to Luke 2:34.  “And Simeon blessed them, and said unto Mary, his mother, 
Behold, this child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel; and for a sign which 
shall be spoken against” (NKJV).   
31. Matthew 11:6 and Luke 7:23. “And blessed is he, whosever shall not be offended in me” 
(NKJV).   
32. See Matthew 11:1-5.   
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